The strongest case for the power
Governments have a legitimate need to act quickly against some online content. Examples include live incitement to violence, child sexual abuse material and imminent terrorist threats. A judge-first process can be too slow for these cases. Türkiye's Article 8/A of the Internet Law (Law No. 5651) was designed for that purpose. The urgency route is also not unreviewed. According to the footnote on Article 8/A in İFÖD's Engelliweb 2025 report, the decision must go to a criminal judgeship of peace within 24 hours. The judge then has 48 hours to rule, and if the judge does not, the decision lapses automatically. On paper, that is a bounded emergency power.
The record of the past few weeks shows that it is no longer used as one.
What happened in September and October
On 12 October 2026, Human Rights Watch, ARTICLE 19, İFÖD and 18 other organisations issued a joint call for Türkiye to end internet censorship. It reports at least 1,270 X accounts blocked in September 2026. The 1,227 of those with available follower data had a combined following of more than 35 million. X complied with about 90 percent of the orders by withholding the accounts in Türkiye only. EDRi's account of the same data puts the geo-blocked figure at 1,139 accounts. It also notes that 995 accounts were blocked in the whole of 2025. On those numbers, a single month of orders exceeded the previous full year.
On 29 September, access to the T24 website and its X account, which had 1.9 million followers, was blocked by an order citing 118 news articles. The site has been inaccessible in Türkiye since 30 September. HRW describes T24 as one of Türkiye's biggest and oldest remaining independent news outlets. It says the order gave no explanation of how the cited content threatened national security or public order. HRW quotes the order as alleging content "aimed at disrupting and weakening the Turkish family structure". The EFF places the T24 block within a wider crackdown on LGBTQ+ and feminist organisations, with websites and accounts blocked and more than 60 members and activists detained.
Most of the September and October decisions invoked Article 8/A, according to HRW. EDRi says the provision is the common factor in all the access-block orders it reviewed. The law allows administrative blocking orders in urgent cases on grounds including national security and public order. The statute does not require the executive to demonstrate urgency for any given account. A bounded exception has become the default route.
Why after-the-fact review is not enough
The 24- and 48-hour safeguards only matter if courts use them to constrain the executive. HRW notes that the Constitutional Court has not ruled on any restriction under Article 8/A since 2023. That is despite the provision's use since 2015 to block Wikipedia for 2.5 years from 2017 and Ekşi Sözlük for a year in 2023.
There are three practical problems.
- The block is the punishment. A news outlet blocked for a day during a political news cycle has already lost its audience for that cycle, even if a judge later lifts the order.
- Platforms act on the first order. X geo-blocked about 90 percent of the accounts. Accounts that comply by default are unlikely to be restored quickly, because few have the resources to appeal.
- Reasoning is thin. An order citing 118 articles without explaining the threat leaves a judge with little to test and a publisher with little to contest.
This is a disproportionate design in the plain sense. The tool is a blunt one, blocking whole accounts and whole sites, when narrower remedies for specific unlawful items exist. The cost falls on lawful speech by journalists and ordinary users.
Law 7590 moves the lever, not the safeguard
Law No. 7590, adopted on 24 July 2026 and published in Official Gazette No. 33326 on 31 July, amends several laws in one omnibus text. According to CMS's legal analysis, it moves functions previously held by the telecom regulator BTK to the Cybersecurity Presidency (HRW calls it the Cybersecurity Directorate). It amends the Internet Law so that content removal and access-blocking functions sit with that body. HRW adds that the transfer includes authority to block sites on the request of the presidency or relevant ministries under Article 8/A. HRW calls the body "the command centre for Türkiye's censorship regime".
CMS judges the changes "principally institutional in character". It also finds that new fines and the broader traffic-data definition "go beyond institutional re-organisation". Those fines include TRY 20,000 to 100,000 for failing to carry out emergency communications measures, which providers must act on within two hours under a new provision in the Electronic Communications Law. The mechanism there has the same shape as Article 8/A, with immediate execution followed by court approval within 24 hours.
A fair reading is that consolidation can bring technical efficiency. The concern is who holds the power. A body attached to the presidency is more insulated from judicial and parliamentary scrutiny than a regulator. Placing the blocking function and the enforcement penalties under the same executive roof removes a layer of friction that once existed.
What proportionate reform looks like
None of this requires abolishing emergency powers. A proportionate regime would do four things:
- Narrow the grounds. Restrict urgency orders to defined categories of imminent harm, rather than open-ended references to public order.
- Target the content, not the speaker. Order removal of specific items, and reserve account- and site-wide blocks for repeated, judicially established violations.
- Require reasons and publication. Publish orders and the reasoning behind them, with notice to the affected account holder.
- Make review real. Require judges to assess urgency and proportionality, and let the Constitutional Court take up Article 8/A cases.
Platforms also bear responsibility. The HRW-led statement urges them to take meaningful steps to uphold their human rights responsibilities. At minimum, platforms should notify users, publish orders in transparency reports, and challenge manifestly unreasoned orders rather than geo-blocking by default.
The Law No. 5651 framework has been in force since 2007, as the Mevzuat database records. Its original purpose included protecting children and combating specific crimes. The September numbers show how far practice has moved from that narrower purpose.