On 21 October 2026, after chairing the National Digital Economy and 4IR Council (MED4IRN), Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim said Malaysia's digital economy must rest on fair competition. He named platform practices that burden small businesses: high commission charges, restrictive contractual terms and control over consumer data. He also listed a review of the Malaysia Competition Commission's (MyCC) digital economy findings as a focus. The Star's report names no company. The app-store connection comes from the MyCC review, which covers mobile operating systems, app stores and integrated payment systems.
The strongest case for intervention
Regulators have real evidence to point to. MyCC's draft final report on mobile operating and payment systems, published in August 2025, put Google's Android at 68.4% of Malaysian mobile OS share and Apple's iOS at 30.5%, a combined 98.9%. It described both firms as vertically integrated across hardware, OS, app store and ecosystem. It said developers are "often required to use proprietary in-app payment systems" and that platform operators can self-preference their own services. It also described the sector's regulatory framework as "largely non-existent" (MyCC draft final report, Book 1).
A Malaysian developer cannot realistically ship to smartphone users without going through one of two gatekeepers. A small business that must pay a gatekeeper's fee has little room to negotiate. That is the steelman, and it is a fair reading of the structure the commission documented.
What the review actually proposes
The public record is more modest than the political language. MyCC says it identified 34 issues and proposes 18 recommendations, and calls the exercise its eighth market review. I could verify the draft's recommendations for the mobile sub-sector, not the final text. In the draft there were three targeted ones:
- A sub-sector guideline setting clear conduct expectations for key platforms.
- A wider payments perimeter. The e-money issuer definition could expand to cover tokenisation platforms and mobile wallets such as Apple Pay and Google Pay, which the draft notes operate without direct Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) regulation.
- A local app developer consultative body.
The draft also proposed six general measures. The main ones were a central digital economy taskforce, a digital platform ombudsman, and consolidating competition oversight under a single authority.
The BNM link needs care. In the draft I could read, the BNM role concerns wallet and tokenisation services. I did not find a proposal for a central bank to set app-store commission rates. If a commission rule is now under discussion, it goes beyond what the draft text shows, and it should be argued as a new proposal.
Why the distinction matters
Brought in through existing payments law, a payment-oversight perimeter is a proportionate tool. It targets a service that moves money, and it fits an existing regulator's expertise. Consumer protection, settlement safety and anti-money-laundering controls are legitimate concerns for any wallet.
A price rule on commissions is a different kind of intervention. App-store fees pay for review, security screening, payment handling, distribution and discovery. Those services have value to the many small developers who could not build them alone. A fee cap set without a cost basis could push platforms to cut services or tighten access. It could also invite a new round of disputes over what counts as a covered fee. The review itself shows why caution is warranted. In the draft, the sub-sector's "take rates" and supply-chain earnings are analysed as a distinct topic. The first need is transparent measurement, so that fee rates and developer outcomes are public data and not claims.
A proportionate programme would start with the draft's lighter tools:
- Publish the fee structure. Platforms would disclose commission tiers, what each tier funds, and the criteria for app rejection and ranking.
- Create a fast dispute route. The ombudsman and developer body could give a small developer a path that avoids full competition litigation.
- Test alternatives before mandating them. Allowing third-party payment options is a more targeted remedy than setting a price. Whether a lower fee follows is an empirical question the commission can monitor.
- Hold remedies to evidence. Price intervention should wait until the data show a fee is above what the services cost to provide.
The institutional question
One general recommendation deserves support on pro-innovation grounds. The draft proposed consolidating competition oversight under a single authority and clarifying boundaries between MyCC and other sectoral regulators. Platform firms and developers both benefit when it is clear who decides a dispute. Overlapping mandates raise compliance cost and delay, and smaller firms absorb that cost hardest. A unified framework also lowers the risk that BNM, the communications regulator and MyCC each issue partly inconsistent rules for the same service.
Bottom line
Anwar is right that a market where two firms supply 98.9% of mobile operating systems deserves scrutiny, and MyCC's analysis gives that scrutiny a factual base. But the evidence in the public draft supports transparency, dispute resolution and a payments perimeter. It does not yet support a price rule. The government should publish what the final report says about fee levels, say which measures it intends to adopt, and measure results before it moves from guidelines to caps. The rhetoric about commissions will be judged against that record.