In the week to about 30 September 2026, X withheld nearly 500 accounts from users in Turkey, according to the censorship monitor EngelliWeb. The accounts belong to journalists, economists, academics and outlets such as Kısa Dalga, and many had discussed the country's investment-fund crisis. The orders cite national security and public order. This article argues the mechanism is the wrong tool for a real problem.
What happened
On 17 September 2026 Turkey's Capital Markets Board (SPK) ordered the liquidation of funds run by seven portfolio management companies after some funds could not meet redemptions. SPK later said the liquidation covers 131 funds and 455,758 individual investors. Listed parent companies also disclosed the decision. Güler Yatırım Holding's filing on the KAP platform confirmed that trading in affected funds was suspended.
The blocks followed in stages. Stockholm Center for Freedom reported 194 blocked accounts around 22-23 September, including economists Uğur Gürses and Bilge Yılmaz and journalist Naz Yavuzarslan. It said officials accused them of "speculative posts" that could cause "fear and panic". The Next Web's account of the EngelliWeb data adds at least 80 more accounts on 26 September, including Kısa Dalga, and at least 150 more on 29 September. The blocked list also includes law professor Yaman Akdeniz, who co-founded the monitoring group. He said X notified him "without providing the details, or a copy of the blocking decision, or the reasons."
The strongest case for the government
The case for acting is not frivolous. Money-market and fund products depend on confidence. When redemptions stall, rumours about which fund is next can trigger a run, and retail savers with no way to verify claims bear the loss. A regulator facing 455,758 affected investors has a legitimate interest in stopping fabricated claims about specific funds or banks. Deliberate market manipulation through false posts is a crime in most jurisdictions, and speed matters because a false rumour spreads faster than a correction.
If the orders targeted demonstrably false, market-moving posts, that rationale would deserve a hearing.
Why the mechanism fails
The tool Turkey used was not designed for this. Article 8/A of Law No. 5651 is an emergency provision for cases where delay would be prejudicial. According to IFÖD's EngelliWeb 2025 report, the measure must be carried out within four hours of notification. The BTK President must then submit it to a criminal judgeship of peace within 24 hours, and the court must rule within 48 hours. The sequence is act first, review later.
That design has three problems.
- The block hits the speaker, not the statement. Withholding an entire account removes every past and future post. An economist who wrote one contested thread also loses years of unrelated commentary. IFÖD, as reported by Stockholm Center for Freedom, said whole-account blocks "disproportionately interfere" with freedom of expression beyond any specific problematic post.
- The exception has become routine. IFÖD counts 179 Article 8/A decisions in 2025 against 71 in 2024, and 995 X accounts blocked against 20. It describes the provision as having shifted from an exceptional measure into routine censorship. Whatever the fund-crisis blocks are, they are not a rare emergency.
- Review is weak and opaque. IFÖD says courts have issued 1,388 decisions since 2020 without applying the Constitutional Court's required "prima facie violation" standard. Affected users often receive only a platform notice, as Akdeniz described. Without the order and its reasoning, nobody can appeal in time or tell false rumour from inconvenient analysis.
The distinction matters for the fund crisis. The most useful commentary is by economists and journalists who read filings, count redemptions and explain what liquidation means. Silencing them removes the people best placed to counter panic with evidence. Meanwhile, officials in Ankara have said the system is not at risk: Treasury and Finance Minister Mehmet Şimşek said there was no widespread systemic risk. If that is right, the stated danger from commentary is smaller than the censorship response suggests.
A proportionate alternative
A pro-innovation approach would keep the goal and change the instrument.
- Target posts, not accounts. Orders should name the specific content and the specific false claim.
- Require a judge first for anything touching journalism or economic analysis, reserving the four-hour route for imminent physical harm.
- Publish the order. Platforms and affected users should get the decision, the legal basis and the appeal route, and monitors should be able to audit aggregate figures.
- Use the regulator's voice. SPK can publish real-time facts on fund status, which is cheaper and more credible than removing critics. Its investor-count statement shows it can do this when it chooses.
The platform's role
X is not the author of these orders, but its handling matters. The Next Web notes X has challenged Turkish orders before while still complying. Withholding access in one country is compliance, not endorsement, but notifying users without the decision text leaves them unable to contest it. Platforms operating in Turkey should publish the orders they receive, or at least their basis, so the public can see what is being blocked and why. Turkey will keep needing a credible way to handle financial misinformation. Account-wide blocks on analysts during a fund crisis make markets less informed and the law less trusted.