What the regulator actually told the court
In a reply filed before the Islamabad High Court in a petition on children's social media use, reported by Associated Press of Pakistan on 1 October 2026, the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA) said that "no law currently exists to ban social media use by children under 16." It added that it cannot build an age-verification system for children "beyond the law and its granted powers" and called for a new legal and policy framework. The petitioner wants the PTA and NADRA, the national identity database, to build a system that keeps under-16s off platforms, citing Australia's law as precedent.
The filing is unusual because a regulator is arguing against its own expansion. The PTA says a 16-year floor or a universal age database would need explicit legislation. It also says the Social Media Protection and Regulatory Authority promised by the 2025 amendments to the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act (PECA) is still "being established."
The strongest case for an age floor
It is worth stating the case for the petition fairly. Children's exposure to harassment, sexual exploitation and compulsive-use design is real, and parents have few practical tools against global platforms that, in the PTA's words, are "neither registered in Pakistan nor bound by local laws." The PTA says platforms have not answered its requests for local compliance or for a grievance officer. A statutory age floor would give enforcers a bright line, and Australia's example shows a legislature can try one. A court asking whether the state has any lever at all is asking a reasonable question.
Why the answer should not be a national age database
The remedy matters more than the diagnosis. Universal age verification means every user, adult or child, proves their age. In practice that means tying accounts to identity documents or a national database. This builds a surveillance and breach risk that is out of proportion to the harm it targets. It also removes anonymous and pseudonymous speech, which journalists, dissidents and vulnerable users rely on, in a country where the legal environment is already contested.
The record of PECA supports caution. Amnesty International, writing on 24 January 2025 about the amendment bill, said it would create a new authority with "power to block and remove content based on vague criteria" and a criminal offence of "false and fake information" carrying up to three years' imprisonment. Amnesty said the bill was presented "in the absence of any consultation or debate." Handing an authority with that mandate a registry of every citizen's age and identity would concentrate power without adding accountability.
The EFF made a related point to Brazil's data protection agency in October 2026: data privacy and free expression must underpin platform regulation, rather than being traded away for enforcement convenience. Age assurance is where that trade-off tends to be made.
What the PTA's own numbers say about enforcement
The PTA's blocking statistics show the limits of the tool it already has. APP's report of the filing says the authority reviewed more than 1.789 million links and URLs and blocked more than 1.577 million, an overall rate of 88.20 percent. Other reports of the same filing give slightly different totals, so the exact counts should be treated as approximate. The rate varies a great deal by platform: TikTok 88.68 percent, YouTube 87.34 percent, Facebook 78.57 percent, and X just 48.42 percent.
The PTA also said that because of HTTPS encryption, "blocking individual content is impossible, and entire websites have to be shut down." That is a candid admission of a technical fact. Blocking at the network level is a blunt instrument. It cannot separate a harmful post from a lawful one on the same site, and the collateral cost lands on ordinary users. A regime built on more blocking, or on forcing platforms to verify age by threat of blocking, would repeat that problem at larger scale.
A proportionate path
The filing points to a more workable sequence than a ban:
- Legislate first, narrowly. If Parliament wants child-specific duties, it should pass them in a statute that is debated and public, with defined scope, rather than leaving them to regulatory improvisation.
- Regulate platform design, not identity. Default privacy settings for minors, limits on targeted advertising to children, and reporting channels are enforceable without a national age database. The PTA itself notes that Instagram has introduced Teen Accounts for Pakistani users.
- Settle the authority question with safeguards. The new Authority should have published procedures, independent appeal and transparency reporting on blocking before it gets any age-related power. The PTA says the cybercrime and immoral-content mandate has already moved to the National Cyber Crime Investigation Agency, so the institutional map is already confused.
- Use platform-based compliance leverage. Local registration and grievance officers address the accountability gap the PTA describes without requiring users to hand over identity data.
What to watch
The court has not ruled. The PTA asked for the petition to be dismissed "to the extent of relief sought beyond its legal scope." The more important outcome is political. The regulator has made the decision explicit: if Pakistan wants an age floor, Parliament has to choose it, and it has to choose the safeguards that come with it. The better outcome would be a targeted, rights-respecting child-safety statute rather than a registry of every user's age.