On the evening of 11 October 2026, NetBlocks reported a "major disruption" to internet connectivity in parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP). It came after President Asif Ali Zardari declared a state of emergency, suspended the PTI-led provincial government and authorised army deployment while a PTI march headed toward Islamabad (Arab News). Local reporting says Peshawar's mobile and internet services were largely restored by 12 October, while Swabi's reportedly stayed down. The PTA and the interior ministry had not publicly explained the outage or its scope (Pakistan Observer).
This article does not claim the government ordered a shutdown, because it has not said so. What can be assessed is the legal framework any such order would sit in, and it is more permissive than many assume.
The case for the state's position
The strongest argument for restricting connectivity is a security one. Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi described the government's concerns as "entirely terrorism-related" (Arab News). Mobile networks have been used to trigger explosives in Pakistan. Law enforcement agencies have repeatedly asked for localised suspensions around religious processions and parades. Pakistan's Supreme Court accepted that need in 2020.
The law is less protective than the 2018 headline suggested
In February 2018 Justice Athar Minallah of the Islamabad High Court ruled mobile network shutdowns illegal. He held that access to telecommunications is a fundamental right and that section 54(3) of the Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-organization) Act 1996 allows suspension only after a presidential emergency proclamation (Digital Rights Foundation). Many advocates still cite that ruling as settled law.
It isn't. On 22 April 2020 the Supreme Court decided PTA v. CM Pak Limited (Civil Appeal 978/2018). According to Columbia University's Global Freedom of Expression summary, the Court treated section 54(3) as a reactive power for emergencies, separate from the PTA's pre-emptive national-security power under section 8(2)(c). It found no conflict between the two. It also accepted a legitimate need for suspensions around events such as Ashoora, the Pakistan Day Parade and the Chehlum protest, based on law-enforcement requests and past terrorist activity (Columbia GFoE). I could not retrieve the judgment text itself, so this rests on that summary.
In practice, then, the state can suspend service through the pre-emptive route without an emergency. The KP case is odd because an emergency proclamation now exists as well.
What the emergency does and does not authorise
Article 232 of the Constitution lets the President proclaim an emergency where the security of Pakistan or any part of it is threatened, including by "internal disturbance beyond the power of a Provincial Government to control." For internal disturbance it requires a resolution of the provincial assembly. If the President acts alone, both Houses of Parliament must approve "within ten days." The proclamation lapses after two months unless a joint sitting approves it (Constitution of Pakistan, Part X). Reporting indicates the KP assembly, which the PTI controls, gave no such consent, so the parliamentary approval clock matters (Asia News Network). I have not independently confirmed which article the proclamation invokes.
Article 233 is the sharper edge. While an emergency runs, the freedoms in Articles 15 to 19 and 24 (movement, assembly, association, speech and property) do not limit state power. The President may also suspend the right to go to court to enforce them (Constitution of Pakistan, Part X). If those suspensions are used, a connectivity blackout could be shielded from the constitutional challenges that worked in 2018. That depends on an order that has not been published.
Why the proportionality problem remains
A legal route being open does not make a measure sensible. Three problems stand out.
- Collateral damage. Reports say some landline and DSL services were affected in Peshawar, which suggests a blunt tool. A blackout hits hospitals, remote workers and small businesses, as well as the marchers it may target.
- Weak evidence of benefit. Shutdowns can block organisers' coordination, but they also block the footage and verification that deter abuses by security forces. This is a policy judgment, and the government has not published any assessment either way.
- Opacity. Neither the PTA nor the interior ministry has stated a legal basis, duration or geography. Without that, no one can test necessity, which is the core of any proportionality standard.
Pakistan has been here before. During the 8 February 2024 election, a countrywide cellular suspension was followed by roughly five days of disruption to X. The Sindh High Court's chief justice asked the government why it was "making a spectacle" of itself in front of the world, and said any shutdown should be limited to specific areas (Dawn).
What a proportionate regime would require
The fix does not require banning all suspensions, which the Supreme Court has already declined to do. It requires a published, time-limited, geographically specific order that names the statutory power relied on, with prompt judicial review. If the government has been truthful that this is about militancy, it should be able to explain which districts, why, and for how long. It should also publish a restoration date.
The parliamentary clock is the next test. If lawmakers approve the proclamation, they should also demand the telecom order be tabled. If they do not, the emergency lapses, and any shutdown justified only by it loses its footing.