On 14 October 2026 the Bundestag's Economic Affairs and Energy Committee heard experts on the government's Twelfth Amendment to the Act against Restraints of Competition (12. GWB-Novelle, Drucksache 21/7865). The bill is often described as a deregulatory reset of German merger control. It is better read as a package of three separate bets, and only one of them is contested.
What the bill does
The worldwide turnover threshold for merger notification rises from €500 million to €750 million. The first domestic threshold rises from €50 million to €75 million, and the second from €17.5 million to €20 million, according to MTR Legal's account of the hearing. The same account says a transaction value above €400 million is to be treated as an indication of future disruptive market change. That is the 'killer acquisition' hook for deals involving young, low-turnover targets.
The bill also lets the Bundeskartellamt analyse procurement prices and data 'systematically and without suspicion', backed by a new data-transmission duty for contracting authorities. It extends the press-publisher cartel exemption to private broadcasters and limits the Bundeskartellamt president's term to eight years. These points are reported in the Bundestag's hearing summary (hib 831/2026) and in MTR Legal's account.
The strongest case for higher thresholds
The case for raising the thresholds is stronger than critics concede. Daniel Zimmer of the University of Bonn told the committee that the increase 'appears justifiable in light of inflation'. The hearing record puts cumulative inflation from 2002 to 2026 at around 50 percent, which is roughly the size of the proposed increase from €500 million to €750 million. Jan Heithecker of Dentons called the change appropriate and said it brings a 'considerable' reduction in bureaucracy.
The ministry's own estimate is modest: it expects notifications to fall by about 13 to 14 percent, or roughly 120 cases a year, per Noerr's overview of the draft. Fewer filings for small deals leave agency staff free for the cases that matter. For startups and mid-sized firms that are selling or buying, avoiding a filing means faster closings and lower legal costs. A merger regime that reviews every mid-sized deal does not make Germany safer. It adds friction to the capital recycling that innovation economies rely on.
Where the critique has force
The opposing case rests on what the thresholds shield. Rupprecht Podszun called the increase 'not purposeful' and warned that deals in regional markets could fall outside control, according to the Bundestag's hearing summary. Andreas Mundt, the Bundeskartellamt president, backed the tender screening but argued that the higher thresholds limit action against economic power 'beyond an economically sensible level' and so 'open protection gaps'.
The objection is concrete, and it is not specific to technology. Local and regional consolidation, in sectors such as waste management, can raise prices without ever involving a €750 million group. Ulrich Möller of Rebalance Now argued that the change is not a nominal adjustment but a real restriction of merger control. He pointed to a consumer-price rise of 21.9 percent between 2020 and 2025, a shorter and more recent window than the 2002 baseline. Which inflation baseline is right depends on when the thresholds were last set, and the hearing did not settle that.
The digital angle is thinner than it looks
The transaction-value test is the provision most relevant to the technology sector. It is not new in principle, since German law already has a transaction-value threshold. The bill sets it on a firmer footing. Since the ministry's draft also introduces a pre-notification phase (the 'Phase 0' described by Noerr), the practical effect on tech acquisitions depends on how the Bundeskartellamt uses it.
Here the proportionate approach has an evidence problem. Killer-acquisition theory is credible, but the burden of proof falls on the regulator to show that a specific deal removes a competitor that would otherwise have grown. A €400 million value threshold sweeps in many ordinary acqui-hires and talent-driven purchases. A regime that notifies these cases without a clear theory of harm risks becoming a toll on exits, which would lower startup valuations and discourage early-stage investment.
The better design keeps the threshold and publishes the Bundeskartellamt's screening criteria, along with a fast track for deals that do not overlap horizontally. Predictability serves both agency and industry.
Tender screening is the clear win
The least controversial item deserves the most attention. Mundt told the committee that the compliance burden of tender screening would be 'absolutely low'. Even Podszun, who opposed the thresholds, called it an 'excellent example of learning from abroad and of digitalising competition protection'. Under the draft, the screening data comes from procurement that already exists. Bid-rigging is a hard cartel offence that is difficult to detect without data, and systematic analysis of award prices is a proportionate tool. It targets conduct, imposes little on lawful firms, and uses the data public buyers already hold. Other European agencies run similar programmes.
Press exemption and the eight-year term
Extending the press-publisher exemption to private broadcasters is aimed at cooperation against large online platforms. The idea is understandable, but it creates a legal carve-out from the cartel ban. Such carve-outs need an evidence base showing that cooperation produces better outcomes for audiences. Parliament should require an evaluation after a fixed period. The eight-year limit on the president's term, which excludes reappointment under the draft as summarised by Oppenhoff, is a sound governance reform. It limits the concentration of power in one office, and it applies to the very authority that Mundt asks Parliament to leave strong.
What lawmakers should do
The thresholds should rise, because pegging them to prices is defensible. But Parliament should pair the increase with a call-in power for sectors where local markets matter, so that Mundt's 'protection gaps' are closed narrowly instead of by lowering thresholds for everyone. It should also require annual reporting on how many transaction-value cases were notified, how many were cleared and how many were challenged. That would show whether the digital provisions catch real harm or only add cost.