Apple's revised EU App Store terms took effect on 1 October 2026. They are the clearest test yet of whether the Digital Markets Act (DMA) can discipline the price of platform access, not just its technical design. The early evidence suggests the Act can change the headline numbers. Whether it can change the underlying economics is still open.
What changed
Apple announced the terms on 18 August 2026. According to iGeeksBlog's summary, they replace the Core Technology Fee, Initial Acquisition Fee and Store Services Fee with a single commission structure. App Store sales using Apple's In-App Purchase carry 26%, with 15% for Small Business Program developers and for subscriptions after year one. Apps using an alternative payment processor pay 20%. Link-outs to the web pay 15%. Apps distributed through alternative marketplaces or the web owe a 5% Core Technology Commission.
John Gruber, writing in Daring Fireball, calls the deal "a near-total victory for Apple". He estimates Apple conceded about four points off a 30% commission. Both sources report that Epic Games rejected the terms and argues that any commission on steered transactions breaks the law.
The case for the critics
The strongest argument against Apple is textual. Article 5(4) of the DMA requires gatekeepers to let business users "communicate and promote offers" and conclude contracts with end users "free of charge". A fee on link-outs sits awkwardly with that wording. Article 6(12) separately requires "fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory general conditions of access" to app stores. Law-firm analysis from Ashurst raises the same questions about the 2025 steering decision. Do fees on out-of-app purchases stay within the limit for initial matchmaking? Do display rules favouring Apple's in-app purchase system conflict with the ban on restricting promotion of alternatives? Are the warning screens shown to users who link out neutral?
There is also a structural case. A 20% rate for alternative payment processors still leaves a developer paying Apple for a payment service it no longer uses. If that holds, the cheaper payment option exists on paper but offers little advantage. Civil-society groups, including ARTICLE 19 and the Coalition for App Fairness, have urged the Commission to reject the terms as non-compliant. We could not independently confirm their filings, so we report that position as relayed in the news hook. The pressure on the Commission is real, and a gatekeeper's compliance should not be judged by the gatekeeper's own accounting.
The case for the Commission's patience
The Commission welcomed the changes in August and said it would monitor implementation rather than open a periodic-penalty procedure, according to iGeeksBlog. That posture is more defensible than its critics allow. Three reasons stand out.
First, Apple's concessions came out of an extended dialogue after the April 2025 non-compliance decision, which carried a €500 million fine that Apple is contesting. Compliance reached through negotiation tends to be faster and less brittle than compliance reached through litigation. A penalty-payment proceeding would invite an appeal that could leave the old fee schedule in place for years.
Second, the 8 July 2026 General Court ruling reportedly upheld Apple's gatekeeper designation. The reports we reviewed say the court treated the App Store variants across iPhone, iPad, Mac, Watch and TV as one core platform service. We could not retrieve the judgment text, so we rely on secondary reporting. The designation is settled, which gives the Commission a stronger legal base. It also removes the argument that the Commission is overreaching, so there is less reason to rush.
Third, the DMA is not a price-control statute. Its fairness test in Article 6(12) asks whether conditions are fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory. It does not ask whether a fee equals some cost-based number. If regulators begin setting commissions, they take on a job they are poorly equipped to do. They would have to estimate the value of platform security, discovery and payments tooling across millions of apps. That is rate regulation, and it is slow, contestable and prone to political capture.
A better test than the headline rate
The pro-innovation position is neither to wave the terms through nor to demand a zero fee. The test should be whether the terms change developer and consumer behaviour. The Commission is the sole DMA enforcer, as its DMA portal notes, so it can publish the evidence that would settle the question. It should do so on a fixed schedule.
- Adoption: the share of EU developers using alternative payment processors, link-outs or alternative marketplaces, six and twelve months after 1 October.
- Effective cost: the blended fee paid after all commissions, so a 20% rate that applies to nobody is not counted as a concession.
- Friction: conversion rates on link-out flows with Apple's warning screens versus without.
- Consumer prices: whether developers pass savings through to EU users.
If those numbers show little uptake, the Commission has the evidence to reopen the question under Article 6(12). It can do that without having to invent a "correct" commission. If uptake is real, the critics' case weakens, and the market is doing what the DMA intended.
The risk on both sides
Over-enforcement carries a cost that is easy to overlook. A regime that treats every Apple concession as a disguised violation pushes platforms toward minimal, litigated compliance. It also teaches other firms that cooperation earns nothing. Under-enforcement carries the opposite cost. If a 26% in-app rate and a 20% rate for payment alternatives become the settled norm, the DMA will have shifted one number by about four points while leaving the gatekeeper's leverage intact.
The Commission's monitoring-first approach is a reasonable bet, but it is only credible with a deadline and published metrics. Without them, "monitoring" looks like a pause. With them, it becomes a measurable test of whether this regulation can open a market without turning regulators into price-setters.