Lines ending in 6 that were not linked to a verified owner reached their suspension phase after the 15 November 2026 deadline. Suspensions continue by last digit on 30 November, 15 December and 31 December, according to the Xataka Mexico report on the CRT's schedule. The registry is also Mexico's largest identity-data collection exercise in years, and carriers hold the data.
The case for the registry
The strongest argument for the registry is public safety. Prepaid SIMs have long been anonymous, and extortion calls and fraud often run on lines that cannot be traced to anyone. A rule that ties each line to a person gives investigators a lead they lack today. The Comisión Reguladora de Telecomunicaciones (CRT) also made some sensible design choices. Its 8 December 2025 press release says the data will be held by the carriers, 'tal como hoy lo hacen para el servicio de pospago'. Registration needs only a voter ID or passport plus a CURP for individuals, or an RFC for legal entities. Xataka reports that the guidelines published in the DOF on 9 December 2025 prohibit keeping biometric data, photographs or copies of identity documents. That is meaningfully lighter than a biometric registry would be.
What the numbers show
By the CRT's count, reported by Xataka, just over 100 million lines had been linked by early November. That is roughly 83% of the 120 million numbers the regulator expects to register by the end of 2026. Suspension is also reversible. Suspended lines can be reactivated at any time with a valid ID and CURP, and the press has reported reactivations in the millions for earlier ending digits. The rollout is therefore working as a staged compliance drive, not a mass disconnection. A last-digit schedule keeps the load on carrier systems manageable.
That success is also the risk. A database of about 100 million people, each tied to a phone number, a CURP and an ID type, is a target. It has been built in under a year. It now sits with private companies whose security practices the regulator has not yet had to examine at this scale.
The enforcement test is already running
On 24 September 2026 the Secretaría Anticorrupción y Buen Gobierno (SABG) issued Comunicado No. 113. It reported that a Telegram post dated 22 September offered databases with more than 12.9 million records. The claimed fields include full names, contact details, dates of birth, RFC, addresses and bank data. The authority obtained a sample of 13,000 records from 13 databases. It said the leak was presumably attributable to call centers and that it would open investigations de oficio under the LFPDPPP. The communiqué cites articles 39 (fraction I), 54 and 55 of the law as its verification powers.
This leak is not part of the SIM registry. The SABG describes it as a possible call-center leak, and it has not said where the data came from. Xataka's reporting adds that the sample names well-known brands, which appear in the sample but are not established as the source. We should not blur the two cases. The link between them is institutional. The same SABG that is investigating call-center data sales is the regulator that now has to police how carriers hold the registry's data. The call-center case shows how it behaves when personal data is already circulating. The registry raises the stakes of that behaviour by a large factor.
What proportionate oversight looks like
We do not argue against the registry here. We argue that the compliance burden should fall where the risk sits. Four things would make the scheme safer without slowing it down.
- Publish the security baseline for registry data. Carriers should know what the SABG will inspect, such as encryption, access logging and retention limits. They should not learn it after a breach.
- Keep minimisation real. The CRT's collection limits are the registry's best privacy feature. The ban on keeping ID copies and biometrics should be audited, not just stated.
- Report on access. Civil-society groups such as R3D have criticised the guidelines for lacking transparency on who consults the registry. Public aggregate figures on requests would answer that without exposing individuals.
- Finish the leak investigation openly. A published finding on the 12.9-million-record case would tell carriers and call-center operators that de oficio investigations lead to outcomes.
The free-expression stakes are real too. Anonymity has long protected journalists, activists and people in vulnerable situations. Tying every prepaid line to a CURP removes that protection for the Mexican population. Migrants without a CURP, or without documents, risk losing a basic communication service. Mexico can accept the registry as a crime-fighting tool while insisting that it is narrowly used, well secured and open to scrutiny.
Bottom line
The registry has reached about 100 million linked lines faster than many expected, and it has avoided the biometric collection that a stricter design would have required. The weak point is not the rollout schedule. It is the untested link between a very large carrier-held identity database and a data-protection regulator that is still building its enforcement record. The call-center investigation is where that record starts. If the SABG can show that it investigates quickly, publishes its findings and holds data holders to clear security standards, the registry can be defended on its merits. If it cannot, the next leak will be a leak of the registry itself.