On 20 October 2026, Access Now published "Deliberately forgotten: internet shutdowns with no end". Its central claim is that the number of prolonged shutdowns "has steadily risen each year, as perpetrators around the world quietly decide to keep people cut off from the internet indefinitely." It also says that even when authorities announce an end, "connectivity often does not return in any meaningful way." That shifts the problem. The shutdown is no longer a short emergency measure that regulators can argue over. In a growing number of places it has become a standing condition.
The scale behind the claim
The post builds on Access Now's #KeepItOn tracking. Its 2025 annual analysis, published on 31 March 2026, documented 313 shutdowns in 52 countries, up from 304 in 2024 and 289 in 2023. Conflict was the leading trigger for the third year running, with 125 conflict-related shutdowns in 14 countries. Myanmar alone recorded 95, 76 of them by the military regime.
The figure that matters most for this argument is persistence. Access Now counts 75 shutdowns in 33 countries that carried over from 2025 into 2026. Those are not blips around an election or an exam. They are cut-offs that outlived the event that supposedly justified them.
One caveat applies. We could read the main text of the October post, but not the testimonies it quotes, and we could not read the full 2025 PDF report. The analysis here rests on the figures above, which we checked, and not on details we could not verify.
The strongest case for emergency shutdown powers
Governments have a serious argument, and it deserves a fair statement. In a real emergency, such as mass violence coordinated over messaging apps or an insurgency that uses networks to direct attacks, officials say they need a fast lever. Emergency statutes exist because ordinary procedure is too slow when lives are at risk. A shutdown is blunt, but its defenders say it is sometimes less harmful than the violence it is meant to interrupt. Those who hold this view add that telecom licences and older telegraph-era laws already give them the authority, and that courts should defer on matters of security.
That case has a hidden premise: the measure ends when the emergency ends. The October analysis suggests that premise is failing. When a power designed for days is used for years, it is no longer an emergency power. It is a policy of permanent disconnection, applied to populations who have no meaningful way to contest it.
What courts have already said
Courts have not been silent. In India, the Supreme Court's 2020 judgment in Anuradha Bhasin v Union of India addressed whether prohibiting internet access is valid. The Court pressed the state to put the relevant orders before it. It held that an order suspending services indefinitely is impermissible, that suspension orders must be made available, and that they are subject to a necessity and proportionality test.
In West Africa, the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice ruled against Togo in 2020 in a case over its 2017 shutdowns, finding them unlawful. Access Now's October piece urges states to "heed court rulings against shutdowns, and enforce the courts' judgments," and names the ECOWAS Court and national judiciaries in Sudan, India and Zimbabwe. The pattern is consistent. Judges accept that states may restrict access in limited circumstances, and they reject the open-ended version.
The gap is enforcement. A ruling that arrives long after a shutdown began, or that a government simply ignores, does little for people who are offline today. India still recorded 65 shutdowns in 2025, the highest count after Myanmar, despite Bhasin. Court doctrine is necessary but not sufficient.
What proportionate regulation looks like
A pro-innovation, pro-speech position does not require denying that emergencies happen. It requires building the safeguards into the law that grants the power. Five design rules follow from the evidence.
- Automatic sunset. Every shutdown order should expire in days, not months, unless renewed by a fresh, reasoned decision. Indefinite orders should be void on their face.
- Published orders. The legal basis, geographic scope and duration should be public within a short deadline. Secret orders cannot be challenged, and secrecy is how "forgotten" shutdowns survive.
- Fast, independent review. A court or independent authority should hear challenges quickly, with the burden on the state to show necessity and that no narrower measure would work.
- Narrowest effective measure. Platform- or location-specific action, where it genuinely addresses a specific threat, must be tried before a network-wide cut.
- Restoration duties. Orders should require verified restoration of service, not just a declaration that the shutdown has ended.
These rules are not hostile to security. They make the measure credible. A government that can show a short, reviewable, published order has a far stronger legal and public case than one that quietly lets a cut-off lapse into permanence.
The economic and innovation stakes
No connectivity means no payments, no remote work, no telehealth, no education, and no way for local firms to reach customers. The cost falls on exactly the small businesses and developers who make up the open internet economy. A jurisdiction that treats network access as a discretionary tool of control is also a harder place to build a company, however good its engineers are.
Conclusion
The 2025 data show a record number of shutdowns, and the October analysis argues that the long ones are growing steadily. Both point the same way. The problem is less that emergency powers exist than that they have no built-in end. Legislators and courts should close that gap with time limits, published orders and rapid review, and the international community should treat an indefinite shutdown as a presumptive violation, not a policy choice that fades from view.