Taiwan's Ministry of Digital Affairs (MODA) has launched an "Election Deepfake Report" site ahead of the 28 November 2026 local elections. It is a sensible administrative fix. It also shows how little the underlying law has changed.
What the portal does
The site is a Chinese-language notification form run by MODA (MODA reporting portal). It accepts reports only from a candidate or prospective candidate personally, not from agents. The filer must attach a police forensic report, name the platform (Meta, Google/YouTube, LINE or TikTok) and supply the URL. The form cites Article 51-3 of the Public Officials Election and Recall Act, the provision added in May 2023.
According to a 1 October 2026 analysis in Tech Policy Press by Eddy Yen-Ting Lin, that provision lets a targeted candidate request a police forensic examination. If the content is officially verified as a deepfake, the candidate can demand removal. Platforms must act within two days, and non-compliance is subject to fines imposed by the Central Election Commission (Tech Policy Press). The same piece says the portal relays verified requests to the platforms but "still depends on the platforms' voluntary cooperation."
The strongest case for the current approach
The case for a hard takedown mandate deserves a fair hearing. A convincing fake of a candidate, released days before a vote, can spread faster than any correction. Taiwan faces sustained information operations from across the Strait. A short removal deadline backed by fines is a reasonable attempt to match the speed of the harm. The Ministry of Justice said on 20 September that it would step up forensic tracing and takedowns, and the Taipei Times reports that disseminators face up to seven years in prison under the election act (Taipei Times). Prosecutors' offices have also set up deepfake processing centers. None of this is frivolous.
Why the law has not worked
The trouble is that the mechanism has gone almost unused. Tech Policy Press reports that the Central Election Commission told an advisory group it had received zero requests as of May 2026. It adds that no election-related deepfake had been reported through the official channels in three years.
The article gives several reasons:
- Narrow scope. The law covers candidates, prospective candidates and recall parties. It applies only from the official election notice, typically 40 to 120 days before election day.
- Procedural burden. The candidate must serve a formal request directly on the platform and copy the commission. Police findings are "notifications of fact" that candidates cannot appeal in court.
- Jurisdiction. Platforms claim to sit outside Taiwan. The article says Taiwan Facebook Limited is registered for market research and advertising services, and that TikTok's entities are in Singapore.
The last point matters most. A fine that a platform believes it need not pay is a request, not a rule. MODA's portal lowers the friction of asking, but it does not change whether the platform has to say yes. That is the gap the 1 October analysis identifies, and the portal does not close it.
The wrong lesson would be harsher compulsion
One response is to compel foreign platforms to open local offices or face sanctions. Just Security's April 2026 analysis by You-Hao Lai argues that middle powers should "condition market access for transnational platforms" on baseline compliance. It also notes that Taiwan's 2022 Digital Intermediary Services Act was withdrawn within months and that existing tools were never designed for foreign information manipulation (Just Security). Taiwan's earlier attempt at platform-wide rules collapsed on free-speech concerns, and that history is a warning.
Our view is that Taiwan should avoid a broad compulsion model. Three reasons:
- Short deadlines invite over-removal. A two-day clock with fines on the platform pushes the cheap choice towards taking content down. Parody, satire and contested political speech get caught alongside real fakes.
- Automation raises the error rate. The Electronic Frontier Foundation's October 2026 guidance on election-period moderation notes that automation should "help, not replace, human moderators" in the weeks around a vote. It also warns lawmakers against legislation that effectively mandates automated systems (EFF). That piece is general and does not discuss Taiwan, but its logic applies to any short-clock mandate.
- Unappealable police findings are a due-process problem. If a police "notification of fact" triggers removal and the speaker has no court route, an error has no remedy.
What proportionate reform looks like
The evidence points to targeted fixes rather than a new regime.
- Name a domestic point of contact. A designated legal representative for service of takedown requests would remove the jurisdiction excuse without forcing content decisions. Tech Policy Press notes that Taiwan's 2024 anti-fraud law already requires this for large advertising platforms.
- Let candidates use agents. The portal currently rejects filings by representatives. Campaigns run on staff, so this limit looks like a drafting accident, not a safeguard.
- Make findings reviewable. Allow a quick court or commission review of police determinations, so removals rest on something more than an administrative notice.
- Prefer labeling and context to deletion. For borderline material, a visible label on the post is less costly to speech than removal and can be applied faster.
- Publish the data. The Central Election Commission (CEC) is the body that would fine platforms. It should report how many requests arrive, how fast platforms respond and what share are upheld.
The last point also answers a fair criticism of this article: no one yet knows how the portal performs. Its first real test is the 28 November vote, and the numbers from that test should drive any amendment.
Bottom line
Taiwan has built reporting channels, forensic units and prosecutor centers. What it lacks is a legal route that reaches foreign platforms without pressuring them to over-remove. A portal makes the existing process easier to use, which is worth doing. It does not turn a voluntary request into an enforceable one. Lawmakers should fix service of process and appeal rights first, then judge by the post-election data whether anything stronger is needed.