Russia Russia Roskomnadzor internet sovereignty law

Russia's TSPU Upgrade Shows the Sovereign Internet Law Works as a Filtering Utility, With Collateral Damage as the Price

Reported TSPU upgrades and quota plans fit a decade-long build-out under Russia's 2019 sovereign internet law, and ordinary users bear the cost.

Russia's Filtering Build-Out in Numbers People of Internet Research · Russia 469 VPN services blocked Roskomnadzor-confirmed count, Febr… 74 of 83 Regions with allowlists At least 74 regions, as of April 2… 100% Nodes covered by TSPU Claim by Roskomnadzor head Lipov, … ~60B rubles Filtering budget 2027-29 Draft federal budget line, per Med… peopleofinternet.com
Russia's Filtering Build-Out in Number… People of Internet Research · Russia 469 VPN services blocked 74 of 83 Regions with allowlists 100% Nodes covered by TSPU ~60B rubles Filtering budget 2027-29 peopleofinternet.com

Key Takeaways

Around 9–10 November 2026, the Russian outlet Men Today, citing Downdetector data, reported outages in Moscow and dozens of regions. It attributed them to a large-scale update of Roskomnadzor's TSPU deep-packet-inspection equipment. The report says filtering has shifted from blocking high-traffic addresses to blocking single low-traffic servers and whole foreign-hosting IP ranges. It also says the equipment now resets OpenVPN- and WireGuard-like traffic and disrupts encrypted DNS. It adds that the Ministry of Digital Development is drafting rules to let Roskomnadzor set quotas on, and throttle, any foreign traffic, extending mobile-network limits to home internet.

Two caveats first. This comes from a single outlet and cites no statement from Roskomnadzor or the ministry. The drafting claim is reported, not confirmed. Even so, the account fits a well-documented trajectory, and that trajectory matters more than any one week of outages.

The strongest case for the state's position

Russian officials present the 2019 law as resilience engineering. Federal Law No. 90-FZ, signed on 1 May 2019 and in force from 1 November 2019, was framed as protecting the network's continuity if foreign connectivity were cut. Any state has a legitimate interest in defending critical infrastructure and in tackling fraud, malware and illegal content. A government can fairly argue that it needs tools to enforce its own courts' blocking orders.

The statute's text shows how far it goes beyond that. The official text published in Rossiyskaya Gazeta obliges operators to install "technical means for countering threats" in their networks. It also adds an Article 65.1 on centralised management of the communications network. That article lets Roskomnadzor issue mandatory instructions and set routing rules for telecom traffic. This is a control plane, not a defensive shield.

How the equipment became the censor

The rollout started before the law took effect. In September 2019, Meduza reported that DPI filtering was being piloted in the Ural Federal District, citing RBC. By October 2023, according to Meduza's October 2026 reporting, Roskomnadzor head Andrey Lipov said all communications nodes were "100% covered by TSPU". Once every node carries the boxes, new rules need only a software update, not new law or new infrastructure. That is why a reported change in filtering logic can reach Moscow and dozens of regions at once.

The same Meduza article reports that the draft federal budget for 2027–2029 includes a record sum of roughly 60 billion rubles for traffic filtering. It also notes that the arithmetic behind that total depends on how a subsidy line is read. Spending at that scale suggests the reported upgrades are a funded programme, not a one-off.

The targets keep widening

Human Rights Watch documented in March 2026 that Roskomnadzor confirmed blocking 469 VPN services in February 2026. It added that authorities had been blocking the three most popular VPN protocols since December. Recorded Future's Insikt Group counted 460 blocked VPN services by early 2026, up from 258 in October 2025. It also reports that at least 74 of Russia's 83 regions had introduced allowlists of government-approved sites by April 2026.

Seen against that record, the November report describes a continuation. Moving from blocking popular addresses to blocking individual servers and hosting ranges is how an arms race between circumvention tools and filters would be expected to evolve. Quotas on foreign traffic would be a further step. They would shift from blocking specific content to rationing access to the outside internet as a whole.

Why proportionality fails here

The Atlantic Council's 2021 assessment of RuNet isolation described the law as building the capacity to disconnect Russia's network from the global internet. The outages described in the reports are what imprecise filtering looks like in practice. Range-level blocking of foreign hosting hits legitimate businesses, remote workers, hospitals' software vendors and ordinary readers that share an address block with a target. Disrupting encrypted DNS does nothing against fraud. It removes a basic privacy and integrity protection that security professionals recommend.

Proportionate regulation has a simple test. A measure should be tied to a defined harm, be reviewable by an independent body, and impose the least collateral cost. Here the same equipment is steered by one agency under administrative instructions. Public disclosure of what has been blocked, and why, is limited. A tool built for centralised control will be used for control. Each upgrade makes the next restriction cheaper.

What this means for innovation

Russian developers, exporters and start-ups depend on foreign cloud services, code repositories and payment infrastructure. A regime that rations foreign traffic raises the cost of building anything for global markets. Businesses respond by moving staff and servers abroad or by buying unreliable workarounds. Policymakers elsewhere should note that VPN bans and traffic quotas are not niche measures. They are an operating model that other states may study.

For outside observers, the practical lessons are modest. Treat single-source outage reports with caution, and watch for the draft rules themselves. If the ministry publishes a quota regime, its text will say more than any outage tracker. Until then, the documented pattern is what can be relied on. It is a decade of statutory powers, near-total equipment coverage, rising budgets and a growing list of blocked tools. The cost falls mainly on users who simply want an open connection.

Sources & Citations

  1. Federal Law No. 90-FZ (Rossiyskaya Gazeta official text)
  2. Federal Law No. 90-FZ of 01.05.2019 (legalacts.ru)
  3. Meduza: Russia plans ~60bn rubles on traffic filtering (Oct 2026)
  4. Meduza: DPI rollout begins (2019)
  5. Human Rights Watch: Digital Iron Curtain (Mar 2026)
  6. Recorded Future Insikt Group: Russia's restrictive information environment
  7. Atlantic Council: Reassessing RuNet