On 3 November 2026, X notified the Software Freedom Law Center, India (SFLC.in) that the Delhi Police had issued takedown requests covering 42 URLs, according to EFF's account published on 6 November. The URLs include posts and accounts belonging to SFLC.in, the Internet Freedom Foundation (IFF) and the account @geoblockedindia. All three document legal notices and online censorship in India. The requests cite hate speech, alleged defamation of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), and safety and security concerns. EFF's report does not say whether X complied, and it does not identify the statutory provision the police relied on.
The case for the state's position
Governments have a legitimate interest in acting against content that incites violence or defames individuals, and India's police cannot be expected to ignore complaints from organisations that say they have been defamed. The Supreme Court upheld the government's power to block content under Section 69A of the IT Act in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (24 March 2015), and it held that the 2009 Blocking Rules are constitutionally valid. A state that never acted on hate speech would also fail its citizens. Defamation of a large organisation is a recognised civil and criminal wrong, and a takedown request is not itself a conviction.
That argument has real force when the content in question is itself abusive. It has much less force when the content is a record of the state's own blocking decisions.
What is actually being targeted
IFF published a notice dated 29 October 2026 that reached IFF, SFLC.in and the @geoblockedindia operator. It was "issued purportedly on behalf of" the RSS, and IFF says it cannot tell whether the RSS authorised it. It demanded written confirmation within seven days and threatened "appropriate legal action." According to IFF, it asked the recipients to stop opposing government blocking directions and to stop documenting restricted content. It also objected to SFLC.in's Free Speech Tracker, which it said "effectively guides people" to removed content through VPNs. IFF says the notice cites no section of any statute.
One of the three complaints concerned a post by @geoblockedindia, dated 24 October 2026, about a Reddit geo-blocking order covering 26 posts, mostly on the India-China border and Arunachal Pradesh maps. IFF's account of the notice is the source for these details, since the notice itself is not published in the page text I could review. The police requests of 3 November and the private notice of 29 October are separate documents. EFF's report puts them in the same context, and I have not seen a public document establishing a formal link.
Even so, the pattern matters. These organisations publish the existence of blocking orders, and the blocking system is largely opaque. In Shreya Singhal, the Court described Rule 16 as requiring "strict confidentiality" about blocking requests, complaints and actions taken. When requests are confidential by design, independent trackers become one of the few ways the public learns what has been restricted. Treating that documentation as the offence turns the confidentiality rule into a gag on third parties who never signed up to it.
Why the legal footing looks weak
The Supreme Court has already said that orders restricting rights must be visible. In Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India (10 January 2020), the Court wrote that an order affecting "lives, liberty and property of people, must be made available." It also held that such orders are subject to judicial review and that only the least restrictive measure may be used. That case concerned internet suspension orders, so it is not a direct holding on content blocking. But its logic applies: a restriction that cannot be seen cannot be challenged.
The intermediary side of the framework has also shifted. On 24 September 2025 a single judge of the Karnataka High Court dismissed X Corp's challenge to the Sahyog portal, holding that Section 79(3)(b) read with Rule 3(1)(d) of the 2021 IT Rules permits authorities to require removal of unlawful content. LiveLaw reported that the court treated Shreya Singhal as concerning the earlier 2011 Rules. SFLC.in's analysis of the judgment argued that the ruling sidesteps the safeguards of Section 69A and "uses a machete to solve a problem that requires a scalpel." X's writ appeal was admitted by a division bench in March 2026, and I could not confirm its current status.
The proportionality problem
The policy test here is simple. A takedown regime is proportionate if it removes content that is unlawful and leaves lawful commentary alone. Posts that say "this URL was blocked on this date" are accurate reports. They do not become hate speech because the underlying content was restricted. EFF makes the same point: reporting that content has been restricted is not an endorsement of it and not an attempt to circumvent the law.
There is also a narrower argument about VPNs. The notice complains that the tracker helps people reach removed material. A tracker that lists what was removed is a different thing from a tool that circumvents removal, and the state can answer any circumvention concern through a specific, reasoned and reviewable order. It does not need to remove the index itself.
What should happen next
Three steps would restore proportion without weakening the state's ability to act against real incitement:
- Disclose the legal basis. Any request against a rights organisation's account should state the provision, the ground under Article 19(2), and the specific post. The reported absence of any statutory citation is the central concern.
- Protect documentation of blocking. Authorities should state publicly that reporting on blocking orders is outside the scope of takedown demands, whatever Rule 16 requires of officials.
- Notify affected users. Platforms should tell account holders before or at the time of compliance, publish the request, and challenge facially overbroad demands.
A government confident in its blocking orders should be able to survive scrutiny of them. If the watchdogs can be removed, the next question is who will report on the orders that follow.