The case for reform is strong
The strongest argument for the UK's new proposals is simple: the law is obsolete and the dependence is total. The government's white paper, Critical Undersea Infrastructure Security and Resilience, published on 22 October 2026, says subsea telecoms cables carry 99% of the UK's international data traffic and that gas pipelines provide 74% of its supply. The statute that protects them is the Submarine Telegraph Act 1885. The Record reports its maximum fine is £1,000, against repair bills that can run to tens of millions. The white paper itself says the Act's penalties "bear little relationship to the value of modern infrastructure."
The Estlink 2 case shows the gap. The Finland-Estonia power cable was damaged on Christmas Day 2024, and grid operator Elering put repairs at €50-60 million. The prosecution of the Eagle S's officers stalled on jurisdiction before the Helsinki Court of Appeal revived it on 27 August 2026. It held that Finland can try the case because the damage and its effects occurred there. The owners are now seeking about €105 million, according to The Record. Deterrence that depends on years of litigation over jurisdiction is not deterrence. A modern offence with clear territorial reach is overdue.
What the white paper proposes
The white paper sets out three tiers of criminal liability for damaging cables, interconnectors and pipelines:
- up to 14 years for intentional damage;
- up to 10 years for reckless damage;
- up to 2 years for gross negligence.
Fines would be unlimited. The government is also considering a higher maximum, including life, for the most serious cases. Life already exists for hostile-state sabotage under the National Security Act 2023.
The paper adds two regulatory layers. Subsea telecoms operators would face statutory duties to manage security risk, respond to compromises and notify government and the regulator. Penalties could reach £10 million or 10% of qualifying worldwide revenue. Separately, the Secretary of State could direct providers of subsea data services and of repair capabilities, such as vessels and equipment, where a risk to national security exists and the direction is necessary and proportionate. Non-compliance could cost up to £17 million or 10% of global turnover. The consultation runs for twelve weeks and closes at 11:59pm on 14 January 2027, per the consultation page.
Where the design is sound
The tiered mental-state structure is the right call. Most cable faults come from anchors and trawlers, not saboteurs. A graded scheme separates the hostile act from the careless one, and the paper says it wants to avoid "unnecessarily criminalising" legitimate maritime, scientific and commercial activity. Keeping the intentional maximum at 14 years, below the National Security Act's life sentence, preserves a sensible hierarchy. The paper also calls the direction power "a measure of last resort".
The approach also builds on existing law rather than inventing a new regulator. Telecoms Minister Liz Lloyd said in her 29 May 2026 RUSI speech that the baseline security duties would build on the Telecommunications Security Act. Operators already know that framework, and that lowers compliance cost.
Where it needs tightening
The risks sit in the detail, and the consultation is the place to fix them.
First, the 10-year reckless tier. Recklessness is a lower bar than intent, and commercial shipping and fishing make decisions under uncertainty every day. Those industries need a precise statutory definition, with defences for emergencies, for operating in line with notified cable routes, and for good-faith reporting. A 10-year ceiling can hang over a master's judgement call, and that is a real cost for a trading nation.
Second, the £17 million or 10%-of-turnover direction penalty. Penalties of that size are justified for refusing a lawful national-security order. They are not justified if the underlying power is vague. The statute should say what a direction may require, and it should say that a direction can be challenged. It should also provide for compensation when a direction forces an operator into uneconomic work, such as rerouting repair vessels. A power over repair providers is unusual. Repair fleets are scarce and globally mobile, and a UK order that conflicts with commitments to other countries could push operators to deprioritise UK-linked work.
Third, standards must be outcome-based. The paper leaves detailed requirements to secondary legislation and codes of practice. That flexibility helps, but cable operators plan on 25-year horizons. They need early certainty on what the codes will require, and the codes should recognise existing international practice rather than set a distinctively British one. Britain wants more cable landings and more investment. Gold-plated, unpredictable rules would send capital to Ireland, France and the Nordic countries instead.
Fourth, sensing. The paper proposes a security framework for fibre-optic sensing on cables. Sensing can improve detection of anchor drags and illegal activity as well as create intelligence risks. The framework should regulate who may access the data, not discourage the monitoring that makes cables safer.
The verdict
The UK is right to replace a Victorian statute and to give prosecutors tools that work. The deterrent logic holds, because hostile-state grey-zone activity relies on ambiguity and weak penalties. But the reform will be judged on whether it punishes sabotage without punishing the operators and mariners who keep the network running. The consultation should push for statutory definitions, a right of challenge, and published, predictable standards.