On September 7, 2026, Bloomberg reported that Deutsche Telekom, Orange, Vodafone and Telefónica are in early talks to form a consortium. It would bid for the EU's planned 2 GHz mobile-satellite service (MSS) spectrum and offer direct-to-mobile service as a European alternative to Starlink. No decisions have been made. The talks matter because they show how Europe's industrial-policy instinct, which is understandable, can end up favouring the wrong thing.
What the Commission actually proposed
On 27 May 2026 the European Commission proposed a regulation creating an EU-level selection procedure for the 2 GHz band. It would replace the 2008 framework under which the current EchoStar and Viasat authorisations expire in May 2027. The Commission presents the band as a strategic asset for direct-to-device (D2D) connectivity, resilience and competitiveness, as its announcement explains.
As reported by Light Reading and described in law-firm analyses, the band splits three ways. One third goes to government and IRIS² use. One third goes to EU new entrants. One third is open to any qualified applicant, with non-EU operators capped at one-third of the commercial spectrum. Existing licence holders can request a two-year extension for current uses, but cannot offer new D2D services.
The strongest case for the reserve
The case for reserving spectrum is serious. A single foreign company that controls both the satellites and the handset-facing spectrum could become critical infrastructure for European emergency and defence communications. Europe has also watched a market tilt before, when scale advantages hardened into dependence. Reserving a slice gives a European entrant a guaranteed footing against a rival with a large launch-cost advantage. The US response has been sharp. According to Light Reading, FCC Chairman Brendan Carr pointed to reciprocity and non-discrimination, which shows that spectrum is now a trade-policy lever as well as a technical one.
Where the plan gets weaker
The difficulty is that the reservation protects a licence, not a capability. As The Next Web put it, reserving spectrum for a European operator does not create a European constellation. A winning carrier consortium would likely have to lease capacity from non-European satellite operators until European alternatives mature.
The consortium also has a conflict built in. In March 2026, Deutsche Telekom became the first telco to sign up for Starlink's second-generation V2 service, with launch planned for 2028 in ten European countries including Germany. TelecomTV reported that SpaceX plans to start launching V2 satellites in mid-2027 and to reach an initial 1,200 satellites within six months of the first launch. The Next Web adds that Vodafone owns half of an AST SpaceMobile joint venture, which it might need to restructure to meet a majority-European-control test.
That is not a scandal. Carriers should hedge across suppliers, and a firm that buys from Starlink is not disqualified from bidding. But it undercuts the sovereignty narrative. If the European third is won by incumbents who also resell American D2D service, Europe will have built a reserved lane that its own anchor customers may not use as intended.
A German lens: incumbents and the spectrum record
German policy has a long record of treating spectrum as a revenue and coverage lever. The typical result is that incumbents with the deepest balance sheets win, and obligations then do the work that competition might have done. Here the risk is concentration. Four large carriers bidding jointly for one reserved third would reduce the number of independent bidders. That would mute the very contestability that a new-entrant reservation is meant to create. The Commission describes the reserved third as for "new entrants", and a consortium of the four biggest incumbent groups in Europe fits that label awkwardly.
What proportionate design looks like
A pro-innovation approach would keep the security carve-out for government use, which is the most defensible part of the proposal. It would then judge the reserved commercial third by outcomes rather than ownership:
- Tie reserved rights to deployment milestones. Licences should lapse if there is no operating service, so a reservation cannot become a warehouse for spectrum.
- Test genuine contestability. Allow joint bids, but require transparency about each member's existing satellite supply agreements, so that regulators can see where dependence actually sits.
- Prefer wholesale access and interoperability. If any operator, European or not, can reach handsets on fair terms, consumers benefit whichever constellation carries the traffic.
- Avoid retaliation spirals. Caps on non-EU bidders invite reciprocal limits on European firms abroad, and Europe's space sector exports more than its handset users import.
The timeline also gives breathing room. Law-firm summaries of the proposal expect adoption in late 2027 or 2028, with assignment around 2029. Parliament and Council can improve the text well before any bidder is committed.
Bottom line
Europe is right to want resilient satellite connectivity and right to worry about single-supplier dependence. But sovereignty is built from satellites, launch capacity and open competition, not from a reservation that four incumbents can share. The Commission's text should keep the government slice, tighten milestones on the commercial slice, and treat a carrier consortium as one bidder among many rather than the intended winner. If the reserve rewards a coalition that still buys capacity from the incumbent it is meant to rival, it will have protected a licence and not European capability.