On 25 September 2026, a meeting in Islamabad attended by Law Minister Azam Nazeer Tarar and Minister of State for Interior Talal Chaudhry weighed a request from the Punjab government to suspend mobile and internet service ahead of a planned PTI march. According to ARY News, participants agreed against an immediate suspension because an early shutdown would cause serious hardship for the public. They also told the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA) not to act until the Interior Ministry issues explicit orders.
The restraint was welcome. But the episode shows that the decision rested on a meeting and a ministry's sign-off, not on a published legal test.
The case for the state's position
The strongest argument for shutdown powers is not frivolous. Pakistan has suffered serious militant attacks on religious processions and public gatherings. Security agencies argue that mobile networks can be used to trigger devices or coordinate violence, and that a temporary, localised suspension is cheaper than a mass-casualty event. The Supreme Court accepted a version of this argument in 2020. It looked at past terrorist activity around events such as Ashoora, the Pakistan Day Parade and Chehlum, and found a legitimate need for protective suspensions (Columbia Global Freedom of Expression).
The 25 September meeting also arguably took that concern seriously. It kept the option open and declined only to act pre-emptively.
What the law actually says, and does not
The legal footing is contested. In February 2018, the Islamabad High Court (Justice Athar Minallah) held that Section 54 of the Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-organization) Act 1996 can be used in only four circumstances: war, hostilities by a foreign power, internal aggression, or the defence or security of Pakistan. Concerns about public safety or law and order did not qualify. On its reading, suspension was lawful only if the President proclaimed an emergency under Section 54(3), as Digital Rights Foundation summarised the day after the judgment.
The Supreme Court reversed that on 22 April 2020. According to the Columbia summary, it held that Section 54(3), which is reactive and tied to a proclaimed emergency, sits alongside the PTA's pre-emptive power under Section 8(2)(c), which covers national security. It also upheld the federal Policy Directive on suspensions as delegated legislation. The Court asked only whether the power was exercised reasonably, fairly and justly. It also held that the telecom operator should first have approached the federal government. A commentary in the Oxford Human Rights Hub argued that this reading lets the executive bypass the limits written into Section 54.
This is why the framing of Section 54 as the source of shutdown power needs care. The statute's emergency clause is the narrowest route. The practical route since 2020 runs through a general national-security power and an executive directive. That leaves no published threshold, no requirement to state grounds or duration, and no prior review.
Why discretion is the real problem
The 25 September decision illustrates the gap. No statute told the participants what evidence a Punjab request must contain, who decides, or how long a suspension may last. A federal meeting made a sensible choice this time. The same structure can produce a different outcome next month with no legal difference.
The pattern is not new. Ahead of a PTI protest in November 2024, the Digital Rights Foundation reported, citing Geo News sources, that the federal government had decided on partial suspensions of internet and mobile services and that the PTA would activate a firewall on mobile internet. The report did not identify a legal basis or a named official who gave the order.
That opacity is the cost. A suspension hits everyone in the affected area, including hospitals, ride-hailing drivers, small online sellers and students, not only the people being policed. The 25 September meeting itself named public hardship as the reason to hold off. A framework that weighs that hardship only when ministers happen to meet is not proportionate regulation.
The pressure is not unique to Pakistan. Shutdowns around protests are being ordered elsewhere in South Asia: India's Home Ministry issued a "top secret" order on 9 October 2026 suspending mobile internet within a 4 km radius in New Delhi without stating its grounds, MediaNama reported. The common failure is unpublished, unreviewable executive orders.
A proportionate alternative
Pakistan does not need to give up security tools to fix this. Parliament could legislate what the Supreme Court's reading currently leaves to directives:
- Require a written order that names the specific threat, the geographic area and a maximum duration, with a default expiry of hours, not open-ended "until further orders."
- Require the Interior Ministry to publish orders, or at minimum a redacted notice, within a fixed period after they are issued.
- Prefer targeted measures, such as localised throttling near a specific venue, over district-wide or multi-city cuts.
- Add prompt review by a high court or an independent committee, and a duty to report costs and outcomes annually.
The 2020 judgment itself asked only for reasonableness and fairness. A statute that defines those terms would meet that standard rather than evade it.
What to watch
The September instruction to the PTA to wait for explicit Interior Ministry orders at least centralises accountability in one ministry. That is better than ad hoc provincial requests. But centralised discretion is still discretion. Whether the next PTI event ends with open networks or another blackout will depend on political judgment unless Parliament writes the test down.