Malaysia app store monopoly

Malaysia's App Store Review Points to Light-Touch Rules, and Anwar's Commission Rhetoric Should Not Outrun the Evidence

MyCC's review found Apple and Google hold 98.9% of Malaysian mobile OS share. Its draft remedies were guidelines and payment oversight, not commission caps.

Malaysia's Mobile Platform Market People of Internet Research · Malaysia 98.9% Apple + Google OS share Android 68.4% plus iOS 30.5% in My… 98.4% Adult smartphone ownership Ownership level cited for 2023 in … 34 Issues MyCC identified Competition, market and regulatory… 18 MyCC recommendations proposed Proposed as a reference for streng… peopleofinternet.com
Malaysia's Mobile Platform Market People of Internet Research · Malaysia 98.9% Apple + Google OS share 98.4% Adult smartphone ownership 34 Issues MyCC identified 18 MyCC recommendations … peopleofinternet.com

Key Takeaways

On 21 October 2026, after chairing the National Digital Economy and 4IR Council (MED4IRN), Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim said Malaysia's digital economy must rest on fair competition. He named platform practices that burden small businesses: high commission charges, restrictive contractual terms and control over consumer data. He also listed a review of the Malaysia Competition Commission's (MyCC) digital economy findings as a focus. The Star's report names no company. The app-store connection comes from the MyCC review, which covers mobile operating systems, app stores and integrated payment systems.

The strongest case for intervention

Regulators have real evidence to point to. MyCC's draft final report on mobile operating and payment systems, published in August 2025, put Google's Android at 68.4% of Malaysian mobile OS share and Apple's iOS at 30.5%, a combined 98.9%. It described both firms as vertically integrated across hardware, OS, app store and ecosystem. It said developers are "often required to use proprietary in-app payment systems" and that platform operators can self-preference their own services. It also described the sector's regulatory framework as "largely non-existent" (MyCC draft final report, Book 1).

A Malaysian developer cannot realistically ship to smartphone users without going through one of two gatekeepers. A small business that must pay a gatekeeper's fee has little room to negotiate. That is the steelman, and it is a fair reading of the structure the commission documented.

What the review actually proposes

The public record is more modest than the political language. MyCC says it identified 34 issues and proposes 18 recommendations, and calls the exercise its eighth market review. I could verify the draft's recommendations for the mobile sub-sector, not the final text. In the draft there were three targeted ones:

The draft also proposed six general measures. The main ones were a central digital economy taskforce, a digital platform ombudsman, and consolidating competition oversight under a single authority.

The BNM link needs care. In the draft I could read, the BNM role concerns wallet and tokenisation services. I did not find a proposal for a central bank to set app-store commission rates. If a commission rule is now under discussion, it goes beyond what the draft text shows, and it should be argued as a new proposal.

Why the distinction matters

Brought in through existing payments law, a payment-oversight perimeter is a proportionate tool. It targets a service that moves money, and it fits an existing regulator's expertise. Consumer protection, settlement safety and anti-money-laundering controls are legitimate concerns for any wallet.

A price rule on commissions is a different kind of intervention. App-store fees pay for review, security screening, payment handling, distribution and discovery. Those services have value to the many small developers who could not build them alone. A fee cap set without a cost basis could push platforms to cut services or tighten access. It could also invite a new round of disputes over what counts as a covered fee. The review itself shows why caution is warranted. In the draft, the sub-sector's "take rates" and supply-chain earnings are analysed as a distinct topic. The first need is transparent measurement, so that fee rates and developer outcomes are public data and not claims.

A proportionate programme would start with the draft's lighter tools:

The institutional question

One general recommendation deserves support on pro-innovation grounds. The draft proposed consolidating competition oversight under a single authority and clarifying boundaries between MyCC and other sectoral regulators. Platform firms and developers both benefit when it is clear who decides a dispute. Overlapping mandates raise compliance cost and delay, and smaller firms absorb that cost hardest. A unified framework also lowers the risk that BNM, the communications regulator and MyCC each issue partly inconsistent rules for the same service.

Bottom line

Anwar is right that a market where two firms supply 98.9% of mobile operating systems deserves scrutiny, and MyCC's analysis gives that scrutiny a factual base. But the evidence in the public draft supports transparency, dispute resolution and a payments perimeter. It does not yet support a price rule. The government should publish what the final report says about fee levels, say which measures it intends to adopt, and measure results before it moves from guidelines to caps. The rhetoric about commissions will be judged against that record.

Sources & Citations

  1. MyCC: Mobile Operating & Payment System market review
  2. MyCC draft final report, Book 1 (Aug 2025)
  3. The Star: Digital economy must ensure fair competition, protect MSMEs
  4. The Vibes: Anwar vows fairer digital economy for local businesses