Uber ended ride-hailing operations in Nigeria on September 2, 2026, after 12 years in the market. The next day the Amalgamated Union of App-Based Transporters of Nigeria (AUATON) condemned the exit. It said drivers received no notice, no transition plan and no consultation. It blamed a business model that rejected collective bargaining. It warned that Bolt and InDrive would "suffer the same fate" unless they bargain with the union, and it demanded recognition as the sole bargaining representative for app-based drivers, plus fair pay, welfare packages and transparency.
The strongest case for the union
The union's grievance is real. A driver who built an income around a platform for years woke up to find it gone. Drivers are formally independent contractors, so no statute obliged Uber to give notice. Where one company sets fares, deducts commission and can deactivate accounts unilaterally, individual drivers have little bargaining power. Collective bargaining is a legitimate way to address that imbalance, and a pro-innovation view should not dismiss it.
The union is also not an outsider. It represents drivers, delivery riders and other app-based transport workers, and it holds a registered trade union certificate.
What actually drove Uber out
The reporting on why Uber left points mainly to economics, not to a missing bargaining table. Al Jazeera reported that fuel costs rose after the government removed the fuel subsidy, and that maintenance and spare-parts costs rose too. Platform commissions of 25–30 percent, combined with those costs, left thin margins for drivers. Drivers staged a three-day strike in March 2026 over these conditions. AUATON co-founder Ayoade Ibrahim described the squeeze this way: the platform takes 25–30 percent, and then come fuel, maintenance and insurance.
That matters for policy. A recognition agreement does not change the price of petrol. If margins are negative at the fares riders will pay, a bargaining council does not create a viable market. It only determines who shares the loss.
Uber is also not alone. Al Jazeera notes that Uber has also pulled out of Ivory Coast (2025), Tanzania (January 2026) and Uganda (September 2026). Those markets differ widely in their labour rules, so an exit in one cannot be blamed on any single regulatory choice.
The "sole representative" demand is the weakest part
AUATON wants to be the only recognised voice for app-based drivers. The Trade Unions Act (Cap. T14) does say, in section 3(2), that no union shall be registered to represent workers where a union already exists for them. That is the legal foundation for exclusivity claims.
Nigeria's own industrial court has since questioned that provision. In NASU v. Akinnibi (30 May 2023), Justice B. B. Kanyip of the National Industrial Court applied ILO Convention No. 87, which Nigeria has ratified. He held that union plurality, not monopoly, meets international standards. The court let a rival union pursue registration despite the incumbent's monopoly. The case concerned university staff, not drivers. Its logic still applies to any claim that one union must speak for an entire sector.
This is a speech and association issue as much as a labour one. Drivers who prefer another union, a cooperative or direct dealing with platforms should be free to choose. A statutory sole-agent status would also hand one organisation leverage over every platform. That is a risk for a market where local entrants and Bolt and InDrive compete for the market Uber left.
A proportionate alternative: transparency and price rules
Kenya offers a more targeted model. Its transport regulator published rules in June 2022 capping platform commissions at 18 percent. Business Daily reported that Uber cut its commission from 25 percent to 18 percent on 30 October 2022 after a driver strike, in line with those rules. Uber had initially opposed the cap. Al Jazeera notes that Uber is still operating in Kenya.
A hard cap has costs. It can push platforms to cut driver incentives or raise fares, and it may deter entry. A cap is still a narrower intervention than a compelled bargaining regime. It targets the disputed variable directly.
A proportionate Nigerian approach would have three parts:
- Disclosure duties: Platforms would publish commission rates, deactivation criteria and fare-setting rules in plain language. AUATON's transparency demand can be met without touching employment classification.
- Notice and wind-down rules: A reasonable notice period before a platform exits or deactivates large driver cohorts. This answers the union's most concrete complaint, the surprise, at low cost.
- Voluntary, plural bargaining: Platforms would be free to negotiate with any registered union or driver association. No single body would be given a statutory monopoly.
What to watch
Bolt and InDrive now carry the market. If they respond with credible commission and transparency commitments, the union has a route to a negotiated outcome. If policymakers instead mandate exclusive recognition without addressing fuel and cost pressure, they risk the very exits the union fears. Drivers are best protected by a viable market with transparent terms and more than one platform bidding for their time.
The lesson of Uber's exit is not that collective voice is unimportant. It is that voice works when the underlying economics can sustain the platform and when workers can choose who represents them.