The strongest case for New York's law is simple. If competing landlords feed confidential lease data into one vendor's model, and that model returns rents they then follow, the result can look like a cartel with a software front end. Courts and enforcers have treated that as a real antitrust harm. A state that wants to stop it before it spreads has a legitimate interest, and the 2025 statute was a serious attempt.
On September 29, 2026, Judge Valerie Caproni of the Southern District of New York preliminarily enjoined one part of it. The challenge is RealPage, Inc. v. James. As Vinson & Elkins reports, the court blocked Section 3 and left Section 2 in force. The Attorney General then asked the court to reconsider, according to the same account. The ruling is preliminary, and an appeal remains possible. But the reasoning is worth taking seriously, because it describes a way to regulate algorithmic pricing that holds up.
What the statute does, and which part fell
General Business Law § 340-b has two operative prohibitions. As the statutory text on the New York Senate site shows, subdivision 2 makes it unlawful to "knowingly or with reckless disregard facilitate an agreement" among owners or managers "to not compete," including by operating or licensing software or an "algorithmic device" that performs a coordinating function. Subdivision 3 reaches the landlord. An owner or manager who knowingly or recklessly sets or adjusts rents, renewal terms, or occupancy levels based on such recommendations is deemed to have entered an unlawful agreement.
The court enjoined that second prohibition, the one the opinion calls Section 3. It held that algorithmically generated pricing recommendations are commercial speech and applied intermediate scrutiny under Central Hudson, not strict scrutiny. That is a modest ruling for the state. The law still failed, because Section 3 was, in the court's words as quoted by Vinson & Elkins, "undiscerning in targeting software without regard to its use of public versus non-public data."
The judge also named the alternative that would have been narrower. The legislature could have limited the prohibition to software performing a coordinating function "based on non-public data from horizontal competitors." Section 2, by contrast, survived at this stage because it does not make new conduct unlawful. It sits on top of existing antitrust law. The state's motion to dismiss was denied.
Why the public/non-public line matters
A rent recommendation built from public listings, published market indices and a landlord's own history is a form of analysis. Think of a broker's comparable-rents memo or a subscription market report. Banning a landlord from acting on it restricts speech and ordinary business judgment, and it does so even where no competitor's secrets are pooled. Section 3 swept in all of that because it turned on the presence of software, not on the presence of coordination.
The antitrust concern is different. It arises when a vendor takes nonpublic, competitively sensitive inputs from rivals and returns outputs that align their prices. That is the conduct the federal government has targeted. The Justice Department's November 24, 2025 proposed settlement with RealPage would, if approved, require RealPage to stop using competitors' nonpublic, competitively sensitive information to set rents in live operation. It would also limit model training to nonpublic data aged at least 12 months, and bar models whose geographic effects are narrower than a state. It would remove features that limited price decreases and require a court-appointed monitor.
That decree draws the line Judge Caproni found missing in New York's statute. It does not prohibit rent analytics. It prohibits pooling rivals' confidential data and using it in real time. The remedy is aimed at the mechanism of harm.
The costs of the broader approach
Overbroad algorithm bans carry three costs.
- Constitutional fragility. A statute that fails at the preliminary stage invites years of litigation, during which neither tenants nor landlords get clarity. Meanwhile Section 2 and general antitrust law still apply, as Multifamily Dive's coverage of the injunction notes in describing the court's treatment of the recommendations as commercial speech.
- Chilling of benign tools. Small landlords without in-house analysts rely on software to price units sensibly. A rule keyed to "software" rather than to "rivals' confidential data" pushes them toward guesswork, which is not obviously better for tenants.
- Misdirected enforcement. Regulators have limited attention. Spending it on public-data analytics dilutes the cases that matter, which are pooled-data coordination schemes.
What lawmakers should take from this
The pro-tenant goal and the pro-innovation goal are not in conflict here. A tightly drawn rule can serve both. Four design choices follow from the ruling and the federal decree.
- Define the offense by the input. Prohibit coordination functions built on non-public competitor data, not "algorithms" in general.
- Keep liability tied to knowledge or recklessness, as Section 2 already does, so that good-faith users are not swept in.
- Use data-aging and anonymization rules, as the DOJ decree does, rather than outright bans on analytics.
- Let existing antitrust doctrine do the heavy lifting where conduct is already unlawful, which is why Section 2 survived.
The Attorney General's reconsideration motion may or may not succeed, and the Second Circuit may eventually weigh in. Either way, the lesson is already visible. Algorithmic accountability works best when it targets what makes an algorithm anticompetitive, namely shared secrets and aligned prices, rather than the fact that it is an algorithm. New York can still pursue that goal. It should amend Section 3 along the lines the court itself sketched, rather than defend a version that treats public-data analysis as price-fixing.