Africa ransomware and cyber extortion policy

South Africa Should Fix Ransomware Reporting Before It Considers Banning Payments

After MIP Holdings paid extortionists and got nothing back, a payment ban is tempting. Section 54 reporting and recovery incentives should come first.

South Africa's Ransomware Payment Pressure People of Internet Research · Africa 58% Victims paying ransom Down from 71% in the 2025 survey. 40% Recovered within a week Lowest of any country surveyed. 72 hours Section 54 reporting window Still awaiting proclamation. $305K Median ransom payment Average recovery cost was $1.08 mi… peopleofinternet.com
South Africa's Ransomware Payment Pres… People of Internet Research · Africa 58% Victims paying ransom 40% Recovered within a week 72 hours Section 54 reporting window $305K Median ransom payment peopleofinternet.com

Key Takeaways

A payment that bought nothing

On 29 September 2026, TechCentral reported that Richard Firth, CEO of the insurance-software company MIP Holdings, wants South Africa to outlaw ransomware payments. His credibility on the point is painful. MIP paid the extortion group The Gentlemen what Firth called a "substantial" sum after data on customers of about 45 insurers was stolen. TechCentral's earlier reporting says the group undertook to destroy the data, but that "the attackers' undertaking has not been honoured" and the group turned on the insurers. Hollard policyholder names, children's names, identity numbers and e-mail addresses were later found on a dark web leak site. TechCentral says Hollard received a ransom demand and refused to pay.

"I think banning ransomware payments will be a powerful deterrent," Firth told TechCentral.

The strongest case for a ban

The case for a ban is serious. Ransomware is a market, and every payment funds the next intrusion and signals that a victim is willing to pay. Payment also guarantees nothing: MIP paid and the data leaked anyway. A legal prohibition would give a victim a reason to refuse that the extortionist cannot argue with, and it would let boards say "we cannot pay" instead of weighing whether they can afford to.

The proposal still has problems. Dominic White, managing director for South Africa at Orange Cyberdefense, argued in the same TechCentral piece that "blindly banning ransomware payments doesn't alleviate the pressure that causes a victim to pay in the first place." A hospital, a small insurer or a municipality facing an outage may be paying to keep operating, not to protect a reputation. A ban does not remove that pressure. It can push the payment out of sight.

What South African victims are actually doing

The underlying data suggests behaviour is already changing without a prohibition. Sophos's State of Ransomware in South Africa 2026, a survey of 135 organisations hit in the past year, found that 58% of those whose data was encrypted paid the ransom and got data back, down from 71% in the 2025 report. Over the same period, 54% restored from backups, up from 35%. This is a vendor-commissioned survey of mid-sized organisations (100 to 5,000 employees), so it shows direction, not a precise national rate.

The survey also shows why payment stays attractive. Only 40% of South African victims recovered within a week, the lowest of any country surveyed and down from 47% a year earlier. The median ransom payment was $305,000, and the average recovery cost excluding any ransom was $1.08 million. For a firm facing weeks of downtime, a ransom looks cheap by comparison, and no ban changes that arithmetic. Better backups and faster recovery do.

The missing foundation is reporting

A ban is hard to enforce if the state does not know who was attacked. South Africa's Cybercrimes Act 19 of 2020 already contains the machinery. Section 54 requires electronic communications service providers and financial institutions that become aware of certain offences to report them to the South African Police Service "without undue delay and, where feasible, not later than 72 hours." Non-compliance carries a fine of up to R50,000. Yet according to TechCentral, citing law firm MJ Kotze Inc, the section "still awaits proclamation." It also depends on the policing minister prescribing, by Gazette notice, which offences are covered. I could not find such a notice.

So the country has a reporting duty on paper, no commencement and no visibility into how many insurers, lenders or municipalities are paying. Legislating a prohibition on top of a dormant reporting regime would invert the sensible order. The cap on the fine is also small next to a ransom in the hundreds of thousands of dollars, which suggests the duty needs rethinking even once it is proclaimed.

A sequenced alternative

White's proposal points the way: tax relief, rebates, grants for smaller organisations or cyber-recovery funding, conditional on prompt reporting to law enforcement and on using accredited incident-response providers. That treats victims as victims and gives them a reason to disclose, which a penalty does not. He also suggested a fast-tracked exception for victims who report and hire an accredited responder.

The United Kingdom shows how cautious a serious government is being. Its Home Office response to its 2025 consultation, published 22 July 2025, covered a targeted ban for public sector bodies and regulated critical infrastructure, a payment prevention regime and mandatory reporting within 72 hours. About 72% of respondents backed the targeted ban. The government's stated plan is narrow, not economy-wide: it said it would keep developing the prevention and reporting proposals and clarify the scope of the ban. A narrow ban is easier to enforce and avoids criminalising a small firm for surviving an attack.

What proportionate policy looks like

For South Africa, the order of operations should be:

MIP's experience is a strong argument against paying criminals who have no incentive to keep promises. It is not yet an argument that the state should add a new criminal prohibition before the reporting duty it already legislated has taken effect.

Sources & Citations

  1. TechCentral: Should South Africa ban ransomware payments?
  2. TechCentral: Hackers turn on insurers after MIP paid the ransom
  3. Cybercrimes Act 19 of 2020, section 54
  4. UK Home Office: response to ransomware legislative proposals (22 July 2025)
  5. Sophos: State of Ransomware in South Africa 2026