On May 6, 2026, the European Commission opened formal proceedings against X under the Digital Services Act (DSA), alleging failures in transparency reporting, researcher data access, and the operation of its content moderation systems. The move follows the Commission's preliminary findings against the platform in July 2024 and escalates a years-long standoff over how Very Large Online Platforms (VLOPs) document, disclose, and appeal moderation decisions.
What is new — and worth watching closely — is the comparative turn in Brussels. Several MEPs and member-state officials have, in recent weeks, pointed to India's Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021 as a possible model for tightening intermediary accountability, particularly the resident grievance officer requirement and fixed timelines for content removal. The instinct is understandable. The substance is a mistake.
What the DSA actually requires
The DSA, which became fully applicable to VLOPs in August 2023, already imposes some of the world's most demanding transparency obligations on large platforms: biannual transparency reports (Article 15), statements of reasons for every content action published in the Commission's DSA Transparency Database, vetted-researcher data access (Article 40), and systemic risk assessments (Article 34). The proceedings opened against X focus on whether these duties are being met in good faith — not on whether new takedown clocks are needed.
That distinction matters. The DSA was deliberately designed as a process-and-transparency regime rather than a content-speed regime. Recital 41 and Articles 16 and 23 emphasise diligent, reasoned, appealable handling of notices — not a stopwatch. Importing a 36-hour or 72-hour removal mandate would not fix X's transparency gaps; it would create new ones, by pushing platforms toward over-removal to meet the clock.
What the IT Rules 2021 actually do
India's IT Rules 2021, notified by MeitY in February 2021 and amended in 2022 and 2023, require significant social media intermediaries to appoint a resident Chief Compliance Officer, a Nodal Contact Person, and a Resident Grievance Officer who must acknowledge complaints within 24 hours and dispose of them within 15 days — with a 24-hour window for non-consensual intimate imagery. The 2023 amendment added a now-stayed Fact Check Unit empowered to flag content about "the business of the central government."
The Bombay High Court struck down the Fact Check Unit provision in Kunal Kamra v. Union of India in September 2024 as violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. The Supreme Court has separately stayed traceability-adjacent provisions pending review of the WhatsApp challenge. The framework is, in short, still being litigated — and the parts EU policymakers find attractive (named officers, fixed clocks) sit alongside parts Indian courts have already found constitutionally infirm.
Why the comparative shortcut misleads
- Different speech baselines. The EU Charter (Article 11) and ECHR Article 10 protect expression with a proportionality test that the Court of Justice has repeatedly applied to takedown orders — most recently reaffirmed in Glawischnig-Piesczek and the Article 17 copyright filter litigation. India's Article 19(2) permits a wider set of "reasonable restrictions," including public order and decency, which gives the IT Rules a constitutional runway the DSA simply does not have.
- Different enforcement architecture. The DSA already centralises enforcement against VLOPs at the Commission, with periodic penalty payments up to 5% of average daily worldwide turnover. India's Rules rely on individual grievance officers and an executive-appointed Grievance Appellate Committee — a structure the Editors Guild of India and the Internet Freedom Foundation have argued lacks judicial independence.
- Empirical results are mixed. India's MeitY transparency reporting under the Rules has been criticised for inconsistency; platforms publish removal numbers but rarely the legal basis. Adding a similar layer in Europe would duplicate the DSA Transparency Database without improving signal.
A better path for the X case — and the next one
The Commission has the tools it needs. If X is not producing Article 15 reports that meet the standard, the remedy is enforcement under Articles 73 and 74 — not a new statute. Three proportionate steps would do more than any borrowed grievance-officer mandate:
- Publish a model transparency report. The Commission's 2024 implementing regulation on Article 15 templates is a start; a worked example with redaction guidance would close the interpretive gap platforms exploit.
- Operationalise Article 40 researcher access. The Delegated Regulation adopted in July 2025 finally clarifies vetted-researcher procedures — funding the Digital Services Coordinators to actually process applications would surface the moderation data the X case is fighting over.
- Resist removal-clock creep. The Terrorist Content Online Regulation's one-hour rule already shows the cost: smaller platforms cannot meet it without third-party filters, entrenching incumbents. A general 24- or 72-hour clock would extend that distortion across all lawful-but-awful speech.
The X proceedings are a stress test for the DSA, not an argument for abandoning its design. India's experience is genuinely instructive — but the lesson is the opposite of what some in Brussels are drawing. Named officers and fixed clocks did not deliver better moderation in India; they delivered litigation, opacity, and chilling effects on lawful speech. Europe should enforce the rulebook it has, not import one its own courts would likely strike down.