Saudi Arabia Saudi NCA cybersecurity national policy

Saudi Arabia's Cybersecurity Market Data Shows Healthy Growth, but Spending Is Not Yet a Measure of Security

The NCA's 2026 indicators put the market at SAR 16.3bn. Its tiered private-sector controls look proportionate, but outcome data is still missing.

Saudi Cybersecurity Sector, 2025 People of Internet Research · Saudi Arabia SAR 16.3B Cybersecurity market size Market grew 10.7% a year over 2023… ~SAR 20B Contribution to GDP SAR 9.7B direct, SAR 10.3B indirec… 69% Private-sector spending share Private entities spent SAR 11.2B v… 33% Women in workforce Workforce exceeded 22,000; global … peopleofinternet.com
Saudi Cybersecurity Sector, 2025 People of Internet Research · Saudi Arabia SAR 16.3B Cybersecurity market size ~SAR 20B Contribution to GDP 69% Private-sector spending share 33% Women in workforce peopleofinternet.com

Key Takeaways

On 14 October 2026 Saudi Arabia's National Cybersecurity Authority (NCA) published its report on Key Economic Indicators in the Cybersecurity Sector. It is the first time the regulator has quantified the sector's economic weight in this much detail. According to coverage of the report syndicated by Zawya, the Saudi cybersecurity market reached SAR 16.3 billion in 2025, growing at 10.7% a year between 2023 and 2025. Products accounted for SAR 8.3 billion (51%) and services for SAR 7.9 billion (49%).

The report matters as policy as well as statistics. It is published alongside a regulatory push: the NCA's Non-CNI Private Sector Entities Cybersecurity Controls (NCNICC-1:2025), adopted on 28 December 2025.

What the numbers say

The same coverage reports that the sector contributes about SAR 20 billion to GDP: SAR 9.7 billion directly and SAR 10.3 billion indirectly. That is roughly 0.42% of total GDP and 0.71% of non-oil GDP. The contribution grew at a 13.2% CAGR over 2023-2025. The workforce exceeded 22,000 in 2025, and women make up 33% of it. The report sets that against a global average of about 22%.

Private entities account for most of the demand. They spent SAR 11.2 billion (69%), against SAR 5.1 billion (31%) for government. That split is the most important figure for policy. The market is no longer mainly a public-procurement story, and the private buyers are the ones the new controls address.

The case for mandatory baselines

The strongest argument for regulation is a market failure. A company that skimps on security passes some of the cost to customers, partners and suppliers whose data it holds. Saudi rules had concentrated on critical national infrastructure, financial institutions and government bodies. That left mid-sized private firms with no common floor. Law-firm summaries of NCNICC-1:2025 describe it as filling that gap. On this view, a non-binding framework would leave the weakest links in the supply chain unchanged, and the controls are a sensible correction.

Why the design is mostly proportionate

In one respect the design is better than many cybersecurity mandates elsewhere. As summarised by CMS, the controls are tiered by size. Category A covers firms with more than 250 full-time employees or revenue above SAR 200 million. It faces 3 main components, 22 sub-components and 65 essential controls. Category B covers firms with 6-249 employees or SAR 3-200 million in revenue. It faces one main component, 13 sub-components and 26 essential controls, and some of those are only recommended. A small firm is not asked to build the programme of a bank. That scaling is what proportionate regulation looks like, and other jurisdictions that apply one checklist to everyone could learn from it.

CMS describes the controls as legally mandatory for firms in both categories, with the NCA retaining the authority to assess compliance and update them. A BSA Law summary, carried by Legal 500, notes that the controls do not say by when companies must comply. Neither source states penalties. That gap cuts both ways. Firms get room to adapt. But they also face open-ended uncertainty about when assessment begins and what a failure would cost.

The measurement problem

The economic indicators report has a weakness that is easy to overlook. Market size measures what organisations spend on security. It does not measure how secure they are. A rising SAR 16.3 billion can mean better defence, but it can also mean compliance-driven purchasing of tools that satisfy an auditor and change little in practice. The 51% share going to products deserves scrutiny for this reason. Licences bought to tick a control are cheap to count and easy to inflate.

A regulator that wants to show its policy works needs outcome data. The useful figures would be incident rates, time to detect and contain breaches, and the share of firms passing assessments. The 2026 report is a good start on the supply side. Its demand-side counterpart would show whether spending is buying resilience.

There is also a competition angle. Workforce growth of 5.9% a year is slower than market growth, which suggests a talent bottleneck. If mandatory controls raise demand faster than skilled people can be trained, small firms will bid against large ones for scarce staff. They will lose. The NCA's push for cybersecurity service providers to register could help buyers identify credible vendors. It could also become a barrier to entry for small domestic and foreign providers if registration criteria are slow, opaque or costly. Registration should test competence and not act as a licensing gate.

What good policy looks like from here

Three steps would keep the approach pro-innovation while still protecting the public. First, publish the compliance timetable for NCNICC-1:2025 and the assessment method, so firms can plan investment. Second, report outcome metrics next to spending in future editions of the indicators report. Third, keep service-provider registration light and transparent, with published criteria and decision times.

The report also shows something rarer than the market figures: a regulator that publishes its sector's economics for others to check. That transparency should be rewarded. The next test is whether the NCA applies the same openness to showing that mandatory controls reduce harm, not just that they increase spending.

Note: the NCA's own pages could not be retrieved by our fetch tooling at the time of writing. Figures here are as reported by Zawya, citing the NCA report. They should be checked against the NCA publication.

Sources & Citations

  1. Asharq Al-Awsat: Saudi Cybersecurity Market Tops $4.3 Billion in 2025 (NCA Key Economic Indicators 2026 report)
  2. Saudi Press Agency: Saudi Arabia's Cybersecurity Market Reaches SAR16.3 Billion, NCA Report Shows
  3. Zawya (via Saudi Gazette): Saudi cybersecurity market reaches SR16.3bn in 2025
  4. CMS: Saudi Arabia issues new Cybersecurity Controls for the Private Sector
  5. Digital Policy Alert: NCA adopted NCNICC-1:2025