On 5 October 2026 the Competition Commission of South Africa issued final Guidelines on Repair, Service and Maintenance Aftermarkets under section 79 of the Competition Act. EWN reports that the Commission's statement is dated that day. The text is published on the Commission's own site. The guidelines cover mobile phones, tablets, gaming consoles, televisions, appliances, medical devices and backup water and electricity systems. Motor vehicles stay under the separate automotive guidelines. This is not an investigation of any named company, but it tells every device maker selling in South Africa how the regulator will read refusals to supply repair inputs.
What the guidelines actually do
The guidelines flag several practices as potentially harmful. ITWeb lists them: denying independent repairers spare parts or repair information, blocking their entry or growth, and pressuring consumers away from independent shops. Restricting access to technical information and diagnostic tools is singled out as a key concern. The guidelines apply mainly to paid repairs outside warranty.
They create no new obligations. ITWeb reports that they clarify which conduct could restrict competition under the existing Act, and that complaints will be assessed case by case under sections 5, 8 and 9. Section 5 covers restrictive vertical practices. Sections 8 and 9 cover abuse of dominance. Law firm Werksmans calls the guidelines non-binding but says they carry real practical weight because they signal where the Commission will focus enforcement.
The process was orderly. The draft was gazetted in August 2026 (Government Gazette 55238, notice 7845), and secondary coverage reports comments were due on 21 September. The final version followed within weeks.
The strongest case for the Commission's approach
The case for acting is serious. When a manufacturer controls the only source of parts, manuals, software keys and diagnostics, the authorised network can set repair prices without competition. A consumer facing an expensive repair may then discard a working device. The Commission's economist, speaking to EWN, said the agency had "found at least informally some of the practices that would concern us." EWN also reports that the Commission is referring a complaint in the medical devices sector and has received mobile phone complaints. So the guidelines respond to actual complaints, not a hypothetical.
The Commission also chose competition law over a bespoke repair statute. That matters.
Why the guidelines are better than the alternatives
The European Union went the other way. Directive (EU) 2024/1799 imposes a manufacturer repair obligation for certain product categories. It requires spare parts and tools at a reasonable price, bars contractual, hardware or software techniques that impede repair unless justified, and prescribes a standardised repair information form. Member States had to transpose it by 31 July 2026. A prescriptive code like that has its place in a large single market with an established ecosystem of regulators. It also brings compliance engineering costs and product-category lists that need constant updating.
South Africa's route is lighter. It leaves the product design decision with the firm and asks it to justify exclusion only where exclusion hurts competition. A manufacturer with no market power and no exclusionary agreements has little to fear. Because the test is effects-based, a small firm that sells a niche device is not forced to publish a manual it never wrote. That is proportionate regulation, and it fits an economy where independent repairers are often small, informal businesses that cannot lobby for rules.
The carve-outs are where this will be won or lost
The guidelines accept that restrictions can be justified by consumer safety, efficiencies or technological improvement, intellectual property, and compliance with other laws. Werksmans reports that the justification must be specific and go no further than necessary. IP in one component will not normally justify restricting repairs to unrelated parts. A firm relying on regulation must name the instrument. Accreditation for security or safety components is acceptable if it is objective, transparent and non-discriminatory, and accredited independents must get terms at least as good as authorised networks.
This is the right design, and also the weak point. Phones carry batteries that can fail dangerously, and medical devices carry patient risk. Security features such as secure enclaves and device pairing are real protections for users, and a blanket demand for open diagnostic tools could weaken them. The Commission should therefore treat a well-documented, narrowly tailored security gate as legitimate, even when it is inconvenient to independents. Equally, it should reject a safety label used as a general barrier. The test is evidence: what failure mode does the restriction prevent, and is there a less restrictive way to prevent it?
What to watch
- First complaint outcomes. Guidelines are only as credible as the first cases decided under them. A clear, reasoned decision on a diagnostic-tool refusal would teach the market more than the document does.
- Access terms. Parity of terms for accredited independents is promising. Watch whether pricing for parts and tool licences is tested as strictly as outright refusal.
- Speech and innovation spillovers. Repair guidelines should not become a back door for design mandates. If the Commission starts treating product architecture as the offence, it will chill hardware investment in a market that imports nearly all its devices.
- Measurement. The Commission should publish how many complaints it receives and resolves. Without data, neither consumers nor firms can judge whether the guidelines work.
Bottom line
South Africa has picked a modest instrument: clarify existing law, invite complaints, and judge each case on its facts. For a pro-innovation reader that is the right order of operations. Start with enforcement of what already exists, and consider mandates only if the record shows that case-by-case review fails. The guidelines will earn trust if the Commission honours its own carve-outs, demands evidence from both sides, and publishes what it learns.