When schools in Azerbaijan began enforcing new uniform rules on 12 October that rights groups say effectively bar the hijab, protests followed. So did a familiar pattern: NetBlocks reported that TikTok, Instagram and the web version of X were restricted across several internet providers. Authorities have not explained the restrictions. That silence is the core policy problem.
What is known, and what is not
The Interior Ministry said 37 people were detained in Baku on 12 October. Amnesty International reports that activists put the figure at more than 200, that most detainees were released shortly afterward, and that six minors were detained on 13 October on suspicion of trying to set fire to a school. Amnesty also says users reported TikTok and Instagram becoming inaccessible at the same time as the protests, and it does not attribute the disruption to any authority.
A Proton VPN account of the timeline says disruptions began early on 12 October and that NetBlocks confirmed the blocks on 13 October. It reports no restoration as of 14 October and says VPN sign-ups from Azerbaijan rose more than 4,000% above baseline. Proton sells VPNs, so treat its framing with care; the surge is a measurement from its own service, and no regulator has verified it. No platform has commented. Nobody in government has said what legal basis, if any, applies.
The strongest case for the authorities
Governments have a real interest in preventing violence. Amnesty itself acknowledges that some participants in the protests took part in violent riots, and an alleged arson attempt at a school is a serious matter. Platforms can accelerate mobilisation, and a state facing street disorder may argue that a brief, targeted slowdown buys time for police to restore calm. That argument deserves a hearing.
It fails on the details.
Why the blocks fail the test
International human rights law does not forbid every limit on expression. It requires that limits be lawful, serve a legitimate aim, and be necessary and proportionate. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights states in Article 19 that everyone has the right "to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers." Article 18 protects the freedom "to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance." The dispute behind these protests touches both rights at once, and the response curtailed a third: the ability to document and discuss it.
Three features make the Azerbaijani blocks hard to defend.
- Unannounced. A restriction that the government will not acknowledge cannot be tested against a legal standard. Citizens cannot challenge it, and platforms cannot respond.
- Indiscriminate. Blocking three platforms affects every user, including parents asking about school policy, teachers, and small businesses selling through Instagram. Most of them are not rioting.
- Disconnected from the harm. If the concern is arson or street violence, throttling video apps does not prevent it. It does remove the footage that lets outsiders judge whether police and protesters behaved lawfully.
A pattern, not an anomaly
This is not Azerbaijan's first such episode. Proton's timeline recalls restrictions on most major platforms during the September 2020 fighting over Nagorno-Karabakh, a TikTok restriction in September 2022, and a TikTok block in September 2023 that an official described to AFP as temporary and that lasted until 31 October. Each time the justification was security. This time the trigger is a civil dispute over school dress.
The legal environment is also moving toward more discretion. Proton reports that a 2026 amendment expands the grounds for blocking websites without a court decision to include insult, defamation and "disinformation" that threatens public safety, and requires platforms to register locally and verify users' ages. I could not confirm the amendment's text and no official has linked it to the current blocks, so this should be read as context, not as a finding. But a regime in which an agency can block first and explain never is exactly what proportionality is meant to prevent.
The global context
Azerbaijan is in crowded company. Access Now's #KeepItOn campaign reports that at least 313 shutdowns were implemented in 52 countries in 2025, which it describes as the highest number since 2016. Shutdowns are now routine tools of crowd management, not emergency measures of last resort.
What proportionate policy looks like
The pro-innovation, pro-speech position is not that governments are powerless in a crisis. It is that if a state restricts access, it should be able to say so publicly, cite the legal authority, name the specific harm, limit the measure in scope and time, and submit it to independent review. Targeted removal of content that incites violence, ordered by a court and published, is a narrower tool than blocking platforms wholesale.
There is also a practical cost. Blocks push people to VPNs of uneven quality, which weakens security for ordinary users. They damage the digital economy, because creators and small firms who depend on these platforms lose income. And they erode trust: when authorities refuse to explain a block that coincides with a protest, observers will draw their own conclusions.
The immediate test for Baku is simple. Restore access, or explain publicly which law justifies the restriction, what it targets, and when it ends. Until then, the blocks look less like public-order policy than like an attempt to control the record of a dispute the government has not resolved.