On 7 September 2026, Communications Minister Samuel Nartey George told the Government Accountability Series at Jubilee House in Accra that biometric verification will be introduced into SIM registration before the end of 2026. He said Parliament has passed the Legislative Instrument (LI) that gives the next phase its legal basis. The same report quotes him conceding that "the work is far from finished" (MyJoyOnline).
The strongest case for the plan
The case for biometric checks is real. Ghana's earlier exercise began on 1 October 2021 in two stages: link the SIM to a Ghana Card, then capture biometrics at a provider's centre or agent. By October 2022, about 28.96 million SIMs (67.28% of those issued) were linked to Ghana Cards. Only 18.93 million (44.28%) had completed both stages, and the exercise closed on 31 May 2023 with over 10 million subscribers only partly registered. MTN Ghana blocked about 5.4 million unregistered SIMs at the close (MyJoyOnline).
A register that is half-verified invites fraud: a SIM registered to someone else's identity is a SIM nobody can trace. The stakes are financial. A 2025 Ecofin report cites the Bank of Ghana's 2023 financial stability report, which recorded 13,451 fraud cases in the financial sector. About 20% of them, nearly 2,700, involved e-wallets such as MTN MoMo (Ecofin Agency). The same report describes mobile money agents as the system's "weakest link." A regulator that wants SIM-swap and mule-account fraud to become traceable has a defensible goal.
What is actually being built
The legal architecture is more layered than the headline suggests. The National Communications Authority (NCA) published draft Number Registration Regulations, 2025, which would repeal and replace the SIM regulations of 2001 (L.I. 2006). The NCA's stated aims include standards for identity verification and authentication, "lawful handling of registration data," and inclusion for underserved groups. The consultation deadline was extended to 2 January 2026 (NCA). The September report does not give the passed LI's title or number, so what it ultimately contains cannot yet be verified. Per the same report, the regulations are expected to cover biometric collection, storage and use, and the obligations of operators and subscribers.
A second instrument matters too. L.I. 2523, the National Identity Register (Amendment) Regulations, 2026, took effect on 9 June 2026. It replaces visual inspection and photocopying of the Ghana Card with biometric checks using methods approved by the National Identification Authority (NIA). It also bars covered organisations from keeping photocopies, scans or images of the card, and its penalties include loss of access to the NIA verification system (Ghana News Agency). Applied to telecoms, this is the right design instinct: verify against the authoritative register and do not stockpile copies of identity documents.
Where proportionality is at risk
A fraud-reduction rationale does not by itself justify a centralised biometric link for every subscriber. Three design questions deserve public answers before launch.
- What happens to the legacy data? The 2021–2023 exercise captured biometrics at agents' counters. Civil-society group IMANI has asked who holds that data and how it will be deleted and audited. Operators should be required to purge it, with a verifiable record, once re-verification against the NIA register is complete.
- Who can query the register, and for what? Biometric data is the kind of personal data Ghana's Data Protection Commission, created under the Data Protection Act, 2012 (Act 843), exists to oversee (Data Protection Commission). The LI should state that operators receive only a match or no-match answer, never the fingerprint template, and that any law-enforcement access needs a warrant or equivalent judicial authorisation.
- Who gets locked out? The earlier exercise left over 10 million subscribers partway through. The same people are most exposed to a hard cutoff: rural users, older people, manual workers whose fingerprints read poorly, and people without a Ghana Card. Blocking a SIM cuts off mobile money, which in Ghana is basic financial infrastructure. A phased deadline, a documented fallback for failed fingerprint reads, and a grievance route are cheap to include and costly to omit.
Fraud evidence should be measured, not assumed
India's debate over SIM binding shows the discipline Ghana should apply. A survey reviewed by MediaNama found strong consumer and business concern about disruption, while noting that neither the survey nor the regulator had measured how much fraud actually runs through the channel the rule targets (MediaNama). That is a different policy from Ghana's, but the lesson transfers: a mandate this intrusive should come with a baseline and a review date.
Ghana should publish the share of mobile money fraud traced to improperly registered SIMs now, then report it again 12 months after biometric verification starts. If the number does not fall, the burden of proof should shift to the programme, not to the subscribers who were inconvenienced.
A workable bargain
Biometric verification is a defensible tool, and verifying against the NIA register, rather than collecting fresh biometrics at every agent's counter, is the better of the available designs. But it will earn public trust only if the instrument pairs it with minimisation, deletion of old data, narrow access, and a path for people the system fails. The minister's own caveat that the work is far from finished is the right starting point. The published text of the LI should show how far along it is.