On 10 October 2026, Nigeria Communications Week reported constitutional lawyer Chris Nnaemeka calling roadside police searches of phones, laptops and chat logs "strictly illegal" under Section 37 of the 1999 Constitution, adding that no authority exists for police to tap phones. The comments came amid public anger over routine device searches at checkpoints. No police statement or court ruling was reported in that coverage. Two separate problems sit behind the outcry, and they point to the same fix.
The strongest case for police access
A fair account starts with what law enforcement needs. Phones now hold the evidence of fraud, kidnapping, terrorism financing and organised crime. Nigeria faces serious security threats, and officers who wait for paperwork may lose time-sensitive leads. The Constitution itself accepts that privacy is not absolute. Section 45(1) says nothing in Section 37 invalidates a law that is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society in the interest of defence, public safety or public order. That is a legitimate door for targeted, lawful surveillance.
The key phrase is "a law". Section 37 guarantees that "the privacy of citizens, their homes, correspondence, telephone conversations and telegraphic communications" is protected, according to the constitutional text published by the Constitute Project. Section 45(1) lets a law restrict that right. It does not let an individual officer at a checkpoint do so.
Roadside searches: a rule that exists on paper
Nigeria's police leadership has said as much. The Force spokesperson, ACP Olumuyiwa Adejobi, said in January 2025 that searching phones on the road, or when a phone is not an exhibit in a case, is "not allowed and unprofessional", according to Sahara Reporters. The same report says the Force had announced a ban in April 2024 on the instruction of the Inspector General of Police, and that the practice continued regardless.
The legal analysis supports the spokesperson. One practitioner commentary on Street Lawyer Naija reads the Police Act as allowing stop and search where there is reasonable ground to believe an item is an object of crime. It reads the Administration of Criminal Justice Act as allowing warrantless searches only of a person who has been arrested. On that reading, ordinary checkpoint stops give police no power to demand a passcode.
That leaves an enforcement gap rather than a legal one. A ban announced by press statement and ignored at the roadside is not a safeguard. Citizens cannot easily litigate against an officer holding their phone, and a seized device exposes contacts, journalists' sources, financial apps and private messages in one search. That cost falls hardest on the people with the most to lose: reporters, activists and small-business owners who run their entire operation from a handset.
The second problem: interception by regulation
The other half of the story is about the network rather than the handset. The Nigerian Communications Commission issued the Lawful Interception of Communications Regulations, 2019 under Section 70 of the Nigerian Communications Act 2003. Media Rights Agenda reported in October 2019 that the rules require operators to monitor and keep records of communications and make them available to security agencies. Operators must bear the compliance costs themselves. Non-compliance carries an immediate N5 million fine plus N500,000 for each further day.
In March 2026 the Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project (SERAP) sued the federal government at the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice, case ECW/CCJ/APP/11/26. According to The Nigeria Lawyer, SERAP argues that warrant applications proceed ex parte, that some interception can occur without prior judicial authorisation, and that a "good faith" provision gives licensees blanket immunity. It also says oversight reporting runs to the Attorney General rather than to an independent body. Arise TV reports that no hearing date had been fixed. These are SERAP's allegations; the government's response has not been reported, and no ruling exists.
This is not SERAP's first challenge to Nigerian state surveillance. In 2021 it sued then-President Buhari over a N4.87 billion plan, funded in the 2021 Supplementary Appropriation Act, to monitor WhatsApp messages, calls and texts, arguing it violated Sections 37 and 39 of the Constitution, according to SERAP's own case page.
What proportionate regulation looks like
Both issues share a design flaw: access to private communications that depends on discretion, not on a clear procedure. A pro-innovation, pro-speech position does not require denying the state any access. It requires access that is narrow, authorised in advance and reviewable.
Five principles follow:
- Judicial warrants as the default. Device searches and interception should require an adversarial or at least independently reviewed warrant, with emergency exceptions subject to prompt after-the-fact review.
- Statute, not subsidiary regulation. Section 45(1) points to "a law". Parliament, not an agency regulation, is the right body to weigh the privacy trade-off.
- Real remedies. Evidence taken through unlawful searches should face exclusion, and officers who ignore the ban should face discipline that is actually reported.
- Narrow immunity. Good-faith protection for telecom operators should not extend to unlawful requests they could have recognised.
- Transparency reporting. Agencies and operators should publish aggregate counts of interception and device-search requests, as many democracies do.
There is also an economic argument. Nigeria's fintech and digital-services sectors depend on user trust. If customers believe that any handset can be searched at a checkpoint and any call monitored without oversight, they will shift to encrypted tools and offshore services, and investment in local digital infrastructure becomes harder to defend.
What to watch
The ECOWAS case is the most consequential test, but regional courts move slowly and the pleadings are not yet public. The nearer-term question is whether the Police leadership will turn a standing ban into enforceable discipline, and whether the National Assembly will take up a surveillance statute with judicial authorisation built in. Lawful investigation and private communications can coexist, but only if the rules are written down, applied by courts and enforced against the people who break them.