A shock that landed on one side of the marketplace
On 7 October 2026, Arab News reported that petrol in Pakistan stood at Rs393.64 per litre, up from about Rs258 in mid-February and well below an April peak of Rs458.41. September consumer prices were 10.3% higher than a year earlier, according to the Pakistan Bureau of Statistics as quoted by the outlet. One Islamabad Bykea rider told the paper that the platform keeps 20% of each fare. He pays for his own fuel, including the unpaid ride to the customer's pickup point.
The case for the government's response deserves a fair hearing. The September relief scheme gives motorcycle and rickshaw users a Rs500 fuel token each week, worth up to Rs2,000 a month. Arab News reports that 5.8 million people had registered by 25 September and 4.7 million had obtained subsidised fuel. A targeted transfer that reaches millions of riders quickly is a real policy achievement. It is faster and less distortionary than blanket price caps, and it does not ask platforms to absorb costs they cannot.
But the same report shows the limit of the approach. The rider says the token would not change his job's economics. The arithmetic supports him: at Rs393.64 a litre, Rs2,000 buys a little over five litres. That is a rounding error against a working month on a motorbike.
Who actually sets the terms
The deeper problem is structural. Platform riders are formally independent contractors, yet the platform sets the fare, the commission and the dispatch rules. When fuel rose by more than half, the rider's cost base moved and the commission schedule did not. Dawn reported in May that petrol-driven fare increases on ride-hailing apps were substantial. Yango's spokesperson said cumulative fare changes were up to 20% in Karachi and Lahore and up to 35% in Islamabad and Rawalpindi. Dawn also reported that the daily fuel cost of a ride-sharing car had risen from Rs3,795 to Rs6,225, about 64%. Customers pushed back on higher fares, and in the Arab News account the rider is left absorbing the gap.
None of this shows that platforms are acting in bad faith. They compete for price-sensitive customers, and a fare rise can cut demand and reduce riders' trips. The issue is that riders have no visibility into how fare, commission and pickup distance are set, and no forum in which to contest them. Pakistan, as the hook reporting notes, has no dedicated gig-platform worker law, so riders have no say over commissions or cost-sharing.
What the new ILO standard does, and does not, require
Pakistan now has an international template to draw on. On 12 June 2026 the International Labour Conference adopted Convention No. 193 on Decent Work in the Platform Economy, by 406 votes to 8 with 36 abstentions. The ILO describes it as the first international labour standard designed specifically for digital platform work.
The convention is notable for what it avoids. According to the ILO's explainer, it does not impose a particular employment classification. It requires states to take measures so that status in employment is correctly determined, guided mainly by the facts of the work. It covers platform workers whether or not they are in an employment relationship, including the self-employed. It addresses transparent use of algorithmic systems and access to review mechanisms when those systems affect workers. The ILO's Ankara office highlights protections that apply regardless of status, including occupational safety and health, minimum remuneration, and protection against unjustified deactivation.
That design is the right one for a country like Pakistan. A heavy reclassification mandate, which would turn every rider into an employee overnight, risks shrinking the number of flexible earning opportunities for people who have few alternatives. The ILO route sets a floor on transparency and recourse without dictating a business model. The convention is now open for ratification. I did not find evidence that Pakistan has ratified it, and ratification is a decision for Islamabad and the provinces, which hold much of the labour jurisdiction.
A proportionate agenda for Pakistan
A proportionate response would have four parts, each testable against evidence.
- Commission and fare disclosure. Require platforms to show riders, per trip, the fare, the commission and the distance travelled to pickup. The 20% figure should not need a journalist to surface it.
- A fuel-cost review trigger. Rather than fixing commissions by statute, require platforms to publish how they review rider-side costs when fuel moves beyond a set band, with a duty to consult rider representatives. This keeps pricing with the platform and adds accountability.
- Deactivation notice and appeal. The ILO text points toward review mechanisms. A written reason and a short appeal window cost platforms little and protect riders' livelihoods.
- Relief that fits the work. If the state uses subsidies, it can design them around professional riders' mileage rather than a flat weekly token, and avoid separate registration hurdles for people who are already identifiable through platform records.
The pro-innovation argument is not that riders should be left alone. It is that the lightest rule that fixes the information gap should come first. Price caps on commissions risk pushing platforms to cut service in lower-income neighbourhoods or to reduce incentives. Transparency and appeal rights do not carry that risk, and they give regulators the data to judge whether stronger action is ever needed.
The test ahead
The fuel shock will ease, but the pattern it exposed will remain. When input costs jump, a platform's costs stay flat while an independent worker's costs do not. Pakistan can answer with a stream of emergency tokens, or it can build a durable framework using the ILO standard as a floor. Tokens are a reasonable bridge. They are not a substitute for a rulebook that lets a Bykea rider see, question and negotiate the terms of his own work.