India's consent manager framework under the Digital Personal Data Protection (DPDP) Rules took effect on 13 November 2026. MeitY Secretary S Krishnan launched the application portal at dpbi.gov.in. The state has opened a registry, but the body that must approve entries is not yet working. The Centre told the Kerala High Court that the Board "has been constituted but has not made functional", and the court has given it eight weeks.
The case for the design
The strongest argument for consent managers is that notice-and-consent has failed. Users click through dozens of dense notices and cannot realistically track what they agreed to or withdraw it. A licensed intermediary that lets a person give, review and withdraw consent from one place addresses a real asymmetry. The DPDP Rules back this with strict obligations. A registered consent manager must act "in a fiduciary capacity in relation to the Data Principal", and it must keep consent records for at least seven years. It must also ensure that the personal data passing through its platform is not readable by the consent manager itself. The Rules also bar conflicts of interest with data fiduciaries. That is a serious attempt to build a trusted layer, and it deserves to be taken seriously.
What the entry gate looks like
Only a company incorporated in India can apply. It must show sufficient technical, operational and financial capacity, sound management, and a net worth of not less than two crore rupees. It must also have independent certification that its interoperable platform meets standards the Board publishes. Rule 4 puts the decision with the Board: it may inquire, then register the applicant and publish its particulars, or reject the application and give reasons. The Board can later require corrective action, and after a hearing it can suspend or cancel registration.
A fiduciary duty, a seven-year audit trail and an independent certification are demanding. Their cost is justified if the aim is a layer people can trust with the keys to their data. A ₹2 crore net-worth floor is modest by the standards of financial regulation. It is unlikely to be the binding constraint on serious entrants.
Where the framework is exposed
The weakness is sequencing. MediaNama reports that MeitY advertised posts for a chairperson and four members in Employment News on 6 June 2026. It also reports that a Lok Sabha written reply on 12 August said a search-cum-selection committee would make the appointments, without giving a date. MediaNama said it could not find a public notification naming the chairperson or members. The portal tells applicants that the Board "will examine your application and decide whether to approve your registration". A Board with no appointed members cannot do that.
The Kerala High Court addressed this in a Digi Yatra public interest petition, C.R. Neelakandan v. Union of India (WP(PIL) No. 15 of 2026). The Division Bench of Chief Justice Soumen Sen and Justice Syam Kumar V.M. said it expected that "the Board will be made functional within a period of eight weeks from date". The reported hearing was around 7 October, which would put the deadline in early December. That date is our inference from LiveLaw's report, not a date stated in the order. The Board's wider workload also grows on 13 May 2027, when most other obligations begin. It will need to be working well before then.
Why this matters for innovation
A consent manager is a business that has to raise capital, build an interoperable platform and sign up data fiduciaries. All of that depends on a regulator that can give a yes or no on a predictable timeline. An open portal and an unstaffed approver is the worst case for investors: money is spent on certification and compliance with no date for a decision. The incumbents that can wait, such as large platforms and telecom firms, are better placed than start-ups. MediaNama notes that Airtel has already argued that data collectors should be allowed to act as consent managers, which the Rules' conflict-of-interest provisions currently restrict. A slow Board therefore invites the wrong pressure to loosen safeguards, because the legitimate route is blocked.
There is a speech and privacy dimension too. The consent manager model only works if people trust it. Early failures, such as a manager that cannot be held to account because no one can revoke its registration, would damage that trust. That is the point of the hearing and cancellation powers in Rule 4, and they exist only on paper until the Board has members.
What proportionate implementation would look like
- Appoint the Board and say so publicly. A gazette notification naming the chairperson and members would settle the question the Kerala court raised.
- Publish a decision timeline. Applicants should know how long the Board has to decide and what information it can request.
- Publish the certification standards early. The Rules require independent certification against standards the Board publishes. Applicants cannot prepare until they see them.
- Keep the safeguards. The fiduciary duty and the bar on conflicts are what make consent managers worth having. They should not be weakened because the Board is slow.
India's rule design for consent managers is sound. What is missing is the institution that will run it. If the Board is staffed within the court's eight weeks and publishes its standards, the framework will have lost little time. If it is not, applicants will have a portal with no one behind it.