The claim and what it measures
On 8 October 2026, Apple's China newsroom published a study saying the China App Store ecosystem facilitated about RMB 4 trillion in billings and sales in 2025. That is roughly double the nearly RMB 2 trillion of 2020. Apple's page says over 95% of that value required no commission. About RMB 3.7 trillion, or 91% of the total, was physical goods and services such as ride-hailing, food delivery and retail, which never touch Apple's payment system. Digital goods and services generated RMB 149 billion and in-app advertising RMB 212 billion. The page names Ju Heng of Shanghai University of Finance and Economics as an author.
The headline number is real as arithmetic and misleading as a verdict. It describes the composition of transaction value, not how many developers pay nothing or how much those who do pay. A delivery app that moves billions of yuan in food orders adds enormous "ecosystem" value and pays Apple nothing, because Apple has never charged commission on physical goods. A game studio selling virtual items sits in the roughly 4% slice where the commission applies. Both sets of developers appear in the same RMB 4 trillion.
The strongest case for Apple's position
Apple's argument deserves a fair hearing. A platform that earns nothing on 95% of the activity it enables is not obviously extracting monopoly rents from the whole. Apple also built and secured the distribution channel, the payment rails and the review system, and it has cut rates under regulatory pressure. According to TechNode, on 15 March 2026 the standard China commission fell from 30% to 25%, and the small-developer rate fell from 15% to 12%. Apple said this followed discussions with Chinese regulators. Apple also reports that Chinese developers' overseas revenue share rose from 32% in 2020 to 52% in 2025. That suggests the platform helps Chinese firms reach customers abroad.
Why the denominator does not settle it
The antitrust question is narrower than the ecosystem's size. It asks whether Apple faces competitive discipline on the activity it does charge for. In China it does not, because third-party app stores and alternative payment systems remain barred. On 23 June 2026, MacRumors reported that 48 China-based iOS developers sent an open letter asking the State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR) to investigate. They allege Apple abused its dominance to impose "unfair and excessively high" costs and failed to deliver on a promise of its lowest rates for the Chinese market. They argue that opening the store to third-party marketplaces, as the EU's Digital Markets Act does, would push effective commissions as low as 5%.
That is the relevant comparison. If the digital-goods market were competitive, a 25% rate would be a price set by the market. Where the channel is closed by design, it is a price set by the gatekeeper. A study that expands the denominator to RMB 4 trillion cannot address that, because the contested revenue is the RMB 149 billion slice. Even there the study reports an ecosystem total, not what developers pay Apple or what they would pay under competition.
There is also a fairness issue in how the evidence is presented. Apple commissioned the study and shaped the framing. That does not make the figures false, and the page describes them as estimates. But a commissioned estimate published weeks before a regulator might act is advocacy, and readers should weigh it that way.
What proportionate regulation would look like
The pro-innovation response is not a price cap. Fixing a commission by decree would swap one administered price for another and could weaken Apple's incentive to invest in security and review. The better remedy is entry. Allow alternative payment processors and external purchase links for digital goods, keep Apple's review and security tools for those who want them, and let developers choose. If 25% is justified by the value Apple delivers, most developers will keep paying it. If it isn't, competition will show that without a regulator guessing the right number.
SAMR has procedural tools for this. Its site regularly publishes abuse-of-dominance penalty decisions, such as a 2026 notice about a regional gas supplier. That case was handled by a provincial office, and its investigation ran from October 2024 to a May 2026 decision. It is a reminder that these cases are slow and fact-heavy. The 48-developer letter does not guarantee an investigation, and none has been announced.
The wider risk of a closed channel
Restricting distribution matters beyond fees. When one company controls the only way to reach iPhone users in a market, it controls what can be installed there. The EFF recently described reports that VPN apps are again being pulled from Apple's App Store in Russia, calling it "an unacceptable crackdown on a vital tool to protect privacy and speech online." That is a Russian case, not a Chinese one, and it should not be read across. But it shows what a single chokepoint makes possible when a government pressures the gatekeeper. Open alternative channels reduce that exposure as well as lowering prices.
What to watch
Three things will show whether the study changes anything. First, whether SAMR opens a formal inquiry into the June letter. Second, whether Apple's March cut is followed by any move on alternative payments in China, as it has made in other jurisdictions. Third, whether future Apple studies disclose what developers pay, by developer, rather than the share of total transaction value. Until then, the 95% figure tells us the App Store sits in the middle of a very large economy. It does not tell us whether the toll on the part Apple does charge for is fair.