On 2 November 2026, Privacy Commissioner Philippe Dufresne told the Senate Standing Committee on National Security, Defence and Veterans Affairs that Bill C-22, the Lawful Access Act, 2026, still needs targeted amendments. The bill passed the House of Commons on 18 June. The Senate referred it to committee on 22 October, according to the LEGISinfo record. It has not yet reached report stage or third reading.
The case for the bill
The strongest argument for C-22 deserves a fair hearing. Police routinely need to know who is behind an account or an IP address. Canada's current tool is a general production order, which is broader than the task requires. The bill would create a narrower order for subscriber information. Under it, police must apply to a judge and show reasonable grounds to suspect criminal activity, and that the information would assist the investigation, Canadian Press reported. The government says the order does not reach the contents of communications such as emails. A judge-supervised, content-excluding order is a reasonable design in principle, and the Commissioner did not say otherwise.
What the Commissioner actually said
Dufresne's statement to the Senate committee is specific. He notes that the Governor in Council and the Minister must consider privacy and cybersecurity impacts. But he says "there is no overarching requirement that all obligations imposed under the Act be both necessary and proportionate," and he recommends that this be made a requirement of the Act.
He also finds that the definition of "subscriber information," and the range of persons it can be sought from, "remain broad relative to the reasonable-suspicion threshold." His fix is to narrow the definition to a finite list of discrete identifiers and to limit compelled persons to telecommunications service providers. If that is not done, he offers a fallback: a carve-out for medical or privileged information. Canadian Press noted the sensitivity of data held by healthcare providers, lawyers, financial institutions and dating apps.
His fourth recommendation is the most structural. He proposes that electronic service providers be able to trigger a pre-emptive, arm's-length assessment by qualified experts, citing comparable laws in the UK, Australia and New Zealand. The stated rationale is avoiding systemic vulnerabilities.
None of this is new. The Commissioner's May 2026 statement to the House committee made six recommendations. They included the necessity-and-proportionality requirement, which would cover metadata retention. They also included a broader definition of "systemic vulnerability" modelled on Australia's law. The House passed the bill on 18 June without adopting an overarching test. The Senate now has a second chance.
Why this is a pro-innovation issue
This is more than a privacy-versus-policing argument. It also concerns the conditions under which Canadian technology companies operate. The Electronic Frontier Foundation describes the bill as giving government new powers to compel digital services to assist surveillance. It says those powers include ministerial orders to create a backdoor, provided it does not cause a "systemic vulnerability," and a requirement to retain metadata for up to a year. That is advocacy commentary, but the provisions it points to are the ones the Commissioner's amendments target.
Open-ended obligations are costly for software and communications firms. A start-up cannot price a duty whose limits are set later by regulation. A statutory test would give courts and regulators a yardstick for judging any order or regulation. It would also give companies something to plan around. Proportionality is not hostile to law enforcement. It is the standard Canadian courts already apply under the Charter, and it should apply here too.
The systemic-vulnerability language matters for the same reason. Encryption either protects everyone or it is weakened for everyone. If a provider can be ordered to alter its product, the effect reaches its customers, not only the target of an investigation. The Commissioner's request, drawn from the Australian formulation, is that the statute treat any action that would make systemic authentication or encryption methods less effective as a systemic vulnerability. That is a drafting fix, not a rejection of the bill.
What the Senate should do
Senators do not have to choose between accepting the bill as drafted and killing it. Three amendments would address most of the Commissioner's concerns:
- Write necessity and proportionality into the Act as an overarching condition on every obligation, including metadata retention.
- Narrow "subscriber information" to a closed list of identifiers, and limit compelled parties to telecommunications service providers. Failing that, add the medical and privileged-information carve-out.
- Let providers trigger an independent expert assessment before they are forced to act in ways that could create systemic vulnerabilities.
There is an honest counterargument. Amending in the Senate sends the bill back to the House and delays tools that police say they need. But the narrower order is the part of the bill most defensible on its merits. Delay of a few weeks to secure a statutory proportionality test costs little against a decade of operating under open-ended powers.
Bottom line
Canada can modernize lawful access without creating compliance uncertainty for its own tech sector or weakening encryption. The Commissioner has made that task concrete. The question for the Senate committee is whether it will write his proportionality requirement into the text, or leave it to future ministers and regulators to apply voluntarily.