Estonia net neutrality

The Kobosko Draft Would Trade Net Neutrality's Bright Lines for Regulator-Brokered Interconnection, and Small Markets Like Estonia Would Feel It First

A draft ITRE report on the Digital Networks Act would loosen traffic-management limits and create a 2% 'significant traffic provider' class. The change would hit national regulators like Estonia's.

Net Neutrality Draft: Key Numbers People of Internet Research · Estonia 2% Traffic share threshold Peak EU traffic that would make a … 4 Legal acts merged The DNA merges four legal acts, in… €9,600 Estonia fine (2017) Reported in 2017; current regime u… peopleofinternet.com
Net Neutrality Draft: Key Numbers People of Internet Research · Estonia 2% Traffic share threshold 4 Legal acts merged €9,600 Estonia fine (2017) peopleofinternet.com

Key Takeaways

What the draft proposes

In late October 2026, Michał Kobosko, the rapporteur for the European Parliament's Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) committee, circulated a draft report on the Commission's Digital Networks Act (DNA). According to the Internet Society's 3 November analysis, he was due to present it to the committee on 10 November, with amendments due on 12 November. I could not find a source confirming that the presentation took place, so this piece treats the draft as a working text, not an adopted position. I also could not open the draft itself. What follows relies on the Internet Society's description of it, which is an advocacy organisation's reading.

As the Internet Society describes it, the draft does three things:

The strongest case for the draft

The case for the draft deserves a fair statement. Network operators carry the cost of building out fibre and mobile capacity, while a handful of very large traffic sources drive much of the load. A bargaining asymmetry can exist when one party's traffic share is so large that a smaller operator cannot realistically refuse its terms. Binding dispute resolution could give small operators a backstop. Extending open-internet duties to CDNs and operating systems also reflects a real point: gatekeeping can happen above the access layer, and a regulation written in 2015 did not anticipate that.

The Commission's own January 2026 proposal took a more cautious route. Its DNA page says the act merges four legal acts into one Regulation, including "the core parts of the Open Internet Regulation." It describes a "voluntary ecosystem cooperation mechanism on IP interconnection, traffic efficiency, and other emerging areas." The operative word is voluntary. Tech Policy Press reported at the time that the Commission had dropped proposals requiring large platforms to contribute financially to network rollout. The draft report, as described, moves from voluntary to regulator-backed compulsion.

Why the design fails on its own terms

First, the 2% threshold is a proxy for size, not for harm. The Internet Society argued in January that there is no evidence of systemic interconnection market failure that would justify this mechanism. A binding-decision backstop changes the incentives of every negotiation. An operator that can expect a regulator to impose a price has little reason to accept a lower one voluntarily. That is how a "negotiation" turns into a de facto network usage fee, which is the "fair share" idea the Commission itself stepped back from.

Second, removing 'no longer than necessary' weakens the one test that kept exceptions narrow. The Commission's open-internet guidance describes lawful traffic management as "reasonable day-to-day traffic management according to objectively justified technical requirements, which must be independent of the origin or destination of the traffic and of any commercial considerations." The draft, as described, would allow measures that are only partly commercial. Once partly commercial reasons are acceptable, almost any prioritisation arrangement can be argued to have a technical rationale alongside a commercial one. Users and start-ups cannot tell in advance which side of the line they are on, and uncertainty is a cost that falls hardest on firms without a legal department.

Third, extending obligations to AI providers and operating systems is overbroad. Applying rules about equal treatment of traffic to actors "capable of influencing traffic management or content delivery quality" could cover a wide range of ordinary product design decisions. A rule that reaches everything gives regulators discretion and gives innovators very little certainty. Proportionate regulation targets a demonstrated problem at the layer where it occurs: access providers controlling the last mile.

The Estonian angle: enforcement capacity matters more than text

Estonia's national regulator enforces the Open Internet Regulation today. The Commission's open-internet page says national regulators "have the powers and the obligation to assess traffic management, commercial practices and agreements and to effectively enforce the Regulation." Under the draft, they would also be asked to adjudicate binding interconnection disputes involving the largest global traffic sources.

A caution about the penalty figure that circulates with this story. A 2017 EUobserver investigation reported that the net neutrality penalty in Estonia was €9,600, against up to €2 million in Spain. An Estonian spokeswoman told the outlet that the framework was proportional and effective, and that the penalty could be applied repeatedly until a breach ended. That article is nine years old. I could not verify the current penalty regime, so the figure should be read as a historical data point, not today's law.

The point still holds. A small regulator in a small market will be asked to impose binding terms on companies whose traffic is a large share of the EU total, with little leverage of its own. The result is either inconsistent outcomes across 27 regulators or de facto deference to the largest national players. Neither helps the single market the DNA is meant to build.

What Parliament should do

The Internet Society's recommendations are reasonable ones. Drop the mandatory interconnection negotiation and binding dispute resolution. Keep CDNs out of the definition of an electronic communications network. Keep net neutrality focused on access providers. I would add two points. Keep the 'no longer than necessary' limit, because it is the test regulators actually apply. And require any compulsory interconnection mechanism to be justified by a documented market failure first, not by a traffic-share threshold.

Amendments were due on 12 November, so the real contest is now in committee. Lawmakers who want investment in networks have better tools than weakening the rules that keep the internet open: faster permitting, spectrum reform and a lighter compliance burden for operators.

Sources & Citations

  1. Internet Society: Digital Networks Act, the European Parliament Must Correct Course (3 Nov 2026)
  2. European Commission: Digital Networks Act
  3. European Commission: Open Internet policy page
  4. Tech Policy Press: EU's Digital Networks Act leaves Big Tech untouched, sparks net neutrality concerns
  5. Internet Society: Fair Share and the DNA, Three Concerns (Jan 2026)
  6. EUobserver: Fines on open internet vary greatly in EU (4 July 2017)