On 16 November 2026, Jordan's Public Security Directorate (PSD) announced a nationwide block of Telegram. Within hours, Iraq's media and communications regulator ordered its own ban. Both moves were justified on security grounds, and the two governments have a serious case to make. Whether a blanket block is the right response is a separate question.
The case for acting
Jordan's announcement came weeks after the 23 October shooting at a Greek Orthodox church in Karak, which killed nine people. On 15 November a Jordanian court sentenced three men to death over the attack, according to Al Jazeera. The PSD said the measure aims to curb the misuse of digital platforms for cybercrime, threats, extortion and "extremist material", as quoted by Al-Monitor. Neither outlet reports evidence that Telegram played a role in the Karak attack itself.
The strongest version of the government's argument is not frivolous. Telegram mixes private chats with large public broadcast channels, and Al-Monitor notes that militant groups including the Islamic State have used those channels to spread propaganda. End-to-end encryption is limited to optional "Secret Chats". A state that has just buried nine citizens will not accept "we asked the company and it didn't answer" as an excuse for doing nothing. Iraq's regulator says Telegram "failed to take the necessary measures to address non-compliant content" and "did not adhere to Iraqi laws" (quoted by Al Jazeera).
What the two orders actually do
The two decisions are less alike than the headlines suggest. Jordan has imposed a block. Iraq has set a 30-day window for Telegram to "settle its legal status", and reporting is inconsistent on whether access is already cut. Al Jazeera notes that Baghdad did not spell out what happens after 30 days.
That ambiguity matters. A deadline is a negotiation, and a negotiation can produce proportionate outcomes such as named points of contact, takedown channels for specific illegal content, and transparency reporting. Iraq has used this pattern before. After an April 2026 block, the Communications and Media Commission restored Telegram on 9 May 2026 once the platform pledged compliance with "content controls, user protection and Iraqi law" under Legislative Order No. 65 of 2004, as reported by 964media. A 2023 Iraqi block lasted just over a week, per Al-Monitor. Blocking has repeatedly worked in Iraq as leverage, not as a lasting solution.
Why a blanket block fails the necessity test
The UN Human Rights Council's 2022 report on internet shutdowns, A/HRC/50/55, is direct on this point. It defines shutdowns to include obstructing "the accessibility and usability of services that are necessary for interactive communications, such as social media and messaging services" (para. 4). It says that restrictions on expression must meet the requirements of article 19(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and be "provided by law" (para. 11). It also warns that when states block platforms, "the legal foundation for their actions is often unstated".
The core problem is collateral damage. Telegram is used by news outlets, small businesses, schools and families. A block cuts all of them off to reach a small number of accounts. The Middle East and North Africa account for about 8% of Telegram's global users, according to Al Jazeera, so the region is a large user base for the app. Blocking is also easy to evade. The UN report notes that some governments have gone on to block VPNs to stop circumvention (para. 5). That escalation drags in even more lawful activity and tightens surveillance.
Jordan's legal backdrop
Jordan's 2023 Cybercrime Law gives context for how the block may be justified. A joint letter from 14 organisations led by Access Now said the law "grants unrestricted authority to the public prosecutor and the executive authority to block social media platforms" without a judicial decision. Human Rights Watch described the draft's Article 33 as allowing authorities to "block the websites, social media platforms, or services from the national network", and noted a 100,000-subscriber threshold for local offices, with throttling as a penalty for non-compliance. Neither organisation commented on the November block, and the PSD's announcement as reported does not name the legal provision it relies on. The published reporting does not tell us whether the block was subject to judicial review.
A proportionate alternative
There is a better path, and it is not complicated:
- Targeted takedowns. Order removal of specific channels and accounts tied to violent extremism, with a judicial or independent review.
- A legal point of contact. Require platforms above a size threshold to maintain a responsive channel to regulators, as Iraq's May 2026 arrangement attempted.
- Published criteria and time limits. Any access restriction should name its legal basis, scope and end date.
- Escalation only after failure. Block only if targeted measures have been tried and refused, and only for as long as needed.
This approach is more effective as well as more rights-respecting. It keeps the lawful majority online and keeps pressure on the company. It also avoids teaching citizens to route around the state with unvetted VPNs, which makes security services' work harder.
What to watch
Telegram had not commented at the time of the announcements, according to Al Jazeera. The practical test is Iraq's 30-day window, which runs to about 16 December. If it ends in a published compliance agreement, the episode will look like regulation. If it ends in an indefinite block, it will look like what the UN report describes: a shutdown with an unstated legal foundation. Governments facing real extremist threats deserve engagement from platforms, and platforms deserve legal certainty. Neither is served by switching off an app for millions of ordinary users.