India's Digital Personal Data Protection regime has reached its first operational milestone for the private sector. Registration of consent managers came into effect on 13 November 2026, and MeitY launched the Data Protection Board's portal at dpbi.gov.in on 13 November. Applicants must be companies incorporated in India with a net worth of at least ₹2 crore, according to Inc42's report of the launch. The remaining obligations on data fiduciaries, along with the Board's inquiry and penalty processes, are scheduled for 13 May 2027.
The design is mostly sound. The delivery risk is institutional, and that is where policy attention should go.
What a consent manager is
The Press Information Bureau's backgrounder on the DPDP Rules, 2025 describes a consent manager as an entity that provides a single, transparent and interoperable platform through which a person can give, manage, review or withdraw consent. The Rules were notified on 14 November 2025, and the backgrounder says consent managers must be companies based in India. The aim is to move consent from a wall of per-app pop-ups to a dashboard the user controls.
The case for the ₹2 crore floor
The strongest argument for a capital threshold is that a consent manager is a trust intermediary. It sits between individuals and every fiduciary they deal with, and it may hold a map of a person's data relationships. A thinly capitalised entity could fail, be sold, or cut corners on security, and users would bear the harm. PPC Land's reading of the framework describes obligations that go beyond capital. These include data-blind platform design, seven-year record retention, fiduciary-style duties to the user, disclosure of shareholders above 2%, and Board approval for any transfer of control. A financial floor is one reasonable proxy for the ability to meet those obligations.
The documentation burden is real but proportionate to that risk. India Briefing reports that applicants must submit 17 mandatory documents. These include three years of audited financials, a system architecture overview, a conflict-of-interest policy and a business continuity plan. For an entity that will mediate consent for millions of people, that is not excessive.
Where proportionality starts to strain
A pro-innovation reading still finds three pressure points.
- The floor is one ₹2 crore number for very different businesses. A specialist consent manager serving one sector, such as health records or lending, faces the same threshold as a general-purpose platform. Net worth is also an imperfect safety signal. Independent certification of the platform and the conflict-of-interest rules are better direct measures of trustworthiness. The risk is that capital becomes the binding constraint and early entrants are the incumbents who already have it.
- The market's value proposition depends on fiduciaries accepting consent-manager flows. The Act does not make a consent manager a compulsory channel. If large data fiduciaries do not integrate, registrations will outrun usage. Regulators should publish interoperability expectations early.
- The ban on foreign entities is a design choice with a cost. India Briefing notes that a foreign entity cannot apply directly. Data-sovereignty reasons are understandable, but it narrows the pool of technical expertise at the start.
The Board is the bottleneck
The bigger concern is institutional. The Act establishes the Data Protection Board of India as the body that oversees compliance and enforces the law, and the PIB backgrounder says it will consist of four members and run as a fully digital institution. PPC Land reports that MeitY's announcement names no Chairperson or Members. It also reports that, at an October 2026 Kerala High Court hearing, government counsel said the Board was constituted but not functional. I could not verify that hearing against a court record, so it should be read as PPC Land's account. If it holds, applicants are filing with a body that has no publicly identified decision-makers.
That matters because registration is a licensing decision. Applicants need predictable timelines, reasoned decisions and a clear route to challenge refusals. The backgrounder says appeals against Board decisions go to the Telecom Disputes Settlement and Appellate Tribunal (TDSAT), which is a reasonable safeguard, but it only works once the Board is deciding things.
Why May 2027 raises the stakes
The penalty regime that begins in May 2027 is steep. The PIB backgrounder says the Act allows penalties of up to ₹250 crore for failing to maintain reasonable security safeguards, up to ₹200 crore for breach-notification failures or violations of children's obligations, and up to ₹50 crore for other violations. PRS India's tracker records that Parliament passed the Bill in August 2023. Those figures are ceilings, not fines already levied, and the Board decides after an inquiry.
Severity is easier to defend when enforcement is predictable. Fiduciaries have roughly six months to build consent flows, and they will find it hard to design against a Board whose practice is unknown. A functioning consent-manager ecosystem would help them, since one dashboard is easier to support than thousands of bespoke notices.
What to watch
Three things will show whether this works as intended.
- Whether MeitY names the Board's members, and when.
- Whether the Board publishes processing timelines and the register of approved consent managers.
- Whether MeitY issues interoperability guidance so that approved managers have fiduciaries to connect to.
The floor itself is a defensible compromise. The risk is that the licensing and enforcement machinery behind it is not ready when the rest of the Act takes effect.