ICASA's strongest argument is simple: a SIM card has become the key to a person's bank account, and weak identity checks at the point of activation let criminals take that key. On 28 October 2026 the regulator announced the draft Numbering Plan Fifth Amendment Regulations, 2026. Under the draft, a subscriber's face or fingerprint would be checked against Home Affairs records whenever a SIM is activated, reactivated or swapped. ICASA's stated aim is that every number has a person behind it. A regulator trying to stop SIM-swap fraud is acting on a real harm, and a government-held biometric register is a more reliable anchor than a photocopied ID.
That case still does not justify the draft as written.
What the draft would do
According to TechCentral's reading of the text, the rules reach beyond new activations. Existing subscribers would get two years to re-verify, which is a large undertaking in a market that legal analysts at ENS/Afriwise put at more than 117 million mobile subscriptions. The draft also proposes a cap of five numbers per subscriber. Companies would be exempt from the biometric check but not from the cap. TechCentral and Afriwise both report penalties of R2 million to R4 million per contravention. Comments are due on 9 December 2026, according to the Digital Policy Alert record.
ICASA has added some safeguards. The TimesLIVE editorial of 16 November notes that the draft limits biometric data to identity verification. Afriwise reports that records must be deleted within 30 days of deactivation. These are real concessions. They are not a security regime.
Where the draft falls short
It is silent on how biometrics are handled. Afriwise's analysis finds that the draft prescribes no security standards for capturing, transmitting or storing biometric data. Fingerprints cannot be reissued after a breach, unlike a password or a card number. If retail agents and operator systems capture fingerprints and then keep them for the life of a subscription, a breach would permanently expose the people affected. The TimesLIVE editorial argues that private companies should store only the verification result, not the biometric itself. That is the right design principle, and it should be written into the regulation, not left to operator discretion.
It overlaps with RICA. ACT, the industry body whose members include Vodacom, MTN, Telkom and Cell C, has said it cannot endorse the rules in their current form. Its main complaint is overlap with the existing registration regime under RICA. ICASA's own explanatory memorandum says the new rules are distinct from RICA, as TechCentral reports. Operators then face two sets of identity and record-keeping duties, which is both costly and confusing. Whatever the merits of the operators' commercial position, the legal point is sound. Two regimes governing the same SIM registration invite inconsistent compliance and litigation over which one controls.
It leans on a state system that may not scale. The scheme depends on Home Affairs answering verification queries at national volume, in real time, for every activation and swap. The TimesLIVE editorial flags that capacity as an open question. If the verification service is slow or down, legitimate customers are locked out of their own numbers. Anyone with an ID mismatch or an unrecorded fingerprint is hit hardest, and the draft's protection against exclusion is thin.
It sits uneasily with data-protection law. Under the Protection of Personal Information Act, 2013, biometric information is a category of special personal information that requires a lawful basis and a necessity case. The Information Regulator's role in a mass biometric collection exercise is not addressed in ICASA's media notice. Neither is the proportionality of applying the same check to millions of low-risk prepaid users.
A proportionate alternative
The fraud problem is real, but it is concentrated at specific moments, chiefly SIM swaps and reactivations. The draft goes much further. Its universal re-verification of existing subscribers is the most intrusive and least targeted element. A narrower rule would require a biometric match only for SIM swaps and reactivations of dormant numbers, which are the high-risk events. It would also:
- Require that operators receive only a pass/fail result from Home Affairs and never retain the underlying biometric.
- Set minimum security and breach-notification standards for any capture device or agent channel.
- Give a single, explicit answer on how the rules interact with RICA, instead of leaving operators to guess.
- Offer a non-biometric fallback so that people whose fingerprints cannot be read are not cut off.
ICASA has been down a similar road before. It floated linking biometrics to SIM cards in 2022, and that idea did not go ahead in that form. The earlier attempt shows the regulator's instinct: when fraud rises, widen the identity net. The more effective response is to harden the specific points where fraud happens.
ICASA also finalised its separate Fourth Amendment on inactive-number recycling only in July, as its 2 July 2026 notice records. ACT has objected to the pace of change. Operators need a stable rulebook to invest in fraud detection, and repeated amendments to the same instrument make that harder.
What to watch
The consultation window is the moment to fix this. Commenters should press ICASA on three points: a statutory ban on private retention of biometric templates, a clear division of duties with RICA, and a targeted trigger instead of blanket re-verification. If ICASA adopts those changes, it will keep the anti-fraud benefit and avoid building a private-sector store of fingerprints that attackers will target.