China's Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) published its Information and Communications Industry Development Plan for 2026–2030 on 7 September 2026. The headline targets are about networks: Xinhua reports 4.1 trillion yuan in industry revenue by 2030, 3.8 trillion yuan of cumulative infrastructure investment, and 95 percent 5G and 5G-Advanced user penetration. The more consequential line for users may be a small one. According to a secondary analysis by Remio, the plan asks regulators and operators to advance embedded-SIM (eSIM) and off-network communications applications, and the related business registrations, "in an orderly manner."
A caveat on sourcing: the Xinhua and Science and Technology Daily summaries we reviewed do not mention eSIM at all, and we could not retrieve the full MIIT text. The eSIM wording therefore rests on that one secondary reading and should be checked against the official document. What follows is analysis of what such a line would mean, not a claim about unpublished clauses.
The case for tight SIM control
The strongest argument for China's regime is fraud prevention. The Anti-Telecom and Online Fraud Law, adopted on 2 September 2022 and in force since 1 December 2022, was a response to industrial-scale scam operations that relied on bulk-registered SIM cards and rented accounts. NPC Observer's summary says the law requires telecom companies to implement real-name registration for all subscribers (arts. 9–10), to enforce a cap on cards per customer, and, where a card is flagged as abnormal and fraud-related, to require re-verification and restrict or suspend it if the user fails (art. 11). Trading in cards, helping others pass real-name checks, or registering under someone else's identity is prohibited (art. 31), with fines and up to 15 days' detention in serious cases (arts. 42, 44).
If you want fewer scam calls, a registry that ties each number to a verified person is a blunt but effective tool. A regulator worried that remote eSIM downloads could make it cheaper to spin up disposable numbers has a legitimate concern.
Why eSIM changes the control problem
A physical SIM is bought, registered and activated at a counter or through an agent network the state can audit; arts. 9–10 make carriers responsible for those agents. An eSIM profile is downloaded over the air, to a device, potentially switched between carriers without anyone touching a card. That is exactly what makes it valuable to consumers and exactly what complicates counter-based identity checks.
China's trial rollout shows how cautiously the state is approaching this. Mobile ID World reports that China Mobile, China Unicom and China Telecom were authorised to run commercial smartphone eSIM trials starting in October 2025. Activation differs by carrier: China Telecom requires a retail-store visit, China Unicom uses a nationwide appointment system (over 70,000 users enrolled, 75 certified devices), and China Mobile offers app-based activation. Earlier, in 2020, Remio notes MIIT approved China Telecom's eSIM only for specified IoT uses, with six-monthly security reporting. Each step keeps a human or a certified device in the identity chain.
The same analysis stresses that the plan does not tie eSIM to 6G and does not promise unrestricted profile switching. The plan itself says only that China will begin 6G commercial service at an appropriate time. So the "orderly" language reads less like liberalisation and more like a managed pathway: eSIM is allowed to scale, registration stays attached.
What proportionate policy would look like
Fraud control is a real goal, but the cost side deserves equal weight. An identity-linked number is also a persistent identifier. It ties a person's calls, messages, location signals and often payment and app accounts to a government-verified record. When remote provisioning arrives, the temptation will be to rebuild that record inside the carrier's activation flow, adding biometric or app-based verification and device-level reporting. Each added check is a new data store and a new point of leverage over users who simply want to switch carriers or travel.
Three principles would keep the eSIM transition proportionate:
- Verify once, not per profile. A person who has passed real-name checks should not need to repeat biometric verification for every profile download or carrier switch. Repeated collection multiplies breach risk without improving fraud outcomes.
- Publish the rules. If eSIM activation requires in-store attendance, device certification or specific reporting duties, those requirements should be in public regulation rather than carrier practice. Today the differences between the three carriers suggest that practice is ahead of published rules.
- Limit retention and secondary use. Data collected for anti-fraud verification should be kept only as long as fraud control requires, and not repurposed for unrelated purposes. The fraud law's own re-verification mechanism is already a targeted tool; it does not require blanket collection.
There is also an innovation argument. Consumer eSIM supports thin devices, dual-number phones, and travel and IoT services, all areas where Chinese manufacturers compete globally. If remote provisioning is throttled by in-store friction, adoption will lag and China's device makers will ship a more constrained product at home than abroad.
What to watch
The open question is not whether real-name registration survives. It does, and the statute backs it. The question is whether remote eSIM provisioning gets a lighter-touch verification path, or whether it is folded into the existing counter-based model with a digital veneer. Watch for MIIT implementing rules on activation channels, any national standard for transferring profiles between carriers, and whether foreign visitors' roaming eSIMs are treated differently from domestic ones. Those details, not the five-year plan's slogans, will determine whether eSIM in China becomes a consumer convenience or simply another way to bind a number to a person.