On 20 October 2026, Access Now published research on indefinite internet shutdowns. It draws on anonymised testimony collected between 2024 and 2026 and finds that in conflict regions, shutdowns increasingly become long-running or recurring conditions, not one-off events. The African cases it names are Sudan, Ethiopia's Tigray region, which was cut off for more than two years during the civil war, and Equatorial Guinea's Annobón island (Access Now).
The strongest case for the governments
It is worth stating the state's argument fairly. In an armed conflict, communications networks are military infrastructure. Combatants use them to coordinate, and officials in many countries argue that disinformation can inflame violence. A government facing an insurgency can argue that restricting connectivity is a lawful emergency measure, not censorship. In Sudan's war, networks have also been physically contested. Access Now's earlier reporting says a nationwide blackout in February 2024 was believed to have been triggered when the Rapid Support Forces took over the data centres of internet service providers in Khartoum (Access Now). Not every outage is a policy decision.
Why the argument fails on the evidence
The same reporting documents what the blackouts cost. In Sudan they blocked access to emergency services and medicine, froze banking and access to funds, obstructed travel-document applications, and hindered humanitarian aid delivery. That is a heavy price for a measure whose security benefit is rarely demonstrated. Shutdowns also blind the people who document abuses. Access Now's earlier Tigray reporting describes how the blackout there hampered documentation of atrocities and split families and businesses apart.
The new research adds a point that matters for policy: an official announcement that a shutdown has ended does not mean meaningful connectivity has returned. Damaged infrastructure, disrupted network operations and continuing government controls can all persist (CircleID summary). A regulator can tell the public that service is restored while a town stays dark. Any serious accountability regime therefore needs to measure actual connectivity, not just whether an order was lifted.
The trend is not confined to war zones. Access Now's KeepItOn report for 2025, published on 31 March 2026, counted 30 shutdowns across 15 African countries. Globally it counted at least 313 shutdowns in 52 countries, the highest number the coalition has recorded. Protests were the leading trigger in Africa, with eight countries imposing 14 shutdowns during protests or political instability. Tanzania imposed eight shutdowns on its own, and Angola cut access for the first time in July 2025. The report also records that Equatorial Guinea kept Annobón isolated from the outside world (Access Now). Conflict-zone blackouts are the sharpest edge of a broader reliance on disconnection as a tool of governance.
The law already says no
Africa does not lack legal standards. On 8 March 2024, the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights adopted Resolution 580 (LXXVIII) on Internet Shutdowns and Elections in Africa. It urges states to keep internet access open and secure before, during and after elections and to refrain from ordering the interruption of telecommunications services. It also asks states to require providers to warn users of potential disruptions and act quickly to resolve them (ACHPR).
Courts have gone further. On 25 June 2020 the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice held that Togo's shutdown during the 2017 protests violated Article 9 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. The court found Togo had no law authorising the shutdown and rejected its national-security justification, because no emergency existed to support it. It ordered compensation of 2,000,000 CFA and required Togo to take steps to prevent a recurrence, according to Access Now's account of the judgment. Access Now's new research also points to national courts in Sudan and Zimbabwe that have found shutdowns violate rights.
So the problem is enforcement, not doctrine. The ACHPR resolution is non-binding, the ECOWAS compensation was modest, and the Annobón and Tigray cases show that a determined government can simply ignore the norm. This also hurts the innovation economy. Mobile money, remote work, telehealth and online education all depend on networks that stay up, and a country known for switching them off is a weaker place to build a business.
What proportionate policy looks like
The goal should not be to strip governments of every tool for dealing with real threats. Narrow, targeted measures aimed at specific unlawful content or accounts, backed by a legal basis and judicial review, are very different from cutting off a whole island or region. The research makes several recommendations that fit this approach:
- Stronger international action against prolonged shutdowns, and enforcement of existing court rulings.
- Investment in alternative connectivity for people in affected areas.
- Attention to telecom infrastructure in post-conflict reconstruction.
- Digital communications provisions in ceasefire agreements.
To these, regulators and telecom operators should add transparency. Licensing conditions should require operators to publish the legal basis of any shutdown order, its geographic scope and its end time. Regional courts and the African Commission should be able to compare those disclosures against independent measurements. Operators also face a real dilemma, since refusing an order can put staff and licences at risk, which is why regional norms that shield compliance-refusing operators matter.
Bottom line
The Access Now research shows that the cost of a shutdown grows with its duration, and that official restoration announcements can overstate how much service has actually returned. African institutions have already written the rules. What is missing is a measurement-and-enforcement layer that makes the first day of a shutdown costly enough that a second day is never reached.