When Switzerland's Federal Council opened consultations on 27 May 2026 on amendments to the Telecommunications Act (FMG), it set out to solve a well-defined problem with a broadly worded tool. The proposal would grant the government statutory authority to prohibit the procurement, installation, and operation of equipment from suppliers "under the influence of a foreign state that represents a geopolitical risk" to Switzerland. Observers have already labelled it "Lex Huawei." What the proposal gets right — and what it leaves dangerously open — will define Swiss telecom policy for the next decade.
What the Proposal Says
The draft amendments, open for consultation until 17 September 2026, do three structurally significant things. First, they give the Federal Council discretionary power to ban specific vendor equipment on geopolitical grounds — a power Switzerland currently lacks in statute. Second, they mandate supplier diversification: Swisscom, Sunrise, Salt, and Full MVNO operators would be required to source network equipment from multiple vendors rather than concentrating risk in a single relationship. Third, they require that network operations centres and security operations centres for these operators be located exclusively within Switzerland.
The package also extends authority to the Federal Police Office (Fedpol) and the Federal Cybersecurity Office (BACS) to block suspicious phone numbers and domain names, and allows operators to independently suspend numbers showing signs of misuse. Taken together, this is an effort to reduce external leverage over critical communications infrastructure — not merely through vendor restrictions, but through operational onshoring.
Why the Problem Is Genuine
The strongest case for these measures lies in Switzerland's current market structure. A Federal Council assessment found that one of Switzerland's three major mobile network operators has a strong dependence on Huawei for network equipment, while a second partially relies on Chinese components. Sunrise, holding roughly 26.5% of the mobile market, built its 5G network in partnership with Huawei. The concern is not hypothetical: Denmark's intelligence services raised espionage concerns about Huawei's role in European networks, prompting Swiss parliamentarian Jon Pult — head of the parliamentary telecommunications commission — to call for a "zero-trust approach" to foreign-state-linked suppliers. If a backdoor or vulnerability exists in equipment embedded across a national network, the damage potential is systemic.
The regulatory logic also has international precedent. The EU's 5G Security Toolbox, adopted in January 2020, established precisely this framework: risk-profile assessments of vendors, restrictions on "high-risk" suppliers, and requirements for multi-vendor strategies to prevent dangerous single-source dependencies. Switzerland, while not an EU member, has consistently aligned regulatory frameworks with European standards — on data protection, on financial services, and now incrementally on telecoms security.
Where the Proposal Falls Short
The concern is not whether supplier security matters — it does — but whether "geopolitical risk to Switzerland" is a sufficiently defined criterion for an executive ban. The proposal grants the Federal Council broad discretion to designate which foreign states pose such a risk. This is not a technical standard capable of objective verification; it is a political judgment presented in the form of a legal trigger.
That design choice creates three cascading problems. First, it lacks transparency: operators, investors, and suppliers need predictability about which states or companies might trigger a ban. A regime driven by executive determination — even one informed by classified intelligence — discourages long-term infrastructure investment. Second, it provides no explicit review mechanism: what appeals process exists for a vendor that disputes its designation, or an operator whose supplier is suddenly blacklisted? Third, it sets a precedent for telecom regulation by foreign-policy fiat, where the operative criteria can shift with changing diplomatic relationships.
Switzerland's historic neutrality makes this structural gap more acute. Unlike EU member states, which operate within a collective threat assessment process coordinated through ENISA and the 5G Toolbox framework, Switzerland would be making these determinations unilaterally. The Swiss Federal Intelligence Service would presumably inform such assessments, but the consultation documents do not specify the evidentiary threshold required, the institutional checks on the process, or whether any finding would be reviewable by an independent body.
What a Proportionate Version Looks Like
The diversification mandate and the NOC/SOC localisation requirements are the stronger provisions in this package. Mandating multi-vendor sourcing reduces concentration risk without naming specific companies — it is technically defined, verifiable, and competitively neutral. These structural requirements address the underlying vulnerability without the legal uncertainty of a discretionary designation regime.
The vendor-ban power need not be abandoned — but it needs clearer substantive criteria, an independent technical review requirement before any designation (the UK's Telecoms Security Act 2021 established the high-risk vendor designation through a structured process involving the National Cyber Security Centre, offering a workable template), and a transparent challenge pathway for affected parties. The consultation period running until 17 September 2026 gives industry, civil society, and legal experts the opportunity to push for exactly those guardrails. BAKOM has a track record of refining proposals in response to substantive consultation responses — the 2021 TCA revision is evidence of that.
The Bottom Line
Switzerland's proposed Lex Huawei addresses a genuine supply chain vulnerability, and the diversification and onshoring requirements are well-calibrated responses. But the broad executive ban power, without a defined evidentiary standard or independent review, risks producing a regime that is powerful, opaque, and structurally resistant to challenge. The consultation is the right moment to close that gap — before ambiguity hardens into statute.