What the bill does
Kenya's Competition (Amendment) Bill, 2026, published as National Assembly Bill No. 4 and sponsored by Majority Leader Kimani Ichung'wah, is now pending before Parliament. The Parliament of Kenya lists it as a bill document on its website. Coverage on 24 July 2026 reported that second reading began on 30 June and that public participation closed in late July.
The bill does two things. First, it lets the Competition Authority of Kenya (CAK) act against digital platforms with a "strategic market position" even when they are not dominant. TechTrends Kenya reports that the assessment weighs data control, network effects, switching costs and how far users and businesses depend on the platform. Second, it targets abuse of "superior bargaining position," where a trading partner has no viable alternative. That category covers merchants, drivers and developers who depend on a large platform.
The bill also lets the Authority require binding sector codes of practice. Reports say the Authority separately told the Assembly it needs powers over virtual assets and AI-driven markets.
The strongest case for the bill
The case for intervention is real. A driver on a ride-hailing app cannot negotiate terms, and deactivation can end their income overnight. Tech-ish reports that the bill targets varying contract terms without notice, failing to give terms and conditions before service begins, and imposing unduly difficult conditions for ending a service. Those are ordinary fairness complaints, not exotic theories.
A dominance test also fits poorly with platform markets. A firm can control a marketplace or app store, and the data behind it, without holding a large share of any conventionally defined market. Network effects and switching costs are legitimate reasons why a firm can matter without being dominant. A regulator with only a dominance test may arrive too late.
Where the design is risky
The problem is not that the concerns are wrong. The problem is that the bill's thresholds are wide and its evidentiary base looks thin.
The triggers are broad. A firm that influences "prices, quality, service, output or innovation to an appreciable extent" could describe most successful platforms. Tech-ish reports that critics see drafting problems, including undefined key terms and a sweep across all digital platforms without separating ride-hailing's issues from those of marketplaces, food delivery or app stores. One rule cannot fit all of those markets.
The penalties are heavy. TechTrends Kenya reports fines of up to KSh10 million, imprisonment of up to five years, or both. Tech-ish reports administrative fines of up to 10% of gross annual turnover in Kenya. It also reports that Kenya's banks asked for a 1% cap on the turnover fine, which shows how sharply firms are contesting the scale. Prison terms for commercial conduct under a vaguely defined test give any platform reason to withdraw services or avoid entering the market. Kenya's ride-hailing and delivery apps depend on venture and foreign investment, and open-ended criminal exposure raises the price of that capital.
The local evidence is missing. Dr. Vellah Kedogo Kigwiru, a research fellow at the Technical University of Munich, argued in Mjengo Hub that Parliament should not adopt digital market rules modelled on foreign frameworks without evidence of failure in Kenya. She noted that the Authority has not published a comprehensive digital market inquiry to justify the shift. She also said India, South Korea and Brazil have paused similar bills. I have not verified that last claim independently, so treat it as her assertion.
A market inquiry is the ordinary way to answer this. It would show which platforms hold leverage, over whom, and with what harm to prices, wages or entry. Without one, the bill lets the Authority define the problem after it has the power.
A proportionate alternative
Parliament can keep the useful parts and narrow the rest:
- Commission a digital market study first. Publish findings on ride-hailing, delivery and marketplaces before enacting sector-specific duties.
- Define the triggers. Set objective criteria for "strategic market position," with a designation process that gives the firm notice and a right of appeal.
- Focus on transparency. Advance notice of term changes and clear deactivation procedures address the driver complaints without prescribing business models.
- Use codes of practice before criminal sanctions. Binding codes negotiated with the sector are more adaptable than prison terms written into statute. Criminal penalties should be reserved for cases such as deliberate defiance of an order, not for a contested market-power judgement.
- Sunset and review. Require a review after two or three years so the rules can be corrected if they discourage investment.
The extra powers the Authority reportedly wants over virtual assets and AI-driven markets raise the same question in a stronger form. Those markets are moving fast, and rules written before any evidence of local harm are the most likely to age badly.
The bottom line
Kenya is right to ask whether a driver, merchant or app developer has any recourse against a platform that controls their livelihood. The bill answers with a broad, low-threshold power backed by criminal exposure and without a published local inquiry. A narrower bill built on a market study would protect the same people at a lower cost to the investment that Kenya's digital economy needs.