Russia's answer to losing Starlink is not working. The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) reported that none of the 16 Rassvet satellites launched on 19 July had reached their intended operating orbit as of 31 August. Many sit at 300-400 km, and at least two may be heading for reentry. That is the weak point in a program meant to replace the connectivity Russian forces lost in February 2026.
What the numbers say
Of 32 Rassvet satellites launched in 2026, only 12 satellites from the first batch of 16, launched in March, reached sustainable orbit. That is 12 of 32, or 37.5%. According to Euromaidan Press's summary of the ISW assessment, those 12 provide two connectivity windows a day over Ukraine, totalling up to 90 minutes. A Ukrainian defense-technology adviser estimates Russia needs 200-300 working satellites for continuous coverage. Some reports put the figure at 200-250. Either way, Russia has roughly a tenth of that in usable orbit.
Ukraine's State Space Agency also reported that the 19 July batch settled at 300-400 km. At that altitude atmospheric drag shortens satellite life sharply and burns propellant. Outlets disagree on the planned target altitude, so we avoid quoting a single figure. The failure itself is consistent across sources.
How Russia lost Starlink
The loss was a policy decision, not a technical one. On 1 February 2026, Ukraine's Cabinet announced with SpaceX a system under which only authorized terminals would operate in Ukraine and unverified ones would be disconnected. Defence Minister Mykhailo Fedorov described it as the next step after earlier measures against Russian drones. The aim was to stop Russian use of commercial Starlink terminals, including on drones.
The rule was narrow. It did not restrict Starlink for Ukrainian civilians or the military. It required owners to register and left everything else alone. Russian Deputy Defense Minister Aleksey Krivoruchko acknowledged on 18 February that terminals had been disabled for two weeks. He claimed this had not affected unmanned systems, a claim that is hard to square with Moscow's rush to build Rassvet.
The strongest case for caution
The best argument against celebrating this arrangement is about sovereignty. Under the whitelist, a private company's cooperation decides who can communicate on the battlefield. The same dependence cuts the other way. The Kyiv Independent reported on 26 August that Ukraine is seeking expanded Starlink access over Russian territory for drone operations. It also reported that Elon Musk has reportedly resisted, viewing this as an escalation. Kyiv gets a powerful capability, but the vendor sets its terms. A sensible state would not want its drones, artillery coordination and communications in places where infrastructure has been destroyed to hinge on one firm's goodwill.
That concern is legitimate, and the fix is not state-built substitutes. Rassvet is a cautionary tale about the alternative. Building a constellation by decree, under sanctions and with scarce launch capacity, is slow and failure-prone. ISW notes that Russia's reliance on Soyuz-2.1b rockets limits it to roughly 128 satellites over four years.
What proportionate policy looks like
Three lessons follow for Ukraine and for governments that depend on commercial infrastructure.
- Use narrow, verifiable rules. The whitelist targeted one abuse (adversary use of commercial terminals) through registration. It did not require surveillance of ordinary users or content restrictions. Registration of a physical device is far easier to defend on civil-liberties grounds than broad traffic controls.
- Diversify through markets, not mandates. Ukraine's resilience improves with more commercial LEO providers, interoperable terminals and procurement contracts that include continuity commitments. These are more realistic than a sovereign constellation. Competition in low-Earth orbit would also reduce the leverage any single owner holds.
- Keep civilian and military rules separate. Emergency measures should carry sunset reviews. Wartime registration regimes tend to outlive their justification, and they should not become peacetime precedent for licensing consumer connectivity.
What to watch
Rassvet is not necessarily finished. Bureau 1440 plans a much larger constellation, and 12 satellites are working, so the program can still improve. But a connectivity window of 90 minutes a day cannot support the continuous, jam-resistant links that drones and artillery coordination need. The gap between Russia's current capacity and the 200-300 satellites it requires is large, and each failed batch widens it.
For Ukraine, the right response to its own dependence is to build redundancy, not to celebrate a rival's failure. The February whitelist shows that a short, targeted rule can change a battlefield. Continued reliance on one vendor is a vulnerability that open competition can reduce and that decrees cannot.