Russia Russia Roskomnadzor internet sovereignty law

Russia's Mobile Whitelist Is Nearing Its Technical Ceiling, and That Exposes the Cost of Rationed Connectivity

Minister Shadaev says the shutdown whitelist holds 900 resources and is close to what operators can support. Access is now rationed by capacity, not by need.

Russia's Mobile Whitelist in Numbers People of Internet Research · Russia 900 Whitelisted resources Near the technical limit, per the … 2,099 Shutdowns, July 2025 Up from 69 in May 2025. 2032 Decree in force until Decree No. 1667 runs from 1 March … peopleofinternet.com
Russia's Mobile Whitelist in Numbers People of Internet Research · Russia 900 Whitelisted resources 2,099 Shutdowns, July 2025 2032 Decree in force until peopleofinternet.com

Key Takeaways

On 12 November 2026, at CNews Forum 2026, Digital Development Minister Maksut Shadaev said that 900 resources are now on the government's mobile-internet "white list". He added that the ministry is "close to the technical limit" on how many operators can support, and that the list "cannot be infinite" (Interfax). The admission matters beyond the number. It shows that Russia's connectivity regime now runs on a quota, and the quota is set by engineering limits rather than by what citizens need.

The strongest case for the system

The government's argument deserves a fair statement. Mobile networks in Russia have faced drone-related and security-related disruptions. A state that restricts mobile data for security reasons can reasonably want banks, taxis, marketplaces and state services to keep working. When Shadaev first described the idea in August 2025, he said the ministry and operators had agreed a system so that essential services stay reachable during shutdowns, with machine-to-machine networks such as ATMs staying up (Meduza). Seen narrowly, a whitelist is a harm-reduction tool: if the switch is going to be thrown anyway, better to leave some lights on.

What the November numbers reveal

That framing assumes the shutdowns are rare and the exceptions are the point. The evidence points the other way. The monitoring project Na Svyazi counted at least 2,099 mobile shutdowns in July 2025, up from 69 in May 2025, across 77 regions, as Meduza reported at the time. A measure designed for emergencies became routine within weeks.

The selection logic is also telling. Shadaev said the ministry follows "a very simple criterion: daily audience", walking down the popularity ranking and proposing the biggest services. The FSB approves the list against its own security requirements (Interfax). Under the conditions described in the ministry's brief, only services whose computing capacity sits entirely in Russia qualify, and nonprofits need a federal agency to sponsor them. The result is a state-approved index of the internet. Popularity and domestic hosting buy entry. Being small, foreign, independent or merely useful does not.

Shadaev acknowledged the weakness himself. Some services, he said, "may not be super-popular but are vital", and he named EV charging and medical services as examples. "Now we are restructuring the approach," he added. That is a quiet concession that a popularity ranking is a poor proxy for essential, and that the people who bear the cost are those who depend on niche services.

Why the ceiling exists

A whitelist is not a software setting. Operators must carry the permitted resources through filtering equipment while everything else is cut, and each added resource increases the engineering burden. Hence Shadaev's remark about operator limits. A policy that requires a central authority to enumerate, in advance, everything citizens might need online cannot scale. The open internet works because nobody has to ask permission per service. A permission list inverts that, and the ceiling is where the inversion starts to hurt.

Gaming the list shows a second cost. In August 2026 the ministry wrote to hosting, web-protection and CDN providers asking them to move whitelisted IP addresses into separate subnets. The stated reason was that sites carrying banned content, including VPN advertising, were riding on whitelisted addresses. One RBC source said vetting happens only when a company first connects (Meduza). When access is scarce, people will route around the rules. The state's response is more segmentation and more enforcement, not less.

The legal architecture behind it

The enforcement framework is Government Decree No. 1667 of 27 October 2025, the Rules for Centralized Management of the Public Communications Network. It was adopted under Article 65.1 of the Law on Communications. It took effect on 1 March 2026 and runs to 1 March 2032, replacing the 2020 rules under Decree No. 127 (decree text, ppt.ru).

The decree defines threats to the stability, security and integrity of the network. Integrity threats include broken interconnection with foreign networks. Roskomnadzor keeps the threat list. It approves response regulations together with the Digital Development Ministry and the FSB, and it can order countermeasures including changed message routes. Those are carried out through the countermeasure equipment known as TSPU. The decree also sets a 24-hour review for operator requests (ppt.ru). Duma deputy Sergei Boyarsky argued at the time that the decree "merely updates" the 2019 rules and that "no one is talking about cutting the Russian segment off" (The Moscow Times). The Moscow Times also noted that the rules could, in an emergency, allow Russia to be disconnected from the global internet.

The legal text is broad and the triggers are administrative. Nothing in the decree gives citizens or operators a route to contest a determination before a court. The same executive bodies define the threat, approve the response and run the equipment.

A proportionate alternative

The security problems Moscow cites, such as network attacks, outages and spoofed calls, are real, and they have narrower fixes. Anti-spoofing measures, resilient routing and targeted filtering of attack traffic do not require a permit for every ordinary service. A proportionate regime would publish its criteria and trigger conditions and cap shutdown duration. It would also give affected services an appeal path and report how often shutdowns occur.

Shadaev's own words provide the test. If the system is so constrained that it must be "restructured" to fit in vital medical services, it is not protecting connectivity. It is rationing it. The honest fix is fewer shutdowns, not a longer list of exemptions.

Sources & Citations

  1. Government Decree No. 1667 of 27 Oct 2025 (text)
  2. Decree No. 1667 (Garant legal database)
  3. Interfax: 900 resources on the whitelist
  4. Meduza: ministry cracks down on masked sites (Aug 2026)
  5. Meduza: whitelist announced (Aug 2025)
  6. The Moscow Times on the expanded Roskomnadzor powers