On 11 October 2026, a Supreme Court bench of Justices Joymalya Bagchi and V. Mohana directed that in Delhi "internet facilities should function unhindered." It is item (c) of a six-part interim order, according to MediaNama's reading of the record. The sentence is welcome. But the order records no suspension order, no stated reasons and no review. The Court did not decide whether the shutdowns were lawful, and that question is the one that matters.
What happened
According to MediaNama, the Home Ministry suspended mobile internet for 12 hours within 1.5 km of Jantar Mantar on 2 October. A second, "Top Secret" order covered everything within 4 km of the Janpath–Kartavya Path crossing from 10 pm on 9 October to 10 pm on 10 October. That order gave no grounds and no reason for the radius, and it was not published. A copy surfaced only because a news agency posted it. A Delhi Police letter cites the Union Home Secretary's approval under Rule 3(1) of the 2024 Suspension Rules and Section 20(2)(b) of the Telecommunications Act, 2023.
The Court reached the issue indirectly. Counsel alleged that its 9 October order had been violated during the 10 October protests against the Chief Election Commissioner. Senior counsel Kapil Sibal described "a complete shutdown of the internet." Solicitor General Tushar Mehta replied that "internet connection has been restored." The Court recorded both statements and, as MediaNama reports, did not call for the suspension order.
The strongest case for the government
The government's case deserves a fair statement. Large, fast-moving protests in a capital city can threaten public safety. Mobile networks can accelerate crowd mobilisation, and authorities may reasonably fear that coordination or rumours will escalate a situation faster than police can respond. The Solicitor General noted that 45 of 303 metro stations were closed on 10 October. That suggests officials saw real operational pressure. Section 20(2)(b) of the Telecommunications Act, 2023 gives the executive this power explicitly, on grounds of public emergency or public safety. The power is not unlawful in itself.
Why the process still fails
The problem is not that the power exists but that its safeguards were skipped. In Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India (10 January 2020), the Court held that only the least restrictive measure may be used by the State. It also held that a decision curtailing fundamental rights "without appropriate justification will be classified as disproportionate." The Court also rejected the State's excuse for not producing the orders. Columbia's Global Freedom of Expression summary records the five-part test: legitimate goal, necessity, alternatives considered, least restrictive measure, and judicial review. It adds that the degree, territorial scope and duration of a restriction must fit what is actually necessary.
The Telecommunications (Temporary Suspension of Services) Rules, 2024, in force from 22 November 2024, wrote several of these ideas into law. SCC Online's summary says orders must be published with reasons. Each must set a duration of no more than 15 days and a defined area and service. Each must go to a review committee within 24 hours, and the Cabinet Secretary-chaired central committee must meet within five days. Judged against that checklist, a Top Secret order with no stated reasons and a 4 km radius with no explanation fails on publication and reasoning at the least. Whether it fails on proportionality is something only a court looking at the order can say.
This is not new. The Internet Freedom Foundation objected on 20 July 2026 when mobile internet was cut in parts of Central Delhi around the Chalo Sansad march. It said no suspension order had been published by any authority, and that the 2020 judgment and the 2024 Rules both require publication. MediaNama dates the series of suspensions around Jantar Mantar to July. A power exercised repeatedly in the same place in secret is no longer an emergency measure. It is routine administration.
What the order does and does not do
The interim direction is useful as a practical matter. Delhi's lawyers, journalists, delivery workers and commuters have a judicial statement to point to. Yet the language is unqualified in a way the metro and movement directions are not. Those refer to reasonable restrictions or law and order, while the internet line has no caveat. Read literally, it might forbid even a lawful, published and proportionate suspension. That ambiguity helps nobody. The government will argue the line means only that service should not be disrupted without lawful cause. Petitioners will argue it means that no disruption should occur.
The Court also did not say whether disrupted connectivity would count as hindering lawyers and journalists in their professional duties under item (f). A contempt notice has been issued and a compliance report was due on 13 October. These proceedings may finally put the orders before the bench. The Court should seize that chance.
A proportionate path forward
A pro-innovation, pro-speech approach does not require pretending that shutdowns can never be justified. It requires making the justification checkable. Mobile data underpins payments, gig work, ride-hailing and news. A 4 km blackout across central Delhi imposes costs far beyond the protest site. The 2024 Access Now report counted 84 shutdowns in India, the most of any democracy, and 41 of those were tied to protests. Proportionality is not only a legal formality. It reflects a policy choice to target disorder directly through policing and narrow, time-limited measures rather than switching off a city's connectivity.
Three steps would help. First, the Court should require the Union to place the 9 October and 10 October orders and the review committee records on the record. Second, the government should publish every suspension order with reasons, as its own Rules already demand, and not leave leaks to do the work. Third, the Court should rule on whether a 4 km, 24-hour blanket suspension met the Bhasin test. Without that ruling, the October order will be remembered as a sentence and not as a safeguard.