In early November 2026, South Africa's Department of Home Affairs, under Minister Leon Schreiber, launched the first phase of a Digital Asylum System. Applicants use the MyHomeAffairsOnline portal to record an intention to seek asylum. They upload facial biometrics, personal details and supporting documents. The portal is live for test cases and is expected to open to the public after the next software release, according to TimesLive's 10 November report. Later phases add appointment scheduling, further biometric verification and checks against existing Home Affairs records. The department also plans to use AI and machine learning on the appeals backlog.
This article argues that the digitisation is defensible, and that the department should publish its data-protection safeguards before it opens the portal to the public.
The case for the system
The strongest argument for the portal is administrative, and it is a serious one. Home Affairs says it had only nine officials handling thousands of outstanding asylum appeals at the start of the current administration. Long delays hurt genuine refugees as much as anyone. A person waiting years for a decision lives in legal limbo, and a backlog gives people with weak claims a way to stay in the country while their case sits unheard. Online registration with a confirmation receipt can shorten queues at reception offices, and it creates a record that shows who applied and when.
The department says the portal gives effect to the Constitutional Court's 7 July 2026 judgment in Scalabrini Centre of Cape Town v Minister of Home Affairs. The Court confirmed that certain Refugees Act provisions were unconstitutional and invalid, according to a government statement. The litigation began with a Western Cape High Court ruling against a screening mechanism that let officers bar people from the asylum system after an initial interview. That is why access to the system matters. A portal that widens access, including for people who entered without a transit visa, is consistent with the judgment, provided it does not become a new barrier.
The department stresses that registration is not a formal asylum application and confers no status. It says people without digital access can get help at refugee reception offices. That fallback is essential. It should be written into the portal's rules so that it is not left to discretion.
What is missing
The published reporting says nothing about how the biometric data is stored, secured or retained. We have also seen no report that the Information Regulator has weighed in. Absence of reporting is not proof that no safeguards exist, and the department may have them. But the gap matters, because facial biometrics are among the most sensitive data a state can hold. They cannot be changed if they leak.
South Africa's Protection of Personal Information Act (POPIA) treats biometrics as special personal information. Section 26 prohibits processing it unless an exception applies. Section 27 lists those exceptions: consent, establishing or defending a legal right or obligation, compliance with an international public law obligation, and others. It also lets the Regulator authorise processing in the public interest, subject to conditions. An asylum system plausibly fits more than one ground. Even so, which ground Home Affairs relies on, and whether it sought the Regulator's authorisation, is a question the public deserves an answer to. Asylum seekers are not in a position to refuse consent.
Why AI on appeals raises the stakes
The department says about 95 percent of asylum applicants are rejected. It wants to deport failed applicants swiftly and use AI to clear appeals. Those two facts pull in opposite directions, and they should be examined together.
A 95 percent rejection rate can mean most claims are weak. It can also mean the decision process is skewed toward refusal. Without published data on outcomes, the public cannot tell which. If a machine-learning tool is trained on historical decisions, it can reproduce whatever bias those decisions contained, and do so faster. Appeals exist to catch the errors of first-instance decisions. An automated tool that echoes those decisions removes that check. The department has not said whether a human official will make or review every appeal decision.
None of this requires abandoning the technology. Triage tools that sort cases, flag missing documents or detect duplicate files are low-risk and useful. The danger lies in letting a model's score stand in for a reasoned decision on a person's safety.
A proportionate path
Proportionate regulation here means conditions, not a ban. Before the public launch, the department should do four things:
- Publish a data-protection impact summary. It should cover what is collected, where it is stored, who can access it, how long it is kept and when it is deleted.
- Limit use to asylum administration. Facial data collected for registration should not flow into general enforcement databases without a legal basis stated in public.
- Keep a human decision-maker on every appeal. AI should assist, not decide, and the department should say so in writing.
- Invite the Information Regulator to review the system. Under POPIA, the Regulator is the body best placed to test the department's safeguards, and an early review is cheaper than a breach investigation later.
These steps cost little and protect the project's credibility. A system that clears a backlog but leaks the faces of vulnerable people would fail by any measure. Efficiency and rights are not opposites here. Public trust in the portal will determine whether people use it, and use is what makes it work.
The bottom line
South Africa is right to modernise a system with nine officials facing thousands of appeals. It should do so with the same transparency it would demand of a private company holding the same data. The first phase is still a test run, and that is the moment to publish the rules.