Per MediaNama's report of August 18, 2026, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) says it has taken an "evidence-based and adaptive approach" to the draft Digital Competition Bill and has ordered a market study before finalising it. The study will test the thresholds for Systemically Significant Digital Enterprises (SSDEs), the list of Core Digital Services, and the bill's effect on competition, innovation, startups and MSMEs. That sends a DMA-style ex-ante framework back for empirical testing, and it is the right call.
The case for moving fast
The strongest argument for ex-ante rules is a real one. Competition law that acts only after harm has occurred can be too slow for markets with network effects. The Committee on Digital Competition Law, whose report is summarised by PRS Legislative Research, argued in March 2024 that the reactive Competition Act framework cannot prevent "irreversible tipping of markets" toward dominant firms. On that view, waiting for an investigation to conclude means the market has already tipped. Parliament's Standing Committee on Finance made a similar push, and MediaNama reports it urged the government in August 2026 to finalise the bill and to include cloud services and virtual assistants. Those concerns deserve a serious answer.
What the draft actually sets
The draft bill text fixes designation thresholds in Section 3(2). An enterprise is deemed an SSDE for a Core Digital Service if, in each of the preceding three financial years, it meets one financial threshold and one user threshold.
The financial thresholds are:
- turnover in India of at least INR 4,000 crore;
- global turnover of at least USD 30 billion;
- gross merchandise value in India of at least INR 16,000 crore; or
- global market capitalisation of at least USD 75 billion.
The user thresholds are at least one crore end users or at least ten thousand business users.
Section 3(3) then lets the Competition Commission of India (CCI) designate an enterprise that misses every number, based on a list of sixteen qualitative factors that ends with "any other factor which the Commission may consider relevant." Designation lasts three years, and the Central Government may revise the thresholds on the same cycle.
The design contains two problems. The numbers are fixed in statute, yet nobody has published evidence on how many Indian firms they capture. And the discretionary route in Section 3(3) means a firm below every threshold can still be designated. That leaves the regime's reach undefined, which is a poor foundation for ex-ante obligations.
Why the EU template needs testing, not transplanting
The EU's Digital Markets Act (Regulation 2022/1925) designates "gatekeepers" using presumptive thresholds on turnover, market capitalisation and user numbers. Those thresholds can be rebutted in exceptional circumstances. The DMA was written for a single market where the largest platforms are overwhelmingly foreign, and its thresholds were calibrated to that market. India's market is different. It has a large domestic startup ecosystem, a payments and commerce stack built on public infrastructure, and a fast-growing base of small business users who depend on platforms for reach.
A threshold that suits Brussels can sweep in a growing Indian firm too early. MediaNama reports that the finance committee itself asked for rebuttal mechanisms in the SSDE framework, to avoid capturing growing domestic firms prematurely. Once an ex-ante regime is in force, the cost of a wrong threshold lands on the compliance budgets of the firms least able to bear it.
The study's scope suggests the ministry sees this. According to MediaNama's account of the MCA's request for proposals, the study covers SSDE identification criteria, the relevance of the nine core digital services, and institutional readiness. It also weighs innovation against fair competition, and involves primary research with Big Tech firms, startups and MSMEs. It compares the EU's DMA with Japan's and South Korea's approaches. That is what evidence-based rulemaking looks like.
What the study must deliver
The delay is only defensible if the study produces something concrete. Three tests matter.
- Publish the methodology and the findings. Startups and MSMEs, whose interests the study is meant to protect, can only assess it if they can read it. A study whose results stay inside the ministry adds delay without adding legitimacy.
- Tie thresholds to demonstrated harm. Each Core Digital Service should be justified by evidence of a contestability problem in India, not by its presence in the EU's list.
- Set a timetable. An open-ended review leaves the sector uncertain. The finance committee's call to finalise the bill shows the pressure to conclude, and the ministry should answer it with a date.
There is also a cost to over-reading this pause. The CCI can still act against abuse of dominance under the existing Competition Act, so this is not regulatory vacuum. The study affects the design of an additional, prescriptive layer. It does not remove the tools Indian regulators already have.
The bottom line
The argument for ex-ante rules stays serious, and the market study does not defeat it. It tests it. If the evidence shows that India's markets are tipping in ways case-by-case enforcement cannot handle, the bill can be finalised with thresholds that stand up to scrutiny. If it shows the draft's numbers would sweep in domestic firms or duplicate existing law, then finalising the draft as written would have been a mistake. Either way, India ends up with a framework based on its own market data. That is better than one copied from Brussels.