On 5 November 2026 the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India released recommendations on a framework for authorising Satellite Communication Network (SCN) providers and assigning them spectrum (TRAI Press Release No. 151 of 2026). The framework is a real step toward regulatory certainty for satellite connectivity. Several of its security conditions, however, are drafted more broadly than the risks they address.
What TRAI proposes
According to the press release, TRAI recommends a new authorisation under Section 3(1)(b) of the Telecommunications Act, 2023. SCN providers would sell satellite network capacity as a service to eligible telecom operators, and would not serve end users directly. The press release describes national coverage and a maximum term of 20 years, renewable. It also covers fixed-satellite (FSS), mobile-satellite (MSS) and direct-to-device (D2D) services.
MediaNama's report on the recommendations describes the control conditions (MediaNama):
- Operation, maintenance and control facilities must be located in India. This includes user terminals belonging to partnering authorised entities.
- Providers must submit the location and technical details of each satellite earth station gateway to the Central Government or a designated agency before establishing it. The government may then direct specific actions.
- Providers must offer a real-time traffic monitoring facility. The aim is to enforce limits on routing Indian user traffic through foreign gateways and on mirroring it to foreign networks.
- Providers must report any attempt to use the network through a terminal not registered with the partnering entity, and must prevent direct terminal-to-terminal communication that bypasses a gateway.
MediaNama also notes that TRAI has not prescribed a specific technology or authentication mechanism for detecting unregistered terminals.
The strongest case for the framework
The case for these conditions is serious. Satellite constellations are, by design, transnational systems. A signal can be relayed through infrastructure that a national regulator cannot inspect. India has legitimate interests in lawful interception, in preventing misuse of terminals in sensitive areas, and in making sure traffic does not quietly leave the jurisdiction. Requiring that control sit inside the country, and that gateways are known before they are built, gives enforcement agencies something concrete to supervise. A wholesale authorisation model also keeps the consumer relationship, and the existing KYC and security obligations, with licensed telecom operators.
Where the framework is sound
The wholesale design is a good idea on its own terms. India's earlier satcom work already moved toward consolidation. In September 2024 the Broadband India Forum welcomed TRAI's recommendations to merge GMPCS and commercial VSAT CUG licences into a single satellite-based telecommunication authorisation (Voice&Data). An SCN category that lets terrestrial operators buy satellite capacity, and use satellite links to extend D2D coverage, builds on that. It could bring connectivity to places where towers and fibre do not pay.
The spectrum track has been slower. TRAI sent spectrum recommendations to the Department of Telecommunications in May 2025. DoT issued a back-reference on 12 November 2025, and TRAI replied on 8 December 2025 (TRAI response page). A framework that settles the authorisation question is welcome after that delay.
Where proportionality is at risk
Three features deserve scrutiny.
First, "located in India" is broad. Placing network control in India is a defensible sovereignty condition. Extending it to partners' user terminals, as MediaNama reports, is harder to read. A terminal is a customer device. If the requirement means operational control over terminals, it is workable. If it implies terminal-level infrastructure inside India for every partner, it could limit which constellations are commercially viable here.
Second, real-time traffic monitoring is open-ended. The recommendations, as reported, require a monitoring facility to enforce routing restrictions. They do not say what the facility sees, who operates it, or what legal process governs access. Surveillance capability built into network infrastructure tends to outlive the problem it was built for. A narrower design would monitor routing metadata, such as which gateway carried traffic, and would leave content inspection to the existing lawful-interception rules under the Telecommunications Act. It would also need to say who holds the data and for how long.
Third, gateway pre-clearance with open-ended directions. Submitting gateway details before construction is reasonable. Allowing the government to "direct specific actions" without stated criteria or timelines creates discretion that investors will price in. Satellite operators commit capital years ahead, and an undefined approval step is a risk cost whatever the intention behind it.
The detection duty for unregistered terminals also deserves a mention. TRAI leaves the technology unspecified. That is flexible, but it leaves providers unsure what counts as compliance and when they face liability.
What a better final framework would look like
- Define the monitoring. Specify the data categories, the operator of the facility, retention limits and the legal authority for access. Tie content access to existing interception procedures.
- Time-limit gateway review. Set a fixed review period and written grounds for any direction, with deemed approval after the period lapses.
- Clarify the terminal condition. Say whether it applies to operational control or to physical infrastructure, and treat customer devices differently from network equipment.
- Make compliance outcome-based. Require that unregistered terminals be detected and reported to a stated standard, and let providers choose the means.
India has a chance to set a regional model for wholesale satellite authorisation. Security and openness are compatible, but only if the obligations are precise enough for operators to build around and narrow enough that they do not become a general-purpose surveillance mandate. The recommendations now go to the Department of Telecommunications. The detail that matters most is in how it turns the monitoring and terminal provisions into licence conditions.