Netherlands Netherlands ACM platform competition Big Tech

The ACM's Brandeis Lecture Rightly Defends Competition Enforcement, but Its Prohibition Option Needs a Higher Bar

ACM chair Martijn Snoep framed Big Tech power as a democratic risk. Enforcement is justified, but prohibition and sovereignty projects need strict proportionality tests.

The ACM's Brandeis Lecture in Numbers People of Internet Research · Netherlands 7 DMA gatekeeper companies ACM lists Alphabet, Apple, Amazon,… 10% Maximum DMA fine Share of worldwide annual turnover… 4 Snoep's policy options Regulation, prohibition, laissez-f… peopleofinternet.com
The ACM's Brandeis Lecture in Numbers People of Internet Research · Netherlands 7 DMA gatekeeper companies 10% Maximum DMA fine 4 Snoep's policy options peopleofinternet.com

Key Takeaways

On 11 November 2026, Martijn Snoep, chair of the Dutch Authority for Consumers and Markets (ACM), gave the first Louis Brandeis lecture, titled "market power and democracy". The ACM's published text uses Brandeis's idea of "regulated competition" to argue that a small number of large US platforms threaten the distribution of wealth and "democracy itself". It is the clearest statement yet of how a mid-sized European regulator sees its role. It deserves a serious answer, including where we think it goes too far.

The strongest case for the ACM's argument

Snoep's history is more careful than the usual "break them up" rhetoric. He places Brandeis's regulated competition between two camps. Populists wanted to dissolve large firms, and Progressives wanted government control of prices and output. Brandeis's Federal Trade Commission was meant to prevent anticompetitive practices "not so much penalizing" as stopping them before they occur.

The present-day parallel rests on three problems the speech names: how welfare is distributed, infringement of fundamental rights, and sovereignty. Snoep also says the interests of governments and Big Tech "have become intertwined". He cites the experience of the ACM itself. According to the text, Big Tech firms submitted information to the US House Judiciary Committee that included the personal data of ACM employees. He calls it hard to see this as anything other than an attempt to intimidate the regulator.

A fair reader should concede the underlying point. Enforcement is slow, and he warns that regulation may only bite "when the harm has become irreversible". His 2025 Edinburgh speech argued that the Netherlands had challenged Apple's App Store conditions as an abuse, and that the case was still in court. Slow cases do hurt the app developers and businesses that depend on these platforms.

What the ACM can actually do today

The ACM's powers are narrower than the rhetoric suggests. Since 10 March 2025, it can investigate reports of non-compliance with the Digital Markets Act (DMA). The same page states that the European Commission has "the exclusive power to enforce the DMA". National authorities support the Commission from their own territory.

The ACM's role is therefore closer to a scout than an enforcer. Its Euronews-reported probes in May 2025 were coordinated with the Commission. Its 2026 priorities add a market investigation into obstacles that firms face in reducing dependence on cloud and IT services, as set out in its 2026 digital focus areas. That is a sound tool. A market investigation that produces evidence and recommendations is a proportionate way to test whether switching costs are real before anyone writes a remedy.

Four choices, and where we part ways

The lecture ends with four options: regulation, prohibition, laissez-faire and collaboration. Snoep's answer is "all four of them". Two of those deserve scrutiny.

Prohibition. Snoep says "we should not rule out a priori the option of prohibition" and suggests starting with protecting children from the services most harmful to them. Child safety is a legitimate concern, and some jurisdictions are already acting. But prohibition is the most speech-restrictive tool in the box. A ban on a service is a ban on a channel through which lawful expression flows, including by minors. The bar should therefore be evidence of specific, measurable harm, a less restrictive alternative that has been tried and failed, and a sunset clause. The speech's own reasoning that a ban could be "supported by a democratic majority" is not that test. Majorities can support bad bans.

Collaboration. The ACM encourages joint procurement of sovereign cloud, common standards and a new e-wallet, with government acting as a "launching customer". Competition in cloud is a reasonable concern, and the ACM works with the Commission in a joint investigation team on cloud under the DMA. Its own page lists a preliminary Commission view of 25 June 2026 that Microsoft and Amazon cloud services fall under the DMA. But state-led alternatives can entrench their own incumbents. Snoep concedes that "digital autarky will remain an illusion". Public money should follow open standards and portability, which let smaller European firms compete, rather than picking national champions.

The innovation cost of the democracy framing

Framing market power as a democratic problem stretches competition law beyond its evidence base. Competition enforcement has measurable tests: foreclosure, switching costs and consumer harm. "Democratic harm" has none. If the standard is open-ended, firms cannot predict what will trigger action, and that uncertainty falls hardest on start-ups building on top of the platforms.

The speech also shows a capacity problem. Snoep warns of a Dutch civil service that is 25-35 percent smaller. A regulator with fewer staff and more mandates will pick its cases by headline rather than harm. The better answer is a narrow, well-resourced remit that rests on the DMA's defined obligations and its fines of up to 10% of worldwide turnover, and that does not drift into general political guardianship.

What to watch

The Brandeis lecture is right that unchecked market power can corrode more than prices. It is right that the ACM should keep enforcing. The risk lies in treating prohibition and state-built alternatives as natural extensions of competition policy. They are not. They need their own, higher burden of proof.

Sources & Citations

  1. ACM: Speech of Martijn Snoep, market power and democracy (13 Nov 2026)
  2. ACM: now authorized to investigate DMA compliance (10 Mar 2025)
  3. ACM: Focus areas for digital economy oversight 2026
  4. ACM: Snoep Edinburgh ICN speech (5 May 2025)
  5. European Commission: About the Digital Markets Act
  6. Euronews: Dutch competition agency launches two probes under DMA