On 11 November 2026, Lina Attalah, co-founder and editor-in-chief of the independent outlet Mada Masr, was due at a hearing in a second criminal case within two weeks. According to the Electronic Frontier Foundation's account, she was found guilty on 27 October of managing an unlicensed news website. Mada Masr says it repeatedly applied for a licence and never received an acknowledgement. She was fined the maximum 3 million Egyptian pounds (about $53,400), and the court ordered the outlet closed and its equipment confiscated. The 11 November hearing concerned false-news and unlicensed-website charges. It was postponed to 18 November, when proceedings were suspended after the defence asked the judge to recuse himself. The appeal against the 27 October closure and fine is set for 25 November.
The obvious framing for a platform-policy publication is that Egypt lacks a Digital Markets Act and that this leaves independent media exposed. I think that framing is mostly wrong. The more useful question is what a competition regime can and cannot do for press freedom.
The strongest case for the platform-power argument
The case deserves a fair statement. Independent outlets in repressive environments depend on a handful of intermediaries for distribution, hosting and payments. A concentrated intermediary can be pressured by a government, or can act arbitrarily on its own. The EU's Digital Markets Act, adopted in September 2022 and applicable since 2 May 2023, targets this kind of leverage. It sets objective criteria for designating "gatekeepers" and allows fines of up to 10% of worldwide turnover, or 20% for repeat infringement. If gatekeepers must treat business users fairly, a small publisher has some protection against being cut off arbitrarily.
That protection is real, but it addresses commercial discrimination by platforms. It does not address a state that prosecutes the publisher directly.
What actually happened to Mada Masr
Nothing in the EFF's account points to a platform as the pressure point. The outlet has been blocked by the Egyptian government since 2017 yet kept reaching Egyptian and global audiences. The leverage the state used was a licensing requirement backed by criminal penalties. EFF argues that "requiring news organizations to obtain government authorization to operate creates an obvious mechanism for restricting who gets to publish."
The legal architecture dates to Law No. 180 of 2018. TIMEP's brief on the law records several features:
- Website applicants had to disclose their purpose and ownership and pay a 50,000-pound licensing fee.
- Personal websites, blogs and social accounts with 5,000 subscribers or more count as media outlets for the false-news prohibition.
- The regulator can censor content found to violate that prohibition.
- More than 500 websites had been blocked by the time the law passed.
The Mada Masr case combines licensing, a false-news offence and a closure order. A gatekeeper-conduct rule has no purchase on any of the three.
Why importing a DMA would be the wrong remedy
Egypt's competition regulator has taken a more modest path. In October 2025 the Egyptian Competition Authority (ECA) published guidelines on applying the existing competition law to digital markets. According to a June 2026 law-firm summary, the guidelines "do not introduce new legal obligations." They keep the 25% market-share threshold for dominance. They add non-price indicators of market power such as active users and time spent, and they cover conduct such as self-preferencing, tying and discriminatory treatment of business users. The ECA's own site lists its guidance documents, though I could not load the digital-markets page directly to check the text.
This is closer to proportionate regulation than the DMA model. It applies existing law case by case rather than imposing ex-ante duties on designated firms. For a mid-sized economy that depends on foreign platforms for reach, that matters. An ex-ante gatekeeper regime in Egypt would hand a regulator discretion over global platforms' product design. That regulator sits in the same state apparatus that licenses newsrooms, and discretion over platforms is exactly what an Egyptian government could point at independent speech. A DMA-style regime run by an institution without independence does not constrain power. It adds another instrument to it.
The EU's experience also shows that DMA obligations are shaped by courts, a free press and a competition authority that answers to law. Those preconditions are what Egypt's media regime removes. Copying the statute without them would not copy the protection.
What would help
The remedy sits in media law, not competition law:
- End the licensing requirement for online news. A permit regime that can be withheld without response, as Mada Masr describes, makes publishing a privilege.
- Narrow the false-news offence. The EFF calls it one of the government's most frequently used tools against journalists. Criminal liability should be reserved for demonstrable, knowing harm.
- Limit blocking to court orders with reasons. The 2018 law's censorship and blocking powers are the structural problem.
- Keep competition enforcement evidence-based. If the ECA applies its guidelines to dominant platforms, it should publish reasoned decisions, so that competition tools cannot become a back door to content control.
Platform-neutral, open-internet protections do matter for Egyptian publishers. Neutral access to app stores and search is worth defending, and competition law can help there. But it is a complement to press freedom, not a substitute.
Conclusion
The Mada Masr prosecutions are a case study in the state acting directly against a publisher. The missing-DMA argument misdiagnoses the problem, and the proposed cure could create a new risk. Egypt's restrained ECA guidelines are a reasonable competition posture. The press-freedom fix is to repeal licensing and false-news criminalisation.