On 25 September 2026, telecom and internet services in Ethiopia's Tigray region stopped working as fighting between federal forces and Tigrayan forces broke a four-year-old peace deal. NetBlocks reported a subnational internet disruption in northern Ethiopia that matched reports of a blackout in Tigray (Al Jazeera). The unusual feature of this blackout is that nobody has accepted responsibility for it.
Two accounts, no resolution
Reuters reported that four people with knowledge of the matter, including a diplomatic source, said the TPLF had ordered both Ethio telecom and Safaricom Ethiopia to shut their networks. One source said this may be a tactic to neutralise the government's advantage in using battlefield drones. A source close to the TPLF, speaking anonymously, denied responsibility and blamed the government (Reuters via The Star). Reuters also found that calls to Ethio telecom numbers did not connect, while Safaricom customers had limited connectivity. Al Jazeera's account says the networks stopped working, so the reporting differs on how complete the outage was.
We cannot tell readers who is responsible. The public record is anonymous sourcing on one side and an anonymous denial on the other. Analysis should not pick a side on facts that have not been established.
The strongest case for a wartime cut
There is a serious argument for cutting networks. A commercial network can be used for targeting, coordination and surveillance. If a party to a conflict believes that live connectivity helps an adversary's drones or intelligence, cutting it looks like a defensive measure. This is the logic reported by Reuters' sources. It deserves a fair hearing because armed groups and states have both reasoned this way.
The argument still fails on proportionality, for three reasons.
- The harm lands on civilians. The same network carries emergency calls, family contact, remittances and aid coordination. A regional shutdown cannot separate a drone operator from a hospital.
- The military benefit is uncertain. Reuters' own sourcing frames the drone rationale as something the cut "may" achieve. A harm to millions justified by a possible tactical benefit does not meet a necessity test.
- Darkness removes scrutiny. When networks are down, abuses go unreported and unverified, and each side's claims become harder to check. The Ethiopian military's reported claim of 436 enemy troops killed could not be independently confirmed by Reuters.
The legal standard does not turn on who ordered it
The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights adopted its Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information in Africa on 10 November 2019. It entered into force on 17 April 2020. Its non-interference principle (Principle 38) covers people's ability to seek, receive and impart information through digital technologies. The Commission relied on that principle in its Resolution on Internet Shutdowns and Elections in Africa, ACHPR/Res.580. We did not retrieve the verbatim text of Principle 38, so we describe it only in those general terms.
These instruments bind states, not armed groups. That gap is the accountability problem. If a government orders the cut, the Declaration and the Commission's resolution apply directly. If a non-state authority orders it, the state is not off the hook. It still controls the licences of Ethio telecom and Safaricom Ethiopia, and it carries the duty to protect and restore service. A shutdown that is hard to attribute should trigger transparency obligations, not a shrug.
What the earlier blackout taught
The 2020-2022 war is the precedent everyone has in mind. Access Now describes a targeted shutdown in Tigray lasting more than two years. Thomson Reuters Foundation's Context reported that a nearly two-year phone and internet shutdown began when fighting erupted in November 2020. It also cited NetBlocks' estimate that an earlier 23-day nationwide shutdown cost Ethiopia more than $100 million. Reuters noted that the African Union estimated about 600,000 deaths in that war. We do not claim the shutdown caused those deaths. The point is that the information environment around a catastrophe was dark, which is exactly why attribution and accountability were so slow.
What proportionate policy looks like
A pro-innovation, rights-respecting response does not require pretending the security concerns are fake. It requires process that survives bad faith from every side.
- Operators should publish and log orders. Ethio telecom and Safaricom Ethiopia should disclose, as far as the law allows, whether a cut was directed, by whom, and under what authority. Silence leaves customers unable to tell an order from an outage.
- Independent measurement should be standard. NetBlocks-style monitoring was the only confirmation here. Regulators and donors should treat that data as a baseline for accountability, not an afterthought.
- Carve-outs for humanitarian traffic. If a network must degrade, emergency, medical and aid-coordination services should be preserved first.
- Restoration timelines. A cut with no stated end date and no review is not a proportionate measure.
We found no reporting on whether the blackout has been lifted, and we do not assume it has. The key lesson is that responsibility for a shutdown should not have to be proven before the questions start. Operators, regulators and the African Commission should be asking who gave the order, on what authority, and when service returns.