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Mexico's SIM Registry Hands Carriers an Identity Database Before Its Data-Protection Enforcement Has Been Tested

With about 100 million lines linked to CURPs and a 12.9-million-record leak under investigation, Mexico's registry needs proven data-protection enforcement.

Mexico's SIM registry and data-protection test People of Internet Research · Mexico ~100M Lines linked to CURP CRT count reported in early Novemb… ~83% Share of year-end target Of about 120M numbers the CRT expe… 12.9M+ Records offered on Telegram SABG says databases were offered o… 13,000 Sample records obtained Taken from 13 databases by the SAB… peopleofinternet.com
Mexico's SIM registry and data-protect… People of Internet Research · Mexico ~100M Lines linked to CURP ~83% Share of year-end target 12.9M+ Records offered on Telegram 13,000 Sample records obtained peopleofinternet.com

Key Takeaways

Lines ending in 6 that were not linked to a verified owner reached their suspension phase after the 15 November 2026 deadline. Suspensions continue by last digit on 30 November, 15 December and 31 December, according to the Xataka Mexico report on the CRT's schedule. The registry is also Mexico's largest identity-data collection exercise in years, and carriers hold the data.

The case for the registry

The strongest argument for the registry is public safety. Prepaid SIMs have long been anonymous, and extortion calls and fraud often run on lines that cannot be traced to anyone. A rule that ties each line to a person gives investigators a lead they lack today. The Comisión Reguladora de Telecomunicaciones (CRT) also made some sensible design choices. Its 8 December 2025 press release says the data will be held by the carriers, 'tal como hoy lo hacen para el servicio de pospago'. Registration needs only a voter ID or passport plus a CURP for individuals, or an RFC for legal entities. Xataka reports that the guidelines published in the DOF on 9 December 2025 prohibit keeping biometric data, photographs or copies of identity documents. That is meaningfully lighter than a biometric registry would be.

What the numbers show

By the CRT's count, reported by Xataka, just over 100 million lines had been linked by early November. That is roughly 83% of the 120 million numbers the regulator expects to register by the end of 2026. Suspension is also reversible. Suspended lines can be reactivated at any time with a valid ID and CURP, and the press has reported reactivations in the millions for earlier ending digits. The rollout is therefore working as a staged compliance drive, not a mass disconnection. A last-digit schedule keeps the load on carrier systems manageable.

That success is also the risk. A database of about 100 million people, each tied to a phone number, a CURP and an ID type, is a target. It has been built in under a year. It now sits with private companies whose security practices the regulator has not yet had to examine at this scale.

The enforcement test is already running

On 24 September 2026 the Secretaría Anticorrupción y Buen Gobierno (SABG) issued Comunicado No. 113. It reported that a Telegram post dated 22 September offered databases with more than 12.9 million records. The claimed fields include full names, contact details, dates of birth, RFC, addresses and bank data. The authority obtained a sample of 13,000 records from 13 databases. It said the leak was presumably attributable to call centers and that it would open investigations de oficio under the LFPDPPP. The communiqué cites articles 39 (fraction I), 54 and 55 of the law as its verification powers.

This leak is not part of the SIM registry. The SABG describes it as a possible call-center leak, and it has not said where the data came from. Xataka's reporting adds that the sample names well-known brands, which appear in the sample but are not established as the source. We should not blur the two cases. The link between them is institutional. The same SABG that is investigating call-center data sales is the regulator that now has to police how carriers hold the registry's data. The call-center case shows how it behaves when personal data is already circulating. The registry raises the stakes of that behaviour by a large factor.

What proportionate oversight looks like

We do not argue against the registry here. We argue that the compliance burden should fall where the risk sits. Four things would make the scheme safer without slowing it down.

The free-expression stakes are real too. Anonymity has long protected journalists, activists and people in vulnerable situations. Tying every prepaid line to a CURP removes that protection for the Mexican population. Migrants without a CURP, or without documents, risk losing a basic communication service. Mexico can accept the registry as a crime-fighting tool while insisting that it is narrowly used, well secured and open to scrutiny.

Bottom line

The registry has reached about 100 million linked lines faster than many expected, and it has avoided the biometric collection that a stricter design would have required. The weak point is not the rollout schedule. It is the untested link between a very large carrier-held identity database and a data-protection regulator that is still building its enforcement record. The call-center investigation is where that record starts. If the SABG can show that it investigates quickly, publishes its findings and holds data holders to clear security standards, the registry can be defended on its merits. If it cannot, the next leak will be a leak of the registry itself.

Sources & Citations

  1. CRT press release on line-identification guidelines (8 Dec 2025)
  2. SABG Comunicado No. 113 on 12.9M-record data sale (24 Sep 2026)
  3. Xataka Mexico: registry passes 100 million lines
  4. Xataka Mexico: 12.9 million records offered on Telegram