MediaNama reported on 15 October 2026 that the Kerala High Court gave the Union government four weeks to respond to a petition against the blocking of the BitChat messaging app. The petitioner is the Appropriate Technology Promotion Society. It argues that the block breaches free-speech and equality rights and the Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public) Rules, 2009, and that no blocking order has been made public. I could not independently confirm the court's directions beyond that report, so the petition's details here rest on MediaNama's account.
What happened
The record is partly documented. According to SFLC.in, the Indian Cyber Crime Coordination Centre, which sits under the Home Ministry, ordered GitHub on 23 July 2026 to remove three URLs linking to BitChat. The notice was issued at 11:16 PM and gave three hours to comply. It relied on Section 79(3)(b) of the IT Act, read with Rule 3(1)(d) of the 2021 Intermediary Rules. SFLC.in says the stated reasons were that the app would impede lawful interception and surveillance and let users get around restrictions such as internet shutdowns. The Internet Freedom Foundation (IFF) reports that the same day's notices also covered Briar and Bridgefy, and that they were reportedly withdrawn after becoming public.
On 3 October 2026, IFF reports, Apple removed BitChat from the India App Store citing a Ministry of Electronics and IT demand under Section 69A, on the ground that the app "includes content that is illegal in India." Neither the content nor the specific Section 69A ground has been identified.
Note what is absent: this is not a disinformation case. The concern, as reported, is anonymous, unlogged communication and use during shutdowns and protests. That matters for how we judge it.
The strongest case for the government
The state's argument deserves a fair statement. Police and security agencies in any country worry about channels that leave no logs, no servers to serve a warrant on, and no intermediary to hold accountable. Shutdowns are themselves imposed to stop violence from escalating, and a tool that routes around them can frustrate that aim. Section 69A exists precisely so that the state can block information in the interests of sovereignty, security and public order, and the Supreme Court upheld it.
Why the block still looks disproportionate
In Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015), the Supreme Court struck down Section 66A, and in the course of its reasoning treated Section 69A as a narrowly drawn provision whose validity depended on its safeguards. IFF and SFLC.in both read that holding as resting on reasoned, written orders and a procedure that can be challenged. A secret order undermines the very condition on which the power was upheld.
The Court's later decision in Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India (10 January 2020) is sharper. It held that the State should place restriction orders before the court, rejected secrecy as a default, and quoted Lon Fuller that "there can be no greater legal monstrosity than a secret statute." It also required restrictions on internet speech to show a legitimate aim, a rational link, and the absence of a less restrictive alternative. The Court noted that Section 69A targets specific websites rather than the internet as a whole.
That is the structural problem with blocking BitChat. IFF argues the app hosts no content and runs no servers; it relays end-to-end encrypted messages over Bluetooth mesh. Delisting it does not remove any particular unlawful item. It removes a whole tool, including its security updates and the ability of researchers in India to test it. A less restrictive route exists in principle: act against specific unlawful uses through targeted, documented process.
The procedural point is the real one
The July episode shows why process matters. SFLC.in argues that Section 79(3)(b) confers no power to block and that using it sidesteps the written-reasons and review safeguards of Section 69A. The order surfaced only because the developer, Jack Dorsey, posted about it. When removals happen through informal channels and unpublished orders, an affected developer cannot know what to contest. That is likely why the petition stresses non-publication.
The Kerala court's four-week window gives the government a simple way to narrow the dispute: produce the order and the grounds. If the order is sound, publication costs little. If it cannot be produced, that answers the petition's central complaint.
What a proportionate approach looks like
India has real security interests, and nothing here requires pretending otherwise. But proportionality points toward four things:
- Publish blocking orders, or at least the grounds, with a hearing for the developer, as Rule 8 of the 2009 Rules contemplates.
- Use Section 69A, with its safeguards, rather than Section 79(3)(b) notices, when blocking is the aim.
- Prefer targeted action against specific unlawful conduct over delisting a general-purpose tool.
- Treat resilience during shutdowns as a feature of communications technology, not a crime. The remedy for contested shutdowns lies in the shutdown rules, not in outlawing the workaround.
A bluetooth messenger is not a disinformation engine. Using enforcement powers built for takedowns of identifiable content against an architecture with no content to take down stretches Section 69A past the limits the Supreme Court set. The Kerala High Court will need to decide whether the Centre can justify that on a record the public, and the developer, can see.